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CONTRIBUTIONS
TO
PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION

VOL. II

No. 1

HEGEL AS EDUCATOR

BY

FREDERIC LUDLOW LUQUEER, Ph.D.

Sometime Fellow in Education in Columbia University



MACMILLAN & CO

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PREFACE

THE present work would view Hegel from a standpoint perhaps new to English readers. Hegel's philosophy has often been made to seem a wall about Hegel himself. His thought is the man, it has been said. An outline, therefore, of his system often serves as biography. But in fact Hegel's life is full of interest apart from his philosophy.

This is especially true of him as student and teacher. Part First would show Hegel mainly in these relationships.

Part Second contains the chief of Hegel's thoughts on education.¹ They enrich the concept of education. Their value is apparent. They may serve, too, as an introduction to Hegel as philosopher—his essential character.

It is hoped that the two parts, taken together, will help to make clear, at least some aspects of a true educational ideal.

¹ Translated mainly from Thaulow: *Hegel's Ansichten über Erziehung*.





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PART I

LIFE

CHAPTER I

HEGEL'S EDUCATION—HOME, SCHOOL AND UNIVERSITY

GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL was born in Stuttgart, the capital of Württemberg, on August 27, 1770. His father held a government position. Of his mother we know little, save that she taught her boy before his school days the elements of Latin; that she died when he was fourteen years of age, and that on the 20th of September, 1825, some forty years afterwards, Hegel wrote his sister, "To-day is the anniversary of mother's death, which I never forget."

Hegel's boyhood passed quietly and happily. In the home, ruled simple burgher comfort and order—"einfach bürgerliche Wohlhabenheit und Ordnung," says Rosenkranz.¹ The town-life of Stuttgart was varied, and the surrounding country was threaded with fine ways and walks. Stuttgart lay in a valley, but this was not walled in narrowly by the hills. There was peace and beauty, and yet outlook. A symbol, we might say, of Hegel himself.

In his fifth year Hegel was sent to a so-called Latin school, and in his seventh to the gymnasium of his city. In this latter, one Löffler seems to have been his favorite teacher. Hegel apparently was not brought up on children's

¹ Rosenkranz, *Hegel's Leben*,—the main source of Hegelian biography.

stories. When eight years of age he was presented by Löffler with Wieland's translation of Shakspeare, with the words, "You cannot understand this now; but soon you will learn to understand it."

In his fourteenth year he began a diary, and persevered in his self-history for a year or more. This was written partly in German and partly in Latin. A complete picture of Hegel's soul must not be sought in this diary. It seems to have been more a self-imposed task for bettering his Latin composition than the confidante of his youthful dreams. Indeed, this former purpose is stated in so many words. In entry "III. Id. Febr., 1786," after quite a break, he says: "Redeamus jam ad prisca haec nostra stylo exercendo instituta, intermissa longo intervallo temporis, cum sit hodie Serenissimi Domini nostri *Ducis natalis* LIXtus.—Let us resume, after a long interval, this work of exercising our style, since, etc." In such a book we need expect little but ordinary observations, and we are not to argue from its lack of record of romantic or of moral struggles, that such were lacking in Hegel himself—that Hegel's soul was merely dull and passive.¹ But the journal gives a good indication of the studious side of Hegel as a boy. A prominent feature of it, as Rosenkranz points out, is Hegel's repeated reference to history. He praises Schrockh's compendium, because it is not a mere list of names and dates, does not mention merely battles, but also has an eye to culture-interests.

Hegel's early training was under the light of the Illumination. "A little Solon of the *Aufklärung*," Caird calls him. But the content of his training was classical. Greek and Latin were chief in the gymnasium. He translates Longinus *On the Sublime*. He studies—and careful lists of the hard words are preserved—the battle songs of Tyrtaeus. There are records, too, of his progress with the Iliad, with Cicero's

¹ A conclusion hinted by Prof. Royce. But see p. 40, Note.

Letters, with Euripides, the *Ethics* of Aristotle and *Oedipus* of Sophocles. These, with Epictetus, Sophocles' *Antigone*, Thucydides and Tacitus, all give tone and color to his mind.

Hegel was a careful reader. He made long extracts from the standard books of his time. He wanted to know what men thought and wrote. He sought to comprehend them from their own point of view. His mind was sympathetic. He could enter into the moods and processes of others, and issue thence, equipped for original elaboration and interpretation. But this latter is for after years.

At the end of his gymnasial course, in the fall of 1788, Hegel delivered a valedictory before the teachers and pupils. It is boyish and bookish enough. There are many rounded periods, and no lack of almost fulsome praise for the benefits bestowed by the school. The deferential yet full-minded manner of the later Hegel is here foreshadowed. He puts himself, thus early, at the standpoint of the teacher, and voices the official consciousness rather than that of a lad freed from school tasks. He pictures the benefits to the state of a good system of education, and then continues: "Such a mighty influence has education upon the entire well-being of the state. How strikingly is its neglect seen in the Turkish nation. If we regard the natural capability of the Turk, and then see how barbarous he is because unschooled, and how little he advances knowledge, we can then rightly value our own high fortune. Providence has given us life in a state whose Prince, aware of the importance of education and of the uses of general and wide-spread knowledge, has made these the special objects of his care, founding institutions which will be lasting monuments to his glory, and which even later generations will wonder at and bless. Of his noble sentiments and zeal for the Fatherland, the greatest proof—and one touching us most nearly—is the foundation of this institute, which has for its great purpose the education of good and useful citizens for the state."



Hegel's parents intended him for the church. The next step therefore was to gain a theological training. For this he entered the seminary at Tübingen. The pupils of the seminary, or *Stift* as it was called, wore a special garb, and the discipline seems to have been rather narrow and petty. Students' positions in class were fixed by examination. "In no land save China," says Rosenkranz, "was there so much examining and placing." The place was the measure of the man. Hegel began as third, but later, partly because of his independent lines of study, he was rated fourth. This degradation was a blow. But it only made him work the harder.

In 1790, Schelling, then only fifteen years of age, entered the seminary. He was mature beyond his years: a *praecox ingenium*, his father said. He was five years younger than Hegel, who was already a Master of Philosophy. It is pleasant to think of Hegel as quick to recognize the bright mind and enthusiastic heart of Schelling, and to love him without any assumption of superiority on account of greater age.

The story of these days, gathered years later from hearsay, is half mythical. In common with all the student youth, Hegel was filled with the ideas of the French revolution. There was a political club among the students of the Stift. It is said that Hegel was one of its leading spirits. The story is told of his going one bright spring morning, with Schelling and other friends, to a field near Tübingen and there planting a liberty tree. The sympathies of Hegel's father were aristocratic. The son was one with the liberal ideas of the time, and eagerly upheld these in debate with his father. Rousseau charmed the young Hegel, as he had the elder Kant. Years, however, brought discriminating judgment.

At Tübingen, the sober side of Hegel gained him the name of "the old man." But this was playful and affection-

ate rather than opprobrious. He was merry enough on occasion. And there are hints of jolly times at the baker's, whose cheer was none the less pleasant for the presence sometimes of a certain fair Augustina. One of his comrades wrote to him, under date of September 7, 1791: "Mon chère ami, voici quelques jours, que nous avons déjà fait beaucoup de sottises en amour. J'espère, que tu te souviendras toujours avec plaisir des soirées, que nous avons passées ensemble chez le boulanger, en buvant du vin de quatre batz et en mangeant des Butter-Brezel." In the album of another comrade Hegel wrote in 1790, this popular verse:

Glücklich, wer auf seinem Pfad
Einen Freund zur Seite hat;
Dreimal glücklich aber ist,
Wen sein Mädchen feurig küsst.

On the next page, a year later, he wrote:

Schön schloss sich der letzte Sommer, schöner der itzige!
Der Motto von jenem war:—Wein, von diesem: Liebe.

7t Octbr, '91.

V. A.!!!

But Hegel's nature was not emotional. It was not turbulent. His mind was gradually growing to be the quiet meeting place of thoughts that entered from every quarter. He would learn of everything. He invited contending and mutually repellent ideas, and stood himself apart, as it were, allowing the clearest and best to gain the field.

Yet this was not all. Underneath the main lines drawn by his biographer, we may discover the earlier lines of his youthful character. To read Hegel's mature works, to puzzle over much of their obscure meaning, to picture the writer merely as a thinker, is apt to give us somber glasses for looking at his youth. The truth seems to be that Hegel was ardent, often mystical, often poetical. He was essen-

tially unselfish, able to put himself completely at another's standpoint. So he had the joy of wide sympathies. I think we misjudge him if we do not think of these early years as having much of intellectual delight. To be sure, he later looked back upon the instruction received at Tübingen as unsatisfactory. There was a cloister-like air, a separateness and theological pedantry, that depressed rather than inspired. His repugnance to this doubtless had effect upon his standing there. At the conclusion of his course, Hegel, it is said, was given a certificate which stated that he was a man of some gifts and industry, but that he had paid no serious attention to philosophy. But it must be remembered that the German idea of "serious attention" makes it a very specializing act. Not ready perhaps, as yet, to devote himself to abstract philosophy, he was wisely gathering up those stores of wide learning that would give rich content to his later philosophical generalizations. Still, his mind was that of a philosopher. It was merely for the most part at the receptive stage. He was none the less, however, interested in the theoretical aspect of things. The young Schelling was his friend in philosophy—or rather, in the sweet border land of philosophy, where everything is new and questionable. Hölderlin was his friend in poetry. Life presented entrancing problems, large and full, unworded; and with the eagerness and good courage of youth, the students sought to grasp and answer them. Then, too, the beauty of literature was felt. Hölderlin and Hegel were one in their love for the classics. Thucydides in history and Sophocles in the drama were Hegel's admiration. His appreciation of the *Antigone* reveals a fine trait of his character. He was never, as Haym would imply, a mere time-server and a flatterer of those who might smooth his way. His moral trend was as straight upward as that of Antigone. It had greater content and wisdom, that was all.

On the 12th of February, 1791, Hölderlin wrote in Hegel's album the words of Goethe: "*Lust und Liebe sind die Fittige zu grossen Thaten*—Joy and love are the wings to great deeds." The great deeds of both these students for some time to come were to be deeds of thought-conquest, without much dust of battle or shouting of applause. Hölderlin, soon leaving Tübingen, went to Jena, where he became an enthusiastic hearer of Fichte; and Hegel became a private tutor in Bern, Switzerland. Correspondence, however, between the two was kept up.

CHAPTER II

HEGEL AS TUTOR IN BERN AND FRANKFURT

HEGEL began work in Switzerland in his twenty-fourth year. A note from Bern speaks of him as, *gouverneur des enfants de notre chère et fidèle citoyen Steiguer de Tschougg*. "Tschugg," says Wallace, "was the summer residence of the family, near Erlach on the lake of Biel; in winter they lived in Bern. Hegel had a few acquaintances in Bern; but, on the whole, he lived in isolation." The number and ages of the children for whom he had to care can only be conjectured.

It is interesting to remember that Kant, Fichte and Herbart, as well as Hegel, were family tutors. The experience was useful for them all. As Rosenkranz says, if such a position admits of opportunity for self-development, it may be well fitted for the further ripening of genius, since it necessitates a thorough working over of the foundations of knowledge. It forms, too, a simple and animated style of speech, without the rhetorical elaboration of the lecture-room. Thaulow thinks that he who studies Hegel's views on education will find many, and these the finest, which must have been gained from his experience as family tutor. These passages, however, can only be inferred. Hegel never spoke much about himself. The particular cases of his experience he soon brought under general categories. He is more philosophical than circumstantial. These three years in Switzerland and the three subsequent years in Frankfurt are spoken of as the birth-years of his philosophical system. He was

in the transition period between youth and manhood. His subsequent career was uncertain. His thought was feeling its way. Perhaps he experienced at times the sadness and hypochondria which he later speaks of as incidental to this time of life. "The form of the ideal," he says, "inspires the youth's aspiration. So he dreams that he is called and is fitted to make the world over, or, at least, to turn it back to its right course. The young man's eye does not see that the substantial universal contained in his ideal is already being evolved and realized in the world. . . . Accordingly he feels the world misunderstands both his ideal and himself. Thus the peace, in which the child lived with the world, is broken by the youth." But with Hegel, such breaking was but temporary.

Stages of character, of development, are not like strata in rock beds. Touches and lines of manhood extend down into youth, and the feelings of youth stretch up and wind themselves in and out through the stuff old age is made of. So we are not to think of this *Sturm und Drang* period of Hegel's life as a very stormy period. The duties of his position, and the intellectual habits he had formed, kept him too busy. It was during this time, too, that he was much absorbed in his *Life of Christ*. No matter if that work be the fruit of the Illumination, if it be "rationalistic" or not, the influence of such a study—whatever be the philosophical explanation evolved—could be nothing but good.

At nearly the end of his stay in Switzerland, Hegel with three other tutors made a foot journey among the Alps. Rosenkranz says that it is clear he undertook the trip in the expectation of being greatly moved by the giant mountain peaks. But the masses of rock and ice drew no exclamation [none recorded at least] of wonder from him. They appeared to him dead, sad, without any quickening touch for fancy. "It is so," and that was all that could be said. But the cas-

cedes with their living play of movement, of light and spray, and rainbow kiss of sun, were quite other—over these he grew enthusiastic. His note-book is characteristic, showing as it does the all-sidedness of his interest. Says his biographer: "Not only nature, which here was most prominent, caught his eye, for all her forms from the giant glacier to the chance crystal, from the forests to the grass and flowers, from the sea to the mountain rill, but also man in his struggle with nature, in his varied ways and doings."

As has been said, the acquaintance of Hegel and Schelling began at Tübingen. When Hegel left the university town in 1793, it seemed at first that the friendship might fade to a mere memory. But at Bern, Hegel happened upon an article written by Schelling, and this prompted him to send a letter. It was written Christmas Eve, 1794. He says, in effect: "I have been wanting for a long time to renew the pleasant relation in which we used to stand to each other. The paper by you in the *Memorabilien* of Paulus, which I have just been reading, gives me the opportunity. I see you are at your old work of letting light in upon hard theological questions. I sympathize with you. I believe the time has come in which men should speak more freely. . . . But my distance from the theatre of literary activity cuts me off from hearing all about matters that interest me so. You would please me much were you from time to time to tell me about them, and about your own work. I am longing for a place—not in Tübingen—where I might carry out what I have neglected. I am not altogether idle, but my too heterogeneous and broken-up activity lets me do nothing as I should like.

". . . What is Renz doing? Has he buried his pound? I hope not. It would be well to encourage him to bring together his thorough-going and important researches. How are things at Tübingen? Until a Reinhold or a Fichte has a chair there, nothing great will result. . . .

"Have you learned that Car—— has been guillotined? Do you still read the French papers? If I remember rightly, I was told that they had been shut out from Württemberg. . .

"A thousand good wishes to Süsskind and Kapf.

"Thy friend."

In response to Schelling's answer, Hegel writes in 1795: "I need not use many words in telling you how glad I was to receive your letter. Other than your true thought of your friend, nothing could more interest me than your intellectual work. We were never estranged as friends. And still less can we differ in regard to what is the chief interest of every rational man, and which he seeks to further and broaden by every means he can.

"For some time I have busied myself again with the Kantian philosophy. . . ."

The letter goes on to speak of the theologico-philosophical discussions of the time. Questions of ethics, of moral faith, of the idea of God, are touched upon. Hegel shows that he is thinking. He would like, he says—and we think it desecration to alter the German of such an aspiration—if he had time to try: "es näher zu bestimmen, wie weit wir, nach Befestigung des moralischen Glaubens, die legitimierte Idee von Gott jetzt rückwärts brauchen, z. B. in Erklärung der Zweckbeziehung, u. s. w., sie von der Ethiktheologie gar jetzt zur Physikotheologie mitnehmen und da jetzt mit ihr walten dürften." . . .

Then he passes to items of news. "Hölderlin," he says, "writes me sometimes from Jena. . . He is hearing Fichte, and speaks enthusiastically of him as a Titan who is battling for humanity, and whose influence will surely spread beyond the walls of the lecture room.

"As to his not writing you, you must not lay that to cooling friendship. That certainly is not true of him; and his interest in world-wide—in *weltbürgerliche*—ideas is as

ardent, it seems to me, as ever. May the kingdom of God come, and our hands not be found idle in our laps. . .

"Answer soon. Greet my friends. H."

In a letter of April, 1795, Hegel writes Schelling in part as follows:

" . . . Another cause of my delay in answering your letter, was that I wished to send you a thoughtful judgment of your article sent me—at least to tell you that I had grasped your ideas. But I have not had time for a thorough study. In so far as I have caught the main ideas, I see in them a furtherance of science that will have most fruitful results. I see therein the work of one of whose friendship I may well be proud, who will have the greatest influence upon the revolution of thought in Germany. . .

"From the Kantian system and from its further development I look for a revolution in Germany, which will proceed from principles already present, and only needing general unfolding to be applied to all previous knowledge. There will always be a sort of esoteric philosophy; the idea of God as the absolute Ego belongs to it. By a study of the postulates of the practical reason, I had had glimpses of what you clearly set forth in your letter, and what the *Grundlage der Wissenschaftslehre* by Fichte will fully disclose. People's heads will whirl on these heights. But why have we been so late in valuing the worth of man, in recognizing his power of freedom, which places him in the rank of spirit? I believe there is no better sign of the times than this: that humanity is being pictured to itself as worthy of highest honor.¹ . .

"I am ever calling to myself from the *Lebensläufen*: 'Struggle towards the sun, friends, that men may be the quicker saved. What of hindering leaves and boughs?

¹ Cf. Amiel's *Journal*, p. 163: "The benefactors of Humanity are those who have thought great thoughts about her."

Strike through toward the sun! If wearied, good. So much the better will be rest at the end.' . . .

"It occurs to me that this summer is your last at Tübingen. If you write a disputation I should much like you to send it me as soon as possible. . . .

"I take Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre* to study this summer, when I shall have somewhat more leisure. . . . The first number of Schiller's *Horen* has pleased me. The letter "On the æsthetic education of mankind," is a masterpiece.

"Hölderlin often writes me from Jena. He is quite inspired by Fichte. . . . How good it must be to Kant to see the fruits of his work in so worthy followers. The harvest will be glorious sometime. I thank Süsskind for the kind trouble he has taken for me. What is Renz doing? . . . "

The next letter of Hegel to Schelling, dated August 30, 1795, gladly acknowledges receipt of some of the latter's writing. Hegel says, however, that Schelling must not expect criticism from him. "I am here," he writes, "only a pupil. I am studying Fichte's *Grundlagen*. But allow me one remark that occurs to me, so that you may see that I should like to satisfy you as regards criticism. In § 12 you apply the attributes of the one substance to the ego. But if substance and accident are correlative terms—the one implying the other—it seems to me that the concept of substance should not be applied to the absolute ego; though it may be so applied to the empirical ego as given in consciousness."

But here translation—not to say the thought—grows difficult. The letter speaks next of Fichte and of Schiller, and of Niethammer's *Journal*. Then it passes to matters of friendship: "Hölderlin has been, I hear, at Tübingen. You two must have had delightful hours together. How I wish I might have made a third.

"Of my work it is not worth the trouble to speak. Per-

haps after a while I shall send you the plan of something I am thinking to work out.

"Now that you are going to leave Tübingen soon, be so good as to tell me what you have in mind, and the place of your future stay, as well as about all your happenings. Before everything else, for your friends' sake, spare your health. Do not be too niggardly with the time you spend for recreation. Give my friends my best greetings. . . . Answer me soon. You cannot think how good it seems in my loneliness to hear now and again from you and other friends.

"Your HEGEL."

In these letters to Schelling, Hegel, as has been seen, frequently mentions correspondence with Hölderlin. When the latter went to Frankfurt a. M., as family tutor, he found there a like position for Hegel, and wrote him accordingly. Hegel, in accepting, wrote in part as follows: "Dearest Hölderlin.—So I have had again the joy of hearing from you. From every line of your letter speaks the same old, unchanging friendship. I cannot tell you how glad it has made me, and still more the hope of soon seeing and embracing you."

The letter goes on to speak of details of the journey; and asks for further information as to his tutorial duty. It continues: "I am sorry that I cannot set out immediately. But I cannot be in Frankfort before the middle of January. . . . How much influence the longing to see you has had on my quick decision, how the scene keeps coming before me of our *Wiedersehen*, of the happy future with you—of this nothing—farewell—Your HEGEL."

But, as Rosenkranz says, this picture was so inspiring that it moved him to address a poem to his friend. It is an expression of mystical yearning, mingled with glad anticipation of greeting Hölderlin again; and looked at from another side, it expresses spiritual trust and well-being. It was

written August, 1796. I translate a few lines of it, with little success, however, at keeping its peculiar meter.

ELEUSIS

TO HOELDERLIN

Around me, within, is quietness. The ceaseless
Cares of busy men do sleep; and I have liberty.
Thanks to thee, O Night, who freest me.
The moon lights up the mist-folds on the uncertain
Summits of the distant hills;
And friendly is the bright gleam
Of the sea.
The tedious noise of day fades in the memory,
As if years lay between the day and now.
Thy face, dear friend, and joys of other times
Rise up before me.

The poem then touches upon the delights of meeting—

—the joy of certainty

To find the old bond truer, firmer than before—
The bond that needs no pledge, but that endures,
In those who live to the free truth alone.

There is then an address to Ceres, "thou who hadst thy throne in Eleusis." The concluding lines are:

And this night I've felt thee, holy Godhead, thee.
Thou art known, too, in thy children's life—
The soul of all their deeds thou seemest to me!
Thou art the exalted mind, the truest trust,
The one Godhead that, mid general shock, stands firm.

The mixture of imagery, yearning, trust, mysticism, in this poem—we have chosen but a few lines of the "good and sensible" part of it—is quite characteristic of youthful work, which, to be sure, drives the chariot of the sun, but does so in rather hap-hazard fashion. "The imagination of a boy," says Keats, in the preface of his *Endymion*—"the imagination of a boy is healthy, and the mature imagination of a

man is healthy; but there is a space of life between, in which the soul is in a ferment, the character undecided, the way of life uncertain, the ambition thick sighted.”¹ This period in Hegel was probably short. I am glad that we have perhaps a trace of it in the poetic tribute to Hölderlin, and a stronger trace, too, in the friendship that existed between them; Hölderlin, perhaps, never outliving this stage of youthhood.

Hegel had been wishing for greater leisure, for better library facilities, for opportunity of meeting with like-minded friends; and all these were to be gained in Frankfort. He taught in the family of a merchant named Gogel. And here surroundings were not unpleasant. The record of the satisfaction of one of his friends is preserved—satisfaction at knowing that Hegel was so very comfortably off. We may infer, too, that Hegel had more time at his own disposal, from the important philosophical work he here accomplished. “That city,” says Rosenkranz, “which was the cradle of Goethe’s poetry, was to be also the real birth-place of Hegel’s system of philosophy.”

Professor Caird beautifully outlines the nature of the change that took place in Hegel’s thought at this time. Sometimes a change of residence will bring out at once into flower things that before were but germinal. Says Professor Caird: “The transition . . . to a higher point of view seems to have taken place in the beginning of Hegel’s residence at Frankfort, and in connection with a remarkable change of language which we find in his papers written about that time. In Switzerland he had used the words ‘life’ and ‘love’ to express the highest kind of social unity; now he substitutes the word ‘spirit.’ This is no mere verbal change. The word ‘life’ suggests the idea of an organic unity, and the word

¹Quoted by Hamilton Mabie.

'love' implies that the members of that unity are conscious beings—conscious of the social organism in which they merge their separate existence, and conscious also of themselves, were it only in the moment of self-surrender by which they give themselves up to that organism. In these terms, therefore, Hegel found a means of expressing that social unity of which the Greek state was to him a type—a unity of individuals who regarded themselves not as isolated persons, but simply as citizens whose life was in the State, and who had no personality apart from it. In such a social unity the idea of self is involved, but it is not emphasized; the division of self-conscious individuals disappears like the separateness of notes in a harmony.

"Love took up the harp of life, and smote on all the chords with might,
Smote the chord of self, which, trembling, passed in music out of sight."

"But the term 'spirit,' or 'spiritual unity,' seems to convey and in Hegel's language always conveys—the idea of antagonism overcome, contradiction reconciled, unity reached through the struggle and conflict of elements which, in the first aspect of them, are opposed to each other. It was, therefore, the appropriate expression for a unity between the mind and the object which is contrasted with it—between mind and matter, or between different self-conscious subjects, each of whom has a complete consciousness of his own independent rights and personality. Such a unity can never be, in Hegel's language, *immediate*, *i. e.*, can never be ready-made from the first, but always involves a process by which difference is overcome and opposition transformed into agreement. Nor can this be a merely *natural* process, *i. e.*, a process in which the opposition melts away without being heard of. Rather it is a process which begins with a distinct consciousness of independence to be removed, of opposition to be overcome, and which involves, therefore, an explicit sur-

render of independence, a conscious reconciliation of the opposition."¹

We may spend a moment in suggesting the parallel between the change of Hegel's written philosophical thought and the change in his experience.

In Switzerland Hegel speaks of his loneliness. His heart goes out toward his friends at Tübingen and at Jena. His mind is busy working over the fruit of his student years. The historical and literary studies, in the absence of exciting social life, all tend to the creation of ideal pictures of the past—some fair Greek republic, tinged with living interest because it may be—and is in the youth's mind—the prophecy of some possible though distant Utopia. "Love" and "Life"—forces apprehended almost pictorially, so to speak,—may easily sum up the relations of this ideal world.

But with the change of residence, the coming into a new social atmosphere, the meeting of friends who think, but whose thoughts are different from one's own—all this tends to put the idealization of the past into the background. It is there as the palette from which we take colors to paint a new picture, but a picture with features having modern and immediate meaning. In Frankfurt, Hegel met others. He won new ideas from living speech. He felt the difficulties of inter-communion—of expressing one's self, so that what one means is fully grasped. There must be social consideration, adaptation of lips that speak to ears that hear. Even stronger oppositions were to be met. And the meeting these, turning them aside, using them, winning them over, or opposing with brave-spirited but generous will—these were the activities that made him conscious of "spirit"—of the self-directed renunciation of the smaller self in order to participate in the larger social life—which is felt as but a beginning of the spiritually possible.

¹ Caird, *Hegel*, p. 35.

Frankfurt not only gave him opportunity to begin to formulate his deeper speculative ideas, but opened up to him a social world. Hölderlin, Sinclair, Zwilling, Muhrbeck, Berger, Erichson and Erhard are mentioned as his companions. Poetry, romantic idealism, Fichte's idealism and Schelling's, the idealism of independent youthhood—all were represented. They formed a ferment, working toward some wider, more inclusive, more logical, more wisely spiritual statement of reality; and it was in Hegel, chiefly, that they worked to make that statement.

In Frankfurt, Hegel, inspired by the example of Hölderlin and Sinclair, attempted some further versification. We have already noted his elegiac address to Hölderlin, just before coming to Frankfurt. Here he wrote, among other matters, a peculiar, grimly humorous, almost tyrannical poem, to his dog, on the meaning of authority. Its last line is: "You whine at the blows: then obey the command of your master."

There is a poem, too, on Spring. If not musical, it is at least manly. We quote the first stanza:

Der Frühling droht! Es drängt dem äussern Leben,
 Wie ihm die Knosp' entgegenschwillt,
 Den Menschen auch, sich preiszugeben.
 Die Sonne wächst und laut und wild
 Hinans geht aller Sinne Streben!—
 Da stellst du noch in uns ein Bild
 Hinein, ein höheres, als der Natur Gestalten,
 Das Inn're, das entflieh'n will, fest zu halten.

Who has not felt the incomings of spring—and, if a youthful poet, not returned them with effusive interest? The riches of unfolding nature seem so satisfying, that one is tempted to let go his grip on inner treasure of character and purpose. The world then seems not so much a theatre for heroic action, as a thing of beauty for easy receptivity.

We grow less like Fichte, and more like Schelling. In this stanza of Hegel we have a hint of the brave mid-point—or rather focal point—of the two, taken by his future system. Nature was to be comprehended—not a bud or leaf, not a word whispered by earth or man, were to be omitted; but at the same time the higher developments within were to be held fast and asserted, not as blotting out the value of the nature forms, but as giving them meaning and interpretation in a wider world of spiritual unity.

It may be regretted that we know so little of Hegel's methods with his pupils. But a teacher's interests outside of the school-room give us, perhaps, the best means of judging of his influence as a teacher. Hegel's interest in politics, in art and literature, in thought, in society, made him a stimulating power. He was so fully—if not noisily—alive that he imparted much more than instruction, namely, the wish for wider experience and knowledge. He was as far as possible from having the "pedagogical cramp," as Dr. Harris calls it. His interests, however, were not without aim. We might use Mr. Mabie's characterization of Rossetti, crowding it even fuller of meaning, and apply it to Hegel: "He had none of that unfruitful and essentially unintellectual curiosity which leads people to ransack all literatures and philosophies, not in the spirit of eager search for principles, but from a desire to discover some new thing—a desire especially to come upon some esoteric knowledge, and thus, by a single brilliant advance, possess themselves of the secret of the universe." Hegel was preëminently a seeker for principles—for the principle which, as a silken cord, might be seen to connect things apparently forever sundered. But this principle was to be discovered, not arbitrarily made. He wanted wide experience as the laboratory of discovery. He sought to include within himself his surroundings—to appreciate, co-operate with, become conscious of as a part of his social

self, the activity and progress of the world. But perhaps "world" is too vague a word here. Hegel's unselfish interests had a deeper tinge than the pale color of mere cosmopolitanism. His nation, unorganized though it was, was peculiarly his own. It was in this that he was to find his place and his duty. The categorical imperative which pronounces the "ought"—that seal, according to Kant, of man's freedom—this imperative was to find content and direction in the ideal toward which the state was developing. The individual man was to read his duty in social requirements.

Hegel was a student of history before he was a philosopher; and his philosophy—from one point of view—is his effort to put in words the significance of history. His early reading gave him broad outlook. After that, including as it did a study of the Greek states, Hegel could be no shallow egoist. He could sympathetically imagine the life of other times and places. But such study, in order to be practical, must be used not as an incitement to empty altruistic emotion, but as a means to awaken an intelligent interest in one's own people, in *their—and so my*—institutional life. Thus, in this Frankfurt period, we find Hegel making political studies. From Bern, which Rosenkranz characterizes as a city of family aristocracy, he had come to Frankfurt, a mercantile city of moneyed aristocracy. The very contrast must have set his mind questioning. What were the grounds of this mercantile system? What do property rights imply? And characteristically enough he seeks to answer these problems, suggested probably by the near at hand, by a study of the remote. England especially interested him. He studied the relations in that country of inheritance and property rights. He followed poor law legislation. He made a commentary to the German translation of Stewart's political economy. In this commentary he concentrated what he had to say on

government, on labor and capital, on social classes, on pauperism, on taxes, and the like. Prompted by a study of Kant, he sought to define the inter-relation of church and state. Kant's opinion he thus summarized: "Both, state and church, should leave each other alone and go their separate ways." But such a statement of separation, to Hegel was a challenge to find some principle of unity back of such seeming lack of connection.¹

We are apt to say that all this is the work of a student rather than that of a teacher. But should not every teacher—while in this life at any rate—be more of a student than teacher? It is perhaps the student's attitude that is the only rational attitude for a mind that can grow. It is one of the fine traits of Hegel, this power of patiently learning. He does not hurry his system in its slow maturing. It was "the foster-child of silence and slow time." It might be said of Hegel, as it was said of Walter Pater: "In him we feel the power of an insight which grows and is not hurried." He did not produce much—as did Berkeley, Hume, Schelling, Guyau—before he was thirty. And, indeed, it was only when he was thirty-six that the manuscript of his great introductory work was complete. Later we shall find him emphasizing, perhaps from the depth of his life-experience, the need of silence and docility in the learner. "One must begin," he says, "by striving to comprehend the thoughts of others. Willingness to yield one's own ideas is the first necessity for a learner. . . . The inner nature of a man is

¹ The motto of Froebel's Song of the Bridge, expresses Hegel's, as well as the child's *Trieb* the "Getrenntes zu verbinden":

Auch Getrenntes zu verbinden,
Lass das kind im Spiele finden;
Und dass wohl die Menschenkraft
Da auch die Verknüpfung schafft,
Wo die Trennung scheinbar unbezwinglich,
Wo die Ein'gung unerschwinglich.

broadened by culture, and given him as a possession through self-restraint. Thought is enriched and the mind vitalized by silence."

During this Frankfurt period, one of Hegel's hardest worked pupils was himself. Rosenkranz tells us of book-dealers' bills of this time that happened to have been preserved. These are mainly for Schelling's works and for the Greek classics in best and most recent editions. He must have studied particularly Plato and Sextus Empiricus. And here, be it said in passing, it is a pleasure to know that Hegel went pretty thoroughly through Sextus Empiricus—that old skeptic, and had but the larger faith afterward. History, politics, religion, and philosophy furnished him the subject matter of his investigations. But investigation is only a half. There must be expression of results. Thus Hegel sought to improve his style of writing. He made a careful study of the sentence period. He analyzed and criticised the prose of Schiller's *History of the Thirty Years' War*. He sought to think clearly and write clearly. But his words are not for those who run. Gray said of Shakspeare, every word in him is a picture. It may be said of Hegel, every word of his is a *Begriff*, a concept, which will surrender its meaning to nothing save the most strenuous attention. And even that, sometimes, seems to find itself staring at a blank wall. But what yields itself to first sight is the pledge of more. We get glimpses of the strong, true, wide meaning of the man. We know his habits of study, his conscientious effort to say his thought; so it needs but little faith to believe that, in the parts not as yet understood, riches are hidden which will repay search. The parts comprehended are but messengers telling of the sleeping princess that lies within, waiting for the kiss of him who loves and dares aright. The strange words and break-brain passages are but the thorny hedge and rough entrance ways to the beauty, which here as elsewhere answers but to the brave.

CHAPTER III

HEGEL AS UNIVERSITY LECTURER IN JENA

IN 1799, Hegel came into possession of a small patrimony. In the fall of the next year he made a trip to Mainz. The passport given him entitles him "Master of Arts," and describes him as: "aged 30 years, height 5 feet 2 inches, hair and eyebrows brown, eyes gray, nose medium, mouth medium, chin round, forehead mediocre, face oval." Rosenkranz remarks that we should be badly off, if we depended upon the passports for the stature of Hegel. The one quoted gives the inches over five feet as 2, while another gives 8, and still another 10!

We are now at the main turning-point in Hegel's early career. The *Lehrjahre* have come to an end, the *Wanderjahre* are to begin. Though it is well to remember that Hegel never "finished" his learning; and as for his wanderings, they had already begun far back in youth. Tübingen, Bern, the Alps, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Mainz—had all given him their lively and diversified message. And in the future he is to live successively in Jena, Bamberg, Nürnberg, Heidelberg, and Berlin.

This is a suggestive contrast to Kant, who never resided elsewhere than in Königsberg—scarcely ever journeyed from it. We are not arguing that Kant should have traveled. His was not the mind to say,

"Romæ Tibur amem ventosus, Tibure Romam."


He was more like the Greeks, who stayed at home and

made their own country famous. And who can tell what visions he saw when he gave his imagination rein, as he sat fixing his eye on the distant spire, which seemed to be the one material speck needed for the precipitation of his thoughts.

And yet for a man who is to deal with thought content as well as thought forms—who is to try to sum up man and nature, and their meaning, we should be glad for him to have wide experience of men and places. Such experience was Hegel's.

But to return to Frankfurt. Hegel's patrimony allows him to think of devoting his whole time to the development of the system that has been taking shape during his years of tutoring. He would go to Jena, the philosophical Mecca. But first he would make short stay in a quieter place. He writes to ask Schelling's advice. Schelling had already won distinction. He had passed his docentship, and had been appointed professor extraordinarius.

Hegel writes, under date of November 2, 1800, in part as follows: "My request would obtain from you some addresses in Bamberg, where I should like to stay awhile. Now that I am at last enabled to break old connections, I have decided to stay some time in a place where I can be independent and devote myself to work that has been begun. Before tasting the strong drink of literary life in Jena, I would strengthen myself by a preparatory stay somewhere else. I the more chose Bamberg, because I hoped to meet you there. But I hear you are back in Jena. . . . If from what you know of places you think some other would be better—Erfurt, Eisenach—please advise me. . . . In my scientific studies, though dealing at first with the lower needs of humanity, I have been driven on to philosophy. The ideal of youthful days has been made reflective, and is shaping itself into a system. I ask myself now, while busy with it, what way of



entrance is there for me to play my full part amid the life of men?"¹

Schelling's answer does not seem to have been preserved. But we may infer its purport, for in January, 1801, Hegel goes to Jena.

Rosenkranz has drawn a picture of the inner life of the city at this time. Fichte had gone to Berlin, with a blind charge of atheism at his back. Schlegel's "piquante" (Rosenkranz calls it) journal which had made the public used to paradoxes had come to a stop. The romanticists had scattered. Novalis had died, leaving behind him, as one has said, little but a rare and exquisite perfume. Tieck had quitted Jena—Tieck, who wrote these lines which have been called the "manifesto of romanticism:"

Magical moonlit night,
Holding the senses fettered,
Wonderful fairy world,
Arise in thy glory.

And Schelling, finally, had at least ceased to be a novelty.

But Jena drew a great number of young men who hoped to make philosophy a life work—and a paying one, too, if possible. This is not said to give color to Schopenhauer's rather surly remark about the philosophers who disagreed with him, namely, that their motto seemed to be *primum*

¹ Prof. Caird translates this last sentence: 'Now, while I am still employed with this task, I begin to ask myself where I can find a point of contact to bring my thoughts to bear upon human life?' It seems to me that the meaning is not quite this. Hegel himself wants to enter into life, that his still growing thought may be enriched. It is not that he has discovered a panacea, and is only waiting for opportunity to apply it to poor, hitherto ignorant, humanity. He is still a learner. He would become acquainted with the subject matter of his thought—namely, human life—by participating therein. In a way thoroughly his own, he believed with Faust,

'Wenn ihr's nicht fühlt, ihr werdet's nicht erjagen.—If you do not feel it, you'll never have the power of expressing it.'

vivere, deinde philosophari. But then the brilliant careers of Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling, fired enthusiasm for philosophy, with a flame that did not consume the hope of livelihood. And young aspirants were many. It is said that the lecture programs of the University of Jena "dripped" of philosophy. All points of view were represented, "from the dogmatism of Wolf to the romantic improvisations of the nature philosophy." Most of the *Weltanschauungen* were interpreted by docents—men who had the privilege of delivering courses of lectures, if perchance students could be found willing to hear. "In the University," says Rosenkranz, "private docents came and went, as doves fly in and out a dove-cote."

It was amidst these conditions that Hegel came to Jena. His first work must be, if he is to gain foothold, the announcement of his powers—"a measuring of strength, very courteous but decisive," as Emerson puts it. His first writing, accordingly, was upon "The difference between the systems of Fichte and Schelling." This was to introduce him to the philosophical world at large. Next must be written an "Habilitation-dissertation," and an "Habilitation-disputation," to obtain the right to deliver lectures as private docent at the university. The dissertation dealt with the courses of the planets. Without going into the merits of this writing, it will be enough, here, to let it serve but as another hint of the many-sidedness of Hegel.¹ Like Kant, Hegel was interested in mathematics, mechanics and astronomy. Much earlier than this he had made extracts from Newton and Kepler. He wrote the dissertation first in German; and then more tersely in Latin. Rosenkranz says:

¹ Hegel might have said with Stevenson—though more sedately, perhaps, than the poet and novelist—

"The world is so full of a number of things
I'm sure we should all be as happy as kings."

"These manuscripts, together with a wilderness of computations connected with them, are still preserved."

Admitted as docent, Hegel lectured several hours a week. He did not have the attractive delivery and manner of Schelling. There was lacking a certain poetical nimbus of word and activity which surrounded the younger teacher. He seemed more as one standing before some great truth, the wording of which needed the greatest care. He was thinking as he spoke. His lectures were a growth—an emerging into clearness. They were addressed to abstract thought rather than to imagination. They demanded much of the hearer—a demand that made them stimulating.

In the winter of 1801, Hegel announced a course in logic and metaphysics. Eleven hearers responded. In 1803, he announced lectures under the title of: *System of Speculative Philosophy*, with the subheads—(a) *Logicen et Metaphysicen sive Idealismum transcendentalem*; (b) *philosophiam naturæ*; (c) *mentis*.

In 1804 his hearers numbered thirty.

In 1805 he became professor extraordinarius, and lectured for the first time on the history of philosophy.

In 1806 he lectured on the philosophy of nature and of spirit.

In a letter to Voss, dated Jena, 1805, Hegel says: "How far I shall be able to do anything here, I cannot say. Each man must approve what he is by his deeds—by his effect upon others. I can only point to fragmentary work." Heidelberg, even at this time, seemed to Hegel to offer greater opportunities in science and literature than did Jena. And in this letter he expresses the wish that he might be summoned thither—a wish which was to be fulfilled some ten years later.

During the first year or two of the Jena period, Hegel was in almost complete accord with Schelling. Together they

carried on a philosophical journal. The contributions of one, it is said, cannot in many cases be distinguished from those of the other. But Schelling left Jena in 1803. Hegel now develops independently—not that he sets aside or refutes the old views, but that he has absorbed them, and seeing their one-sidedness, presses on to a higher standpoint. This is based both upon the old and upon the new, which latter seems almost to unfold itself—putting on as it does form and body as suggested by the negative, complementary implications of the old.

Schelling, too—or rather, perhaps, his followers seem to have diverged from the common ground taken at first. Tendencies to theosophy and mysticism were developing—“wayward and fanciful constructions,” says Prof. Caird, “hybrids between poetry and philosophy, with the distinctive merits of neither.”

Hegel, though capable of mystical and poetical feeling, thought philosophy to have higher uses than the expression of this. Philosophy was to express “mit dürrén Worten,” the clear, crystalline outlines of thought—the cool judgment of the spirit. Philosophy was not to ignore feeling, emotion, passion. Every phase of truth and being was to have due evaluation. But that evaluation itself was to be as unperturbed, and as universal in meaning and impartiality, as any algebraic x or y .

Divergence of opinion was followed, unfortunately, by estrangement of friendship. But it is folly to put the blame of such estrangement wholly upon Hegel; and it seems unfair, to say the very least, to make such charge add point to the assertion that Hegel used men as long as he wished, and then cast them off. Says Prof. Royce: “In his dealings with his friends, as for instance with Schelling, he was wily and masterful, using men for his advantage so long as

he needed them, and turning upon them without scruple when they could no longer serve his ends."¹

In a note, Prof. Royce says of this passage, and its context: "The expert reader will easily detect the influence of Haym's and of Dr. Hutchinson Stirling's estimates of Hegel's personality in what follows." But no reason is assigned for choosing these estimates rather than those, for instance, of Rosenkranz, of Thaulow, of Köstlin, of Michelet, of Erdmann, of Hotho.

Stirling's book—the first part of it—is almost a tragical drama—the story of a soul's conquest of Hegel. It is vivacious, too. Having once found the "Secret of Hegel," the writer seems almost to play with the philosopher, as a boy with a ball. The only trouble is, that the playing sometimes seems careless; and what wonder that Hegel falls—as would any ball—i' the mud. For instance, touching again upon the relations of Schelling and Hegel, take this passage from Stirling. It refers to Hegel's writing to Schelling, just before going to Jena.² "Hegel was by four years and five months the senior of Schelling: as yet, nevertheless, he has done nothing; he was but an obscure tutor, and his existence was to be wholly ignored. Schelling, on the contrary, though so much his junior, was already an old celebrity, a placed professor, an established author, a philosopher, the rival of Fichte, the rival of Kant. To Hegel, unknown, obscure, of

¹ In several instances I have had to express disagreement with Prof. Royce's estimate of Hegel's character, given in *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*. This book of Prof. Royce has been so much to me, that I am sure he will pardon, if he ever sees, this disagreement, motioning the criticism away as a mother brushes a fly from her child. In Prof. Royce's book, the sketch of Fichte precedes that of Hegel; and it seems to me that it was artistic requirement, rather than candid judgment, which pictures Hegel dark in order to offset the brilliant beauty of Fichte's character. It would appear that the facts of the case would lend themselves to a much fairer portraiture.

² Stirling, *The Secret of Hegel*, Vol. I., p. 25.

no account, nothing, but who would rank precisely among these highest of the high—who would, in fact, as the paper in his desk prophesied to him, be all—the immense advantages that would lie in Schelling's introduction, in Schelling's association of him with himself as philosophical teacher, as literary writer, could not be hid. Why, it would be the saving to him of whole years of labor, perhaps a whole world of heart-breaks. There is, quite accordingly, a peculiar tone, a peculiar batedness of breath in the letter of Hegel: admiration of Schelling's career, almost amounting to awe, is hinted; he looks to Schelling with full confidence for a recognition of his disinterested labor (the paper in his desk), even though its sphere be lower," . . . etc., etc.¹

But before we take this judgment too seriously, we should refer to a subsequent statement of Stirling—a statement which is perhaps meant to extract the sting, even as far back as page 25. On page 116 he says, "the objections and vituperations which occur in this chapter are not judgments: they are but the student's travail-cries."

As regards the estimate of Haym, reference might best be made to the answer of Rosenkranz.² Haym's dislike seems to have originated in difference of political creed. He was a liberal; and the doctrines of Hegel lent themselves to reactionaries. *Hinc lacrymae illae*—and enmity, also—an enmity which, as Rosenkranz says, extends not alone to the system but to the man.

A man's life is checkered. It needs but a little malice to piece the black squares together in one's description; and evil fame is the result. George Eliot once pictured a little

¹ The early letters of Hegel to Schelling when still at Tübingen show a like friendly appreciation. The "peculiar tone" and "batedness of breath" perceived in this later letter would seem somewhat subjective phenomena incident to adverse criticism.

² Haym's *Hegel und seine Zeit* was published in 1857. In 1858 Rosenkranz met this with his *Apologie Hegel's gegen Dr. R. Haym* (pp. 55).

girl as trotting along, "stepping always, by a peculiar gift, in the muddiest places." The same may be said of some critics. Rosenkranz makes that charge of Haym. "He has," he says, "a preference for all the lacks and weaknesses of Hegel. . . . He delights in bringing out his imperfections. . . . He has the talent for belittling all the greatness of this man, for making his merits seem doubtful."

To clear the air after this bit of polemic, it may be well to give this short whiff of kindlier appreciation. Burt, in his *History of Modern Philosophy*, says: Hegel's "domestic and social relations seem to have been only felicitous." And this they never could have been, had his dealings with his friends been merely "wily and masterful."

There is preserved a note of Goethe to Hegel, in which Goethe calls him "mein lieber Herr Doctor." He asks Hegel "to regard what I enclose as a proof that I am still quietly working for you. I wish I had more to promise you, but, in such cases, often much is gained for the future when once a beginning has been made."¹

Hegel was intimate with Paulus, and saw through the press for him the French translation of his edition of Spinoza. With Knebel and his wife he spent pleasant hours, enjoying especially the latter's singing. His closest friendship, however, was with Niethammer—a friendship that lasted with their lives.

In these years at Jena, Hegel was busy with what was to be his first great publication, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. The work has been called the Alpha and Omega of Hegel,

¹ Mention may be made of a side light upon Goethe's activity given by one of Hegel's letters. In a letter to Schelling, November 16, 1803, Goethe is described as being devoted to "the real and to apparatus." He has had arranged a botanical cabinet; a physiological cabinet was under construction; and an order was out for a plan of some galvanic apparatus. The same letter speaks of Schiller working on *Wilhelm Tell*. The items of news in this letter are another indication of Hegel's friendly interests.

his later writings being only extracts from it. This may be going too far, says Wallace, "yet here the Pegasus of mind soars free through untrodden fields of air, and tastes the joys of first love and the pride of fresh discovery in the quest for truth. The fire of young enthusiasm has not yet been forced to hide itself and smoulder away in apparent calm. The mood is Olympian—far above the turmoil and bitterness of lower earth, free from the bursts of temper which emerge later, when the thinker has to mingle in the fray and endure the shafts of controversy."

The *Phenomenology* is Hegel's voyage of discovery, not undertaken, however, in the spirit of romantic adventure. The spirit of wonder, of worship before mystery, is to be laid aside for a little. The priests will leave the temple for a moment, and an appraiser of its stones and furnishings will enter. The *love* of wisdom is to become a *knowledge* of wisdom. A science of the spirit is to be constructed.¹

During the Jena period, Hegel's influence did not reach the mass of students at the university. He was still comparatively unknown. But there was an inner circle that clung to him, whose devotion and admiration steadily increased. Youth has the power of coloring the most abstract of terms with roseate hue. In efforts to conceive the absolute, there was all the glow of religion added to the bracing air of dawning intellect. Hegel himself has expressed the feeling in one of the aphorisms he wrote at this time: "We are lifted up by the words eternal, holy, absolute, infinite. They give light and warmth. They are forces swaying us to and fro, and the seal of their power is, that in them one feels himself." And Hegel, too, in his own reserved way, was enthusiastic. There is an emotional tone in his very logic.

¹ "Daran mitzuarbeiten, das die Philosophie der Form der Wissenschaft näher komme—dem Ziele, ihren Namen der *Liebe* zum *Wissen* ablegen zu seyn—ist es, was ich mir vorgesetzt."—*Phänomenologie, Vorrede*.

He is uniting old conflicting views, massing these for onslaught against strongly held positions. There is a sense of conflict and victory. His parting words in 1806, after the course of lectures, are almost a bugle call. "This, gentlemen, is speculative philosophy, as far as I have been able to unfold it. You must regard it as but a beginning of philosophizing, which you must carry on. We are living in a momentous time—a time of upheaval in which the spirit has put off its old form and won a new. The entire mass of former ideas, conceptions, the bonds of the world, are loosened and fall away as a dream. A new advance of the spirit is at hand. It is the philosopher chiefly who has to greet this advance, to recognize it; while others, vainly striving against it, cling to the past; and the majority, though making up the mass of its progress, do so unwittingly. But it is philosophy which, recognizing its eternal aspect, gives it honor.

"Hoping to dwell pleasantly in your thoughts, I wish you a happy vacation."¹

It was indeed a time of upheaval. Things were being overturned not merely by logic, but by shot and shell. Napoleon and the Napoleonic army were making Europe their own. Now it was Jena's fate to be a stepping-stone of their progress.

While the French soldiers were burning and plundering the town, Hegel remained for some time in his house. He gave the soldiers to eat and drink what he had. He was threatened with rough usage by a party of them. But seeing one of their number wearing the cross of the Legion of Honor, he appealed to him, saying that he, a simple German scholar, might expect honorable treatment at his hands. "Whereupon," says Rosenkranz, "the soldiers somewhat

¹ Rosenkranz, *Hegel's Leben*, p. 214.

quieted down and contented themselves with a bottle of wine." The storm of fire increasing, Hegel put in his pocket the last pages of the *Phenomenology*, and sought refuge in the house of Gabler, the pro-rector. This house was protected by a French officer of high rank, who had taken up his quarters there.

After the battle, Hegel found his household effects in the utmost confusion. He was without a penny. But Niethammer, who was in Bamberg, supplied his immediate needs. And Goethe wrote Knebel, if Hegel were in want of money, to give him some.

There is a letter of Hegel to Niethammer, dated: "Jena, Monday the 13th of October, 1806, the day on which the French have taken Jena, and the emperor Napoleon entered its walls." In this he says: "I saw the emperor—that world-soul—ride through the city reconnoitering. It is indeed a memorable experience to see such an individual, who, seated here on horseback, as from a center overlooks the world and rules it."

It must be remembered that Hegel was a Suabian, not a Prussian. The taking of Jena did not seem to him a calamity befalling his own country. Indeed, there was no great nation of Germany at that time. There was little national spirit. The foremost German thinkers seemed to be citizens of the world. Their kingdom was untouched by the rise or fall of merely national governments. Taking into account this general condition of things in Germany, recognizing that the time was not yet ripe for the nationalizing of the country, we shall not be so quick as are some, to condemn as unpatriotic and pusillanimous Hegel's admiration of the foreign invader. Did not Hegel suffer as much as many? It is only a proof, then, of the magnanimity of the man that he could find worth in his conqueror. And then, too, there are various orders of men. The division of men into workers, soldiers, statesmen

or philosophers, is not merely Plato's division; to some extent, it is Nature's. Hegel was more philosophical than soldierly. Yet was he not courageous? He met what came unflinchingly, and up to the very firing of Jena persevered in his literary work—the duty which life had put upon him. Where is it that, finally, he met his end? Cholera is raging in Berlin. But Hegel is there, too, at his place in the lecture room. And when the disease strikes him, there is no cringing. Not so dramatic perhaps as the death-stroke of Fichte, gotten while caring for the wounded soldiers. And yet, without losing one whit of admiration for Fichte, may we not see something great also in Hegel?

In January, 1807, Hegel wrote,¹ in reply to a letter from one of his older students: "Nothing could show more plainly than do the events of these days, that the trained and cultured must be victors over the rude, that spirit must conquer spiritless understanding and scheming." This was in praise of the French. But then follows: "Science, knowledge, is alone the Theodicy—the justifier of God to man. It must, therefore, not stand in brutish amazement before events. Nor must it count them the result of a chance moment, or of the talent of an individual. It must see that the fates are not dependent upon the possession or non-possession of a hill. It must not complain as if wrong had conquered and right fallen." The letter then says that the French nation, by the baptism of its revolution, had freed itself from many burdensome fears that oppressed others. Its individuals, too, had left behind them the fear of death, and had broken loose from mere habit life. "This gives her the great might she approves before others. Others, stupid and without energy, pay the penalty. But these, perhaps, forced at length to rouse themselves from indifference to

¹ Köstlin, *Hegel in philosophischer politischer und nationaler Beziehung, für das deutsche Volk dargestellt*, p. 180.

realities, will come out into the real. It may well be that in the future they will, while dealing with the external, still keep their inner depth, and so will surpass their teachers." This is a prophecy of 1870; and Hegel had his part in the developing of the German national spirit. Patriotism and true citizenship were no mere side-issues of his philosophy. "In the spirit of a people each citizen has his spiritual substance. It is not alone the maintenance of the individuals which is dependent upon this living whole; but this latter constitutes the general nature or essence of each as an individual. The maintenance of the whole, therefore, is more important than the life of individuals as such; and all citizens should have this conviction."¹ This is what Hegel believed, and what he later taught his boys in Nürnberg.

¹ *Philosophische Propädeutik*, XVIII, Part I, § 55.

CHAPTER IV

HEGEL AS SCHOOLMASTER IN NÜRNBERG

HEGEL'S versatility was to be tested now at a new point. Not gaining foothold at Heidelberg, he becomes the editor of a Bamberg newspaper. It was Niethammer who made the proposition. In accepting, Hegel wrote: "The work itself will interest me; for, as you know, I eagerly follow the world-happenings. . . . I hope quickly to find myself at home in their recording."

Busied with the newspaper, he nevertheless found time to carry on work upon a critique of the political condition of Germany. This remained in manuscript. Still it is important as indicating Hegel's breadth of activity. Though political, such a work has educational significance. The school exists as the introducer of the individual into the larger social life of citizenship. A first necessity, then, of the educator is to have some sort of conception of the state, its history, its present problems, the ideal towards which it may grow. The development of such a conception was one of Hegel's life-tasks. It is true, perhaps, that Hegel did not undertake that task as an educator, primarily. But the scientific spirit in which he undertook it—his self-devotement to the main human problems, illustrated thereby—is one high characteristic of the true educator.

Work on the newspaper, however, is but a tide-over. And before two years are gone, again through the kindly offices of Niethammer, Hegel is in a position in closer touch with the educational world. He becomes rector of the classical

school—the Aegidien Gymnasium—in Nürnberg. Besides having the administrative duties of the rectorate, he has to lecture on philosophy. This will be his work for eight years. These years, in one sense, are still years of preparation. They bring forth, it is true, Hegel's second great work, the *Logic*; but they also train Hegel for his future as university lecturer and rector.

In 1807, Niethammer became the minister of instruction for Bavaria. His was a work of reconstruction. Indeed, that was peculiarly the work of all German educators at this time. In 1809, for instance, the Prussian minister of instruction wrote as follows, to some teachers who had been sent to learn Pestalozzi's principles and methods: "The section of public instruction begs you to believe, and to assure Mr. Pestalozzi, that the cause is the interest of the government, and of his majesty, the king, personally, who are convinced that liberation from extraordinary calamities is only to be effected by a thorough improvement of the people's education."¹

When Niethammer entered upon his office, there were two rival educational tendencies in Bavaria, one whose principle was monastic scholasticism, and one whose principle was utilitarianism. These represented the extreme medieval and modern tendencies—those of the monastery and those of the Illumination.² The advance was to be made on the mid-way between them. Niethammer was the leader of the advance. Bavaria would furnish steps from the common school to the universities by establishing scientific and classical schools. At Nürnberg, a scientific school was founded, and the classical school was re-organized. At the head of the scientific school was the good Schubert, from whose pen we have, as we shall see later, a pleasing picture of Hegel. The rector

¹ Barnard, *National Education in Europe*, p. 84.

² Rosenkranz, *Hegel's Leben*, p. 246.

of the classical school was ever to be a philosopher, and was to instruct in philosophy and in religion.

While seeking for some one to fill such a rectorate, Niethammer felt some hesitancy in offering the place to Hegel. It might seem a degradation. Having lectured at Jena, and published his *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, and with aspirations still for a university chair, would he be content to take charge of a school of boys?

But Hegel willingly accepted. The newspaper had been a need-shift—"a stop-gap and pot-boiler," Wallace calls it. He welcomed the return to more scientific, studious work. The anticipation was so pleasing, says Rosenkranz, that Hegel could hardly believe in the reality of his new position, until actually in Nürnberg.

Hegel must have felt the need of a vocation. "A vocation," he has said, "is something universal and necessary, and is part of a complete human life." He was no free lance, seeking single combat, and strange battle-fields. Rather would he choose a well-trod path. He would share in some broadly human work, which would bring him into many-sided relation with his fellows. Herein is much of Hegel's inspiration for ordinary people. He walked in common ways; and afterwards the stones under foot spoke a new meaning.

It is true that Hegel during all this time was looking out for a university position; but he does so with no complaint, or shirking of present duty. "He gave himself," says his biographer, "he gave himself to his office with entire devotion, with unwearied zeal." In a letter to Van Ghert, Amsterdam, dated Nürnberg, December 16th, 1809, he says: "I have been now for a year rector, and professor of the philosophical sciences in the gymnasium of this place, with a salary of about 1100 Fl. So you see my immediate economic necessities are met. I had the hope that the recent political

changes would bring some offer of a chair in a university; but I have no near prospect of it. From your sympathy in what concerns me, you will be glad to know by this letter that things have not turned out as badly as you had feared. My office has, it is true, a heterogeneous aspect; but it is nevertheless very close to my chief interest, that of philosophy in the strict sense of the word, and, in part, is one with it."

To another friend, the poet Sinclair, Hegel wrote in 1810, in part as follows: "I thank you most heartily for your letter that brought with it the offer of a position in your neighborhood. But at the gymnasium here, I am professor of philosophical propædeutics and rector, and have the hope moreover of being called in time to a university. Here, then, I have a settled course—a thing which suits me most—and have besides official duties closely connected with my studies. Were I to throw away these advantages, or to give them up for apparently greater, there would be a break in my outer doings that would set me back considerably. It would be pleasant indeed could we live near each other, reviewing everything together, and sharing new ventures in common. But come and visit our old Nürnberg. You can make the excursion much more easily than I I am on the lookout for your philosophical work. You have made a proper beginning—in your former rôle as poet, with three tragedies; so as a philosopher, with three volumes. I am eager to see whether or not you are still a stiff-necked Fichtian. . . . Finally, I send you a sample of my beginning which I started some years back. See yourself what you can make out of it. It is a concrete side of the spirit that is dealt with therein; the science itself is yet to be formulated. I wonder how, your free—not to say, anarchic—nature will like the Spanish boots in which I have the spirit walk.

"But I see that you, also, blame the lack of method in

the would-be philosophical writings that are rife—or used to be so. I am a schoolman who have to teach philosophy; and perhaps it is on that account that I hold that philosophy, just as geometry, should have a regular structure which may be taught. An acquaintance with mathematics and with philosophy is one thing; quite another is the talent which discovers or produces the new in the field of mathematics or of philosophy. It is my work to discover a [teachable] scientific form, or at least to contribute to its discovery.”

As stated in this letter, Hegel had to give instruction in philosophy. He did this in accord with the Bavarian program. Modifications, however, prompted by pedagogical insight, were introduced. Rosenkranz, fortunately, gives the paragraphs of this Bavarian program, or *Normativ*, as it was called, which relate to the teaching of philosophy. They are substantially as follows:

Philosophical Instruction for the Gymnasium

In this the main point of view to be constantly in mind, is that the chief object of this part of gymnasial study is to conduct the pupils to speculative thinking. The pupils are accordingly, by graded exercises, to be made ripe for the systematic study of philosophy which is begun in the university.

1. In the lowest class a beginning may be made with the formal part of philosophy—that is, with logic. Here attention is mainly to be paid to the logical technique and to the laws of logical reasoning. This will give, on the one side (formal), opportunity enough to exercise the sharp-mindedness of the pupils; and on the other side (material), technical readiness in scientific logic is attained, which is presupposed by the other sciences.

2. For the lower middle class, cosmology (retaining the

old division of philosophy) may be taken as the first means of speculative discipline, in order now to lead the pupil, in his speculative thought, out from himself to philosophizing about the world. And since natural theology is connected in many ways with the foregoing, the same course of study will treat of both. The Kantian critiques of the cosmological and physico-theological proofs of the existence of God are here to be used.

3. In the upper middle class, the youth in his philosophizing may be led back to self; and, as a second means of speculative discipline, psychology may be taken. Then naturally follows the ethical and legal concepts; and the course of study embraces these also. For the first part of this course, the psychological writings of Carus are to be mainly used; and for the second, Kant's writings.

4. In the highest class of the gymnasium, finally, the previously studied subjects of speculative discipline may be brought together in one philosophical encyclopedia, or connected outline of the whole.

Hegel much doubted the practicability of such a plan for the gymnasium. He would prefer making an intelligent study of the Greek and Roman classics the doorway to philosophy. Hegel was not one to hurry boys into speculative thinking. In his actual teaching he rightly avoided this. He began with practical philosophy, because the material dealt with by this lay nearer to the boy's experience. The principles of law, morality and religion were to come first; then logic and the more abstruse philosophy. A letter of Hegel to Niethammer is preserved, on the teaching of philosophy in the gymnasium.¹ He also drew up an outline of his own instruction, which has since been published as the 18th volume of his works.² This, as Caird says, not-

¹ See among the Translations, No. 48.

² See among the Translations, No. 49.

withstanding "all the rector's explanation, must have puzzled the clever boys at Nürnberg." Nevertheless, Hegel did his best to help their understanding—an effort that had the best of results in his own subsequent thinking and writing. The manuscript of the outline of these introductory lessons was a difficult one to edit. Full of erasures, transpositions, red-ink insertions, rewritings, modifications—it was a clear indication of the conscientious work of the teacher. Every word had to be chosen with a reference to carrying a difficult subject into untrained minds. He sought gradually to accustom his pupils to deal with general conceptions of the understanding—a process which he jokingly described as an act of abstraction, in which the youth had to learn to do without eyes and ears.

He gave instruction in philosophy to all classes. In each he altered the mode of teaching, suiting it as far as he could to the age of his pupils, with a care, too, for the individual. He dictated paragraphs, giving explanation and illustration. He did not read off what he said, though he had his manuscript before him. The pupils had to copy neatly their dictation. The verbal explanation, too, was to be written from memory as well as might be. From time to time Hegel would call upon one and another to read their notes, the call serving to keep the attention and to stimulate correct work. At the beginning of each hour, one of the class had to give a summary of last hour's exercise. The scholars were quite at liberty to ask questions. "In his kindliness," says Rosenkranz, "Hegel allowed his lecturing to be broken in upon, and often a good part of the hour was taken up with the points suggested in the questions, though Hegel knew how to bring these particulars into the general point of view, and into close bearing upon the main subject." At times, too, the philosophical lessons gave the subject matter for Latin exercises—an early example of the correlation of studies.

The philosophical instruction in the gymnasium was to be a propædæutic—a preparation for the university study of philosophy. In the letter to Niethammer, Hegel sketches the province of the gymnasia work. In a letter¹ written while still at Nürnberg to Prof. F. v. Raumer, he writes of the university study. In this, after speaking of the unsystematic way in which philosophy had been taught, he says: "This, I think, can be rightly maintained, that the teaching of philosophy at the university can only then effect its purpose—the giving of a definite kind of knowledge—when it pursues that end in a definite, methodical way, comprehending and co-ordinating the various details. In this systematic form alone is the science of philosophy, like any other science, capable of being learned. And even if the teacher does not like this word "learn," he still must be conscious that it expresses the aim of teaching. It has become a prejudice, not in philosophy alone, but also in pedagogy—and here the prejudice is strongest—that the power of original thought should be developed and given rein, and that, for this, material or content is not the thing of first consideration. There is a notion that learning is opposed to original thought; whereas, in fact, it is only with the material got by learning that thought can deal. . . . It is a common error to fancy that a thought can have the stamp of originality [of essentially belonging to one's self] only when it departs from the thoughts of other men. But against this we might use the word: the new is untrue, and the true is not new. . . .

"A scientifically developed philosophy does full justice to definite thought and to fundamental knowledge; and its content, the universally true of spiritual and natural relationships, has to do immediately with the positive sciences, which show this content in more concrete form, in greater detail and application. So true is this, that the study of

¹ Hegel's *Werke*, XVII., 349–356.

these sciences is necessary as a basis for true insight into philosophy. . . .

"Edification is often expected of philosophy. To my mind philosophy, even when presented to youth, is not meant to be edifying.¹ But it has to satisfy a need akin to edification, which I shall touch upon briefly. The more strong the recently renewed demand for worthy material, for higher ideas and religion, so much the less adequate than ever is the form of feeling, fantasy, vague imagination. To give just insight into what has reality and content, to comprehend this in definite thought, and to guard it against hazy instability—such is the work of philosophy. . . .

"Philosophy includes these sciences: logic, embracing the quite abstract and general, with all of this character formerly treated by metaphysics. The concrete is dealt with (1) in natural philosophy, and (2) in the philosophy of spirit, to which latter belong psychology, anthropology, ethics, æsthetics, philosophy of religion, and history of philosophy."

Five commencement-day addresses given by Hegel have been preserved.² Upon prize-day, or commencement, it was customary for the rector of the gymnasium to give an address touching upon the history of the school during the preceding year, and upon matters of general interest to the pupils and their friends. Many of Hegel's important educational views are given in these addresses. A number of passages from them are included among the translations, in the

¹ Cf. Mackenzie, *Social Philosophy*, p. 4: ". . . There is a special danger in any attempt to work at what may be called the edifying side of philosophic study, before the more purely theoretical parts of the subject have been placed on a secure foundation. Questions in which our sympathies and hopes are directly concerned can scarcely be treated without bias; and there is a risk that if we begin with these, our whole subsequent speculations may take their color from our personal aims and wishes."

² In *Werke*, Vol. XVI.

second part of this volume. Here it may be well to give the substance of a portion of the first address, which lays down as it were the educational platform of the school. "The spirit and purpose," says Hegel, "of our institution is to give a preparation for more advanced scholarship—a preparation based upon Greek and Roman foundations. For a thousand years this has been the ground upon which all culture has stood."¹ But this study of the ancients is to be carried on in a modern spirit. Latin and Greek authors are to be read in the original so as to get nearest to their meaning, to the content of the life portrayed. Translations are like artificial roses, which in form, color, even perfume, may resemble the real, but which lack the exquisite loveliness of life. Formal training is not to be divorced from learning of content. The noblest food in the noblest form is contained in the works of the ancients. They are golden apples in baskets of silver.

The process of education, says Hegel in this first address, is not to be looked upon as the mere adding, link by link, to a chain—the later links joined to the earlier it is true, but with no re-working of the old into higher forms. But education must have material and substance already present, upon which it works, enriching it and forming it anew. We need to win for ourselves the world of the ancients, not for the mere possession, but for substance to work upon. "Unhappy he who is estranged from his immediate world of feeling; for this is nothing else than that the bonds of faith, love and trust, which holily unite mind and heart with life, are broken! This moral pain, this heart sorrow, is not demanded by the estrangement which is essential to theoretic

¹ It must not be thought that the Nürnberg school was merely a classical school. Religion, introductory philosophy, mathematics, natural history and physics, French, Hebrew (for intending theological students), and the mother tongue, with its literature—all were taught.

culture. This demands the slighter tension and pain of the intellect, incident to the effort which copes with things not immediate, with the foreign, with things of memory and of thought. This demand for separation is so necessary, that it expresses itself in us as a general and well known tendency. The strange, the distant, has enticing interest." Youth pictures it as good fortune to get away from the home land and to dwell with Crusoe on a remote isle. It is a necessary illusion, to expect to find what is most worthy in things farthest. "This centrifugal tendency of the soul causes the young spirit to separate itself from its natural life and conditions, and to put itself in a far and strange world." In education, the means for bringing about this separation are given by the world and speech of the ancients. But this ancient world, which separates us from ourselves, contains, at the same time, the starting points and Ariadne threads of return to ourselves, to a new friendship and recovery of self—a self now instinct with the true and universal spirit.¹

Hegel's was a friendly and mild disposition. This won the confidence of his pupils. But there was no lack of firmness, with, perhaps, sometimes a trace of grim Suabian humor that was not unlike sarcasm. He believed in having order in his school. Life was a serious thing, and the school had to fit for life. The pupils were to be brought under general law. Many things in themselves innocent might not be done by any, because disorder would result if attempted by all. "Yet," says Caird, "in insisting upon strict order and method, Hegel seems to have avoided the extreme of petty interference, and to have tolerated the frolic and license of his school boys, even beyond the point which is now considered desirable."

Stories of school days, recounted in after years, are apt to be somewhat more pointedly than broadly descriptive. They

¹ Cf. what Rosenkranz says on Estrangement, *Philosophy of Education*, § 24.

are a species of abstraction chosen by wit rather than reason. With this in mind, while reading the following anecdote, we shall be saved from thinking Hegel another Dr. Busby, or James Boyer of Elian fame. Caird gives this story as told by one of Hegel's Nürnberg pupils: "I remember that in 1812 a dancing master came to Nürnberg, and, with Hegel's permission, opened a course of lessons at the gymnasium, for which the members were requested to put down their names. Naturally almost every one subscribed. After a time, however, some of us became discontented. The dancing master, skillful enough in his art, was, as is not unusual, a coxcomb; the wearisome exercises in mannerly deportment, the standing in stocks to turn the toes outwards, etc., were not liked. . . . In short, some of the scholars planned how to withdraw from their engagement. But that was impossible without Hegel's consent, and I and another were sent to lay our grievances before him. But what a reception we got! I scarcely know how we got down the stairs. He would not see the dancing-master lose the fees guaranteed to him, and, in short, we were obliged to dance, stand in stocks, and make our salutations till the end of summer." A fact, we may add, which, thanks to Hegel, doubtless resulted in much ease and pleasure amid later social functions.

But now we must turn to a new aspect of Hegel. We have seen him, a man of about forty, scrupulously neat in appearance, with plenty of white linen, formal, but genial withal in demeanor, deeply thoughtful, yet sympathetically trying to make his boys so too. A dull, colorless picture, perhaps. But is it so? Are there not gentle but effective tints therein? It may be that praise is too apt to go to the showy, the flaring. But just as in pictorial art, the taste nowadays prefers the subdued, the grays and browns that often clothe the richer imagination, so in taste for character, the every-day person—if so be he have some spiritual signifi-

cance—is becoming the profoundly interesting person. So we may perhaps dilute the dye of Prof. Royce's brilliant blackening of Hegel: "He was no patriot," he says, "like Fichte; no romantic dreamer like Novalis; no poetic seer of splendid metaphysical visions like Schelling. His career is absolutely devoid of romance."¹

Well, the romantic novel is perhaps not the highest type of literature. Nor is "romantic" the crowning epithet of worth. And in Hegel, if romance were absent, there were nevertheless present hope, trust, patience, brave undertaking of duty, friendship and love. The life was deep, though having but little swirl and foam.

Settled at his school work, Hegel falls in love—or ripens into the lover, we perhaps had better say, inasmuch as he does nothing whatever "romantic," save to write two short poems—though these have as happy a glow as one could wish. "We even have," says Prof. Royce, "one or two of his love letters. They are awkward and dreary beyond measure." Others have not found them so. Nor did Marie von Tucher, the young and beautiful maiden to whom they were addressed. She was but nineteen years of age, not rich but talented. The veriest romancer might take her for his heroine—drawing upon our sympathies, too, if he wished to pervert history—by making her seem an earlier Dorothea united to a Mr. Casaubon, of Middlemarch. But alas for the romancer! The marriage was a happy one, and would furnish no plot either for *Middlemarch* or for the *Sorrows of Werther*.²

¹ We might quote Lowell here: "But it is one of the schoolboy blunders in criticism to deny one kind of perfection because it is not another." *Essay on Gray*.

² Cf. the elder Titbottom and his young wife, in *Prue and I*:

"He was much older than she, without doubt. But age, as he used to say with a smile of immortal youth, is a matter of feeling, not of years.

"And if sometimes, as she sat by his side on the piazza, her fancy looked through her eyes upon that summer sea, and saw a younger lover, perhaps some

Ten years afterwards, when two sons had been added to the family group, Hegel, while traveling, writes home: "I am traveling, on the whole, out of a sense of duty and because I must. I should be a hundred times more contented could I divide my time between my studies and you." This perhaps will give a hint of the—unromantic it may be, but affectionate—domesticity of Hegel. A lady acquainted with him in Berlin describes him, with a little feminine hyperbole, as "worshiped by his children and adored by his wife, who, younger by twenty-two years, hung upon him, not alone with the tenderness of a wife, but with a child's reverence."

A similar picture in more detail is given by Schubert in his autobiography: "In the first months after my coming to Nürnberg, I became acquainted with several men whose influence remained with me even in later life. First of all there was G. W. Fr. Hegel, who afterwards was to become the most famous of my contemporaries. As rector of the gymnasium his place was similar to mine, and our official relations were many. I can only repeat what everybody knows of him. I had previously, in Jena, learned to respect him highly as a teacher. His *Phenomenology of the Spirit* was at that time one of the most talked-of writings in philosophy. He had extraordinarily broad and deep knowledge. He was a man of firm, honorable character, careful in his speech, just and right towards others, a man of preëminent power, but ready, when need was, to extend his hand to others. Not indeed on account of age, for he was but ten years my elder, but because of his mental and spiritual maturity, Hegel might have been my father; and, especially in the wise, competent way in which he fulfilled his office, my

one of those graceful and glowing heroes who occupy the foreground of all young maidens' visions by the sea, yet she could not find one more generous and gracious, nor fancy one more worthy and loving. . ." And we might write similarly of Hegel, had we Curtis' way of saying things.

pattern and example. As to his scholars at this time in Nürnberg, he quickened their understanding and gave them the proper use of their spiritual powers, a use turned to fine and right account by many of them. He who has seen and known Hegel only in the lecture room or by his printed books, does not know the charm of his personal intercourse, his tender sympathy as husband and father. His good sense even in every-day affairs was educative, and his genial wit made common things the brighter."¹

In one of Hegel's letters to Niethammer, he says: "Wenn man ein Amt und ein Weib, das man liebt, gefunden so ist man eigentlich mit dem Leben fertig.—When a man has a place and a wife that he loves, life begins to be complete." But not his life's work. Hegel had written but his *Phenomenology*—had made but his voyage of discovery. Now there was to be the serious labor of putting in general, logical form the results of that voyage. The quiet years from 1812 to 1816 give him the opportunity. His great *Logic* is the outcome—"the one work," says Caird, "which the modern world has to put beside the *Metaphysic* of Aristotle."

Writing the *Logic*, Hegel was not neglecting his work as schoolman. Indeed the *Logic* was to be the standing ground of his soul, while he moved his world of home and school. It was the *ποῦ στῶ* of Archimedes, which every true worker seeks to find, and most of all the teacher. "One's vocation," said Hegel, "is a many-sided thing." We may be sure that one of its sides has a doorway leading out to the world-and-spirit questions of philosophy. And dealing with these, Hegel was but fulfilling his duty as educator and man.

From two of Hegel's correspondents we have interesting glimpses from without of the *Phenomenology* and of the *Logic*—glimpses, too, which indicate something of Hegel's growth

¹ Quoted by Köstlin, *Hegel in philosophischer politischer und nationaler Beziehung, für das deutsche Volk dargestellt*, p. 127.

between the writing of the two works. In 1810, Windischmann, a physician, somewhat fanciful and with a touch, too, of pietism, wrote to Hegel. He had been greatly moved by the *Phenomenology*. "The study," he says, "of your system of knowledge, has convinced me that this work, when it has come to be understood, will be looked upon as the first book of humanity's liberation, as the key to the new gospel, which Lessing has foretold. You understand, of course, what I would say by this. But I should like you to know what the work has been to me, and that there are few who have been stirred by it so deeply." Windischmann later became Professor at Bonn. Fifteen years after writing the letter above quoted, he closes a letter to Hegel with these words: "May I tell you, that I think of you daily in my prayers? It is indeed the best that one can do for another. Give me also a place in the inner chamber of your heart, which, hid from many, is still not unknown to me."

Quite an other character we have in Thaden, who found Hegel's *Logic* to be "the book of books." This difference of character is significant. It indicates the wide variety of readers that found help in Hegel; and the contrast serves also to bring out Hegel's character more clearly, Thaden being perhaps the same type of man as Hegel. We follow Rosenkranz's portrayal. Instead of Windischmann's tendency to lose himself in mystical obscurity and to take the bliss of ecstatic reverie as the highest insight, we find in Thaden a clarity of thought tending rather to mere abstract rationality. Instead of Romish Churchism we find the self-reliance of Protestantism, which cannot believe without knowing what and why it believes. Instead of the passive armor of prayer, there is capableness and readiness to act. In the place of the tendency to ecclesiasticize social relationships, and to be subservient to priestly control, there is a tendency to political self-direction, and to a manly independence conscious of itself.

Finally, instead of the preference for symbolical and mystical expression, there is an effort to make science known to as many people as possible—an effort for clear and understandable expression.

It was this Thaden who wrote to Hegel, in 1815: "Your *Logic* is the book of books, a finished masterpiece of the human spirit. It yet, as it seems, is little known, and is not valued at its true worth by a single writer." But it was early for competent judgment to express itself. The style of its writing was difficult. Hegel was as aware of this as were others. In December 1812, he wrote to Van Ghert, in Holland: "It is due to your interest, most of all, that my work is attracting attention in Holland. I am very sorry that complaint is made of the difficulties in the expression. The nature of such an abstract subject precludes its being given the ease and lightness of an ordinary reading book. Nor can truly speculative philosophy have the dress and style either of Locke's or of the ordinary French philosophy. To the uninitiated its contents must appear as a world turned upside down—as contradicting the usual conceptions of so-called common sense."¹

Nevertheless there has been gain in presentation since the days of the *Phenomenology*. Erdmann thinks this gain is due, in part at least, to his efforts as teacher. And Hegel himself, when it was said that perhaps his years of absence from a university chair had unfitted him to lecture again at a university, speaks of his experience with the gymnasial students, as having done more for his delivery and expression than could a chair at the university itself. In the *Logic*, the reader is kept more constantly in the mind of the writer, and is not distressed by mirage-like allusions. That this was a gain consciously striven for, may, be shown by a letter of Hegel to Voss, written in 1805: "Luther made the

¹ Hegel's *Werke*, XVII., *Briefe*.

Bible speak in German; you have done the same for Homer, the greatest boon that could be given a people. For a people is barbaric, and cannot look upon the greatest works as its own, until it knows them in its own tongue. And if you will forget these two instances, I will say of my own efforts, that I am trying to make philosophy speak in German. If I succeed, it will be much harder to make shallow thought seem deep." In another writing Hegel says: "This strange terminology becomes a great evil, in that therein conceptions grow fast and fixed. Then the life and spirit of things disappear, and philosophy sinks to an empty formalism. There is nothing easier than to learn this, and to prate with it, because it permits one, under the veil of wisdom, to say all sorts of foolish and trivial things; if so be that one is not ashamed to talk to people in a speech they do not understand."

Still it must be said that the beginner—and if we believe the records, the older student, too—finds the combination of Hegel's thought and style to be hard and rugged. We are tempted to say what Coventry Patmore said, in another connection:

"How foreign is the garb he wears,
And how his great devotion mocks
Our poor propriety, and scares
The undevout with paradox!"

But then Dante speaks a word, that brings us back to our allegiance: "If [he] delight thee not, thy heart must err." And coming back to a not too deep or prolonged study, we feel that if charm and flattering ease are wanting, there is nevertheless the calm, far vision of the mountain tops.

CHAPTER V

HEGEL AS PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HEIDELBERG

EIGHT years Hegel served the Nürnberg gymnasium. His influence however had spread. All at once, in July, 1816, he received calls to the chairs of philosophy at Erlangen, at Heidelberg and at Berlin. The call to Erlangen was somewhat conditional; and while Hegel was considering it, there came an urgent invitation to Heidelberg. Daub, the rector of the university, wrote Hegel to the following effect: "By a note from Karlsruhe received yesterday, I am under the pleasant commission of having to ask you if you will accept the position of professor of philosophy in the university here. The salary consists of 1300 guilders, 6 malters of corn, and 6 malters of spelt. That is indeed little. I am sorry that more cannot be promised at first. And I should have small hope of an affirmative answer were I not warranted in saying, from the long experience of my colleagues and of myself, that if professors work with diligence and have any success, their remuneration is increased from time to time. Now, in you, if you will accept this call, Heidelberg for the first time (Spinoza was once called here, but in vain) since its founding will have a philosopher." The letter proceeds most cordially to press the acceptance, and concludes: "If I may see you belonging to Heidelberg University, which I love, and will love while I live, then clear and refreshing light will have come into my life.

"With sincere regards,

"Yours most obediently,

"DAUB."

Hegel had some doubt as to the sufficiency of "1300 guldern, 6 maltern of corn, and 6 maltern of spelt," for the needs of his family. But these fears were set at rest by a better offer from the university, and Hegel then gladly accepted the call.

In October, 1816, Hegel came to Heidelberg. His countryman, Professor Eschenmayer, gave most friendly help in the work of home-making in a new city. Paulus, too, with wife and daughter, gave him hearty welcome. Frau Paulus was of bright and joyous disposition. A mingling of merriment and good sense was hers. Hegel gladly spent social evenings at her home.

But at first the philosopher was more or less lonely. His wife and children had been left for a time at Nürnberg. Hegel wrote them almost daily, with full expression of longing for their presence—the unromantic man! In one of those letters Hegel said it seemed to be the motto of Heidelberg society: Each for himself, and God for us all. There was little public stir, in the form of great meetings and the like; but instead there was a quiet "liebes Leben."

Hegel was somewhat disappointed in the number of students who first came to hear him. On October 29th, he wrote: "I began my lectures yesterday. As regards listeners, things are not so glowing as were the accounts. If not at a loss and displeased, I at least wondered to find it otherwise than I had been led to expect. In one course I had but four hearers. But Paulus comforted me; he, too, he said, had lectured to but four or five." But this was only at the beginning. In a few days he had in one of his courses, the encyclopedic, some twenty auditors; and in the other, the history of philosophy, some thirty, when, as Rosenkranz says, he comforted himself: "In the first half year, at the beginning of one's work, one must sometimes be content if he can but hold his own. The students must be warmed up to him."

And Hegel was warmth-giving, and attractive, notwithstanding a certain dryness and hesitancy of manner. His enthusiasm does not flare and sparkle; but there is an intense glow about it—all the more admirable because of its self-repression. Philosophy was the temple, and even its altar fires must be restrained by the sacredness of the place.

Hegel's closing words of a course of lectures at Jena have been given some pages back. Their hope and courage were pointed out. The same spirit breathes in the opening address of his Heidelberg lectures. In the world, calm had come after the Napoleonic storm. And Hegel's voice speaks in the calm; but calls to a new effort that was to be as strenuous, though on other fields, as battle. We quote, from Caird, part of this introductory address: "While the spirit of the world was so much occupied with real interests, it could not turn inwards, or gather itself together in itself; but now that the stream of events, on which we were carried along so rapidly, has been checked—now that the German nation has redeemed itself by the sword from the worst of tyrannies, and regained its nationality, that foundation of all higher life—we may hope that besides the kingdom of this world, on which all thoughts and efforts have been hitherto concentrated, the kingdom of God may also be thought of; in other words, that besides political and other worldly interests, science and philosophy, the free interests of intelligence, may also rise to newness of life.' This hope is the more reasonable, Hegel declares, as philosophy is the peculiar vocation of the German nation. 'History shows us that even when all but the name of philosophy was lost in other lands, it has maintained itself as the peculiar possession of the German nation. *We* have received from nature the high calling to be guardians of this sacred fire, as in earlier times the world-spirit maintained the highest consciousness in the Jewish nation, that from them it might rise again as a new spiritual

force in the world. . . . Let us greet together the dawn of a better time, when the spirit, that has hitherto been driven out of itself, may return to itself again, and win room and space wherein to found a kingdom of its own.'"

Hegel was charmed with the beauty of nature about Heidelberg. He writes home that his wife, when she joins him, will then first know what walks can be. Hegel lived at almost the outskirts of the town. He was often seen at his windows, looking out, in Socratic meditation, toward the forest stretches and the haze-softened hills beyond. Some of the students therefore concluded he was not particularly busy.

We are told that, during the summer of 1817, he was often so lost in thought that he was quite oblivious to outer happenings. Once, it is said, he was walking to the university building over a miry piece of ground. One shoe remained sticking in the mud. Hegel went on his way without noticing the loss.

But perhaps, in the absence of definite information, we may believe the shoe was a loose over-shoe; then the abstraction might not have been so deep as the story implies.

Among the students closest to Hegel, was a young Russian, Baron Boris d'Yxkull. He had taken part in the Russian campaign against France; and now would refresh himself after field-work by university study. Without having read anything of Hegel, he nevertheless had the idea that he might from him gain the quintessence of human knowledge. He came to Heidelberg early in 1817. He gives the following account of his aims, and of Hegel's way of satisfying them: "After looking around somewhat, the first thing I did was to call upon the man of whom I had sketched almost extravagant pictures to myself. With well-studied phrases, for I was quite aware of my general ignorance, and outwardly composed, though somewhat afraid within, I went to the Pro-

fessor; and found, to my no little surprise, a perfectly plain and simple man, who spoke with some hesitation, and uttered nothing very marvelous after all. Unsatisfied with this impression, though secretly attracted by Hegel's friendly reception, and a certain air of good-hearted, but a little ironical, courtesy, I went after the Professor's lecture to the nearest book store, bought all the works of Hegel that had been printed, and in the evening settled myself comfortably in my sofa-corner to read them. But the more I read, and the more attention I tried to fasten on the reading, the less I understood of it; so that after struggling for two hours with a proposition without nearing its comprehension, I laid aside the book. But out of curiosity I kept on attending the lectures. I must confess, however, that I did not understand my own notes, and that I was lacking in needed prefatory knowledge for this science. So in my need, I went again to Hegel; who, after he had patiently heard me, advised that a beginning be made with some other studies, Latin, rudiments of algebra, natural science, and geography. This I did for a half year, as hard as it was for one twenty-six years old. For the third time, then, I presented myself to Hegel, who could not help smiling as I told him of my propædæutic endeavors. His advice now was quite definite, his sympathy strong; and I took his course with some profit. A seminar—or *conversatorium*—of Dr. Hinrichs was helpful. This was attended by disputationists from all the four faculties. The general theme was the exposition of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Sometimes in the two following semesters Hegel called upon me. I was often with him, and accompanied him on his walks. He often said to me, that our over-wise time needed method most of all; it was only by it that the thoughts could be kept in rein, and so could make real progress. Religion, he said, was anticipatory philosophy; and philosophy nothing but religion conscious of itself. Both sought, though by

different ways, the same object, God. I was never to trust a philosophy that was either immoral or irreligious.”¹

After this stay at Heidelberg, d'Yxkull traveled far and wide; now amid the ruins of Ephesus, now on the snow-fields of Sweden, now in Paris, next in Rome. Everywhere, like Alexander with his *Iliad*, he took with him Hegel's *Logic*. Correspondence was maintained. It seems that the young Russian had a tinge of melancholy in his disposition—a sense that outer conditions and inner ideals are clashing, and that one's arm is weak amid the on-rush of events. Hegel writes cheerfully. He wisely seeks to turn the eyes outward, to point the man to his work as a citizen. In November, 1821, he wrote: “You are happy in having a fatherland that has played so great part in the world's history, and that without doubt will have a still more exalted destiny. Other modern states might seem as if they had reached, or nearly reached, the end of their development; perhaps some of them already have back of them their culmination, and have now become static. Russia, on the other hand, even now perhaps the mightiest power among the others, gives promise of wondrous development. You are personally favored by your birth and fortune, by your talents and knowledge, by services already rendered; so that you may expect to fill in this colossal building a no unimportant place.”

Another of the students intimate with Hegel was Hinrichs. He at first studied law. He attended a course of Hegel's lectures on natural rights. Attracted at first rather out of curiosity, he gradually became deeply interested; and finally entered upon a thorough and absorbing study of Hegel's works. In the summer of 1818, Hegel set as the subject for a prize dissertation, “A Comparison of the Platonic Idea

¹ Rosenkranz, *Hegel's Leben*, p. 302.

and the Aristotelian Entelechy." Hinrichs presented a paper. This occasioned a personal acquaintance with Hegel. In 1820 Hinrichs habilitated at Heidelberg as private docent in philosophy. Soon afterwards he sent to Hegel, who meanwhile had gone to Berlin, the manuscript of a work for which he desired Hegel to write an introduction. Hegel's reply, fortunately, is preserved. It gives fine hint as to Hegel's kindly way of treating younger men just entering the path on which he himself was far ahead. He begins: "It has been a real pleasure, dear friend, to run through the manuscript you sent me, though I had not the time to read every word of it. [What a frank editorial admission!] I shall be heartily glad to meet your wish by writing for it an introduction to the public. While your pages are being printed there will be time. I am lecturing this summer on the philosophy of religion; and so already have had my thoughts turned in the same direction as your book." Then follow wise suggestions as to improvement of the style. "It might be well," he says, "to introduce paragraphs in which the reader may rest. The argument is too long sustained. There should be pauses, in which the threads are gathered up and neatly put in summary statement. Paragraphing should be attended to, with easy transitions; for your writing is meant to have readers, as well as to be a proof of your *donum docendi*. Explanation and illustration are not to be forgotten. You write for a public that reads and studies—rather more reads than studies—and this public demands introductions and reflections; and—rightly too—sees therein the *teaching power* as such." And so the letter goes on with helpful particularity, and not mere general captiousness. It closes: "Keep on in your work of writing and lecturing; and be always assured of my hearty sympathy. Yours,

HEGEL."

Hegel seems to have had little of the spirit of aloofness;

though he did once say there was nothing in which one was so lonely, as in philosophy. His was a dignity that might be touched without crumpling. His walks, shared now and again by a student, amid the beautiful surroundings of Heidelberg; show us a pleasant side of the professor. We have had a word or two said of this, by d'Yxkull; and later it will be touched upon again in the account of Hotho, one of Hegel's students in Berlin.

In 1817-8 Victor Cousin, then about twenty-five years of age, visited Germany. Spending a few weeks at Heidelberg, he made the acquaintance of Hegel. This was the beginning of a long friendship.¹

Cousin, though an eclectic, regarded Hegel in many ways as his teacher. As a hint of this regard we may quote a sentence from a letter of 1826: "Je veux me former, Hegel; j'ai donc besoin tant pour ma conduite, que pour ma publication d'avis austère, et je l'attends de Vous. Sous ce rapport Vous me devez de temps en temps une lettre sérieuse."²

Of his visit to Germany and of the meeting with Hegel, Cousin in 1833 gave the following account: ". . . The great name of Schelling was heard in all the schools, here with approbation, there with almost malediction, everywhere

¹ The correspondence between Hegel and Cousin is given pretty fully in Janet, *Victor Cousin et son œuvre*; Ch. IX., Cousin et Hegel.

² Stirling gives an interesting anecdote, with his own setting: "Fancy the smile into which the iron of Hegel broke when the never-doubting M. Cousin requested a succinct statement of the system! 'Monsieur,' said he, 'ces choses ne se disent pas succinctement, surtout en Français!'" Unfortunately, Stirling's memory fastened this story on the wrong man. It should not be taken to add sound to the little slap at Cousin, in the "never-doubting." It was another Frenchman, Baron de Reiffenberg, who made that request of Hegel. I say this, assuming that Rosenkranz's statement is the original: "Es lag in Hegel eine durch seine ganze Jugendgeschichte vermittelte Sympathie für das Französische, wenn er auch in Lüttich einem Franzosen, dem Baron de Reiffenberg, welcher eine '*explication succincte de son système*' verlangt, sehr naiv antwortete: '*Monsieur, cela ne s'explique pas, surtout en Français.*'"



exciting that passionate interest, that mingling of ardent praise and violent attack, which we call fame. At this time I did not see Schelling, but, instead, happened to meet Hegel at Heidelberg. I began with him, and it was with him also that I finished my work in Germany.

"Hegel was not then the celebrated man he was when I saw him again at Berlin, with all eyes upon him, and at the head of a numerous and enthusiastic school. Hegel had as yet no reputation other than that of a distinguished disciple of Schelling. He had published books read by few; his lecturing was hardly beginning to make them better known. . . .¹

"Hegel did not know much more French than I knew German; and immersed in his studies, uncertain of himself and of his renown, he saw almost no one, and to say truth, did not seem particularly amiable. I do not know how a young man so obscure as myself came to interest him, but at the end of an hour we were at one with each other; and to the last our friendship, tested more than once, was firm. From this first conversation I divined his greatness, I knew his power, I felt myself in the presence of a superior man; and from Heidelberg going on through Germany, I spoke of him everywhere, I prophesied of him, in some sort; and on returning to France, I said to my friends, Sirs, I have seen a man of genius.

"The impression left upon me by Hegel was profound but confused. In the following year I sought out in Munich the originator of the system, Schelling. There could hardly be less resemblance than between master and disciple.² Hegel uttered with difficulty words rare and profound, almost enigmatical; his diction was powerful but embarrassed, his

¹ Rosenkranz rather demurs at some of these confident measurements of Cousin.

² Master and disciple are hardly the proper terms for Schelling and Hegel, after at least the early years at Jena.

countenance unmoved, his brow clouded—the image of thought turned back upon itself. Schelling, on the contrary, was thought easily unfolding itself; his speech, as his appearance, full of sparkle and life Hegel has borrowed much from Schelling; and I, far feebler than either, have borrowed from both. . . . It is more than twelve years ago that in dedicating to Schelling and to Hegel my edition of the Commentary of Proclus on Parmenides, I publicly named both as ‘my friends and my masters, the leaders of our time in philosophy — amicis et magistris, philosophiæ præsentis ducibus.’”¹

It may be said, perhaps, that Cousin had an apprehension but not a comprehension of Hegel. At Heidelberg, Hegel was surer of his course than the account of Cousin would indicate. Heidelberg, in fact, saw the completion—at least in outline—of the entire circle of Hegel’s system. There were to be rewritings and further development of special phases; but the whole was mapped out in his *Encyclopedia of the philosophical sciences*. The basis of this work had already been laid in his *Propædæutic* for the gymnasium.² His efforts to make this latter clear and understandable stood him in good stead now. In the preface he speaks against writing for show. His work, too, is constructive; he declares against the poverty of thought and shallowness of mere skepticism. There is to be knowledge beyond the mere immediacy of feeling; and the book is dedicated to seekers after such knowledge.

“In the first edition of the *Encyclopedia*,” says Rosenkranz, “there is everywhere the creative breath of fresh production.” And that phrase is descriptive, too, of Hegel’s manner in the lecture room. His lectures seem not to have been

¹ Victor Cousin, *Fragmens Philosophiques* (ed. 1833), p. xxxvii.

² For part translation and outline of the *Propædæutic*, see Translations, Selection 49.

finished products. They had a scheme, of course—there was an ideal which he wanted them to reach; and this, like an Aristotle's entelechy, governed the delivery. But the lecture itself was a thing of travail. He was not so much repeating something he had learned by heart, as creating then and there a new order out of the rich chaos of ideas at his disposal. Thaulow tells us that Hegel took only a sketch of his lecture to his chair, little scraps with notes, and spoke from these.

He held it essential that the students should have at hand a statement of the main conceptions of the subject matter of his courses.¹ He therefore published his *Encyclopedia*, as well as his *Philosophy of Rights*. This fact will account for the form, at least of the early editions. They take for granted the exposition and illustration of the teacher in the class-room.

In Heidelberg, Hegel was not discontented. But with the resumption of academic activity, his horizon had widened and he could not but think of the possibility of a growing recognition of his philosophy; and for this, Heidelberg did not promise most. The glorious country about Heidelberg seems to have been more enticing to the pleasure-loving disposition of the students, than provocative of research and reflection; and, if they were not unindustrious, their interest chose the positive sciences and professional study, rather than philosophy.

The authorities at Berlin had not forgotten Hegel. Their call of a year or so before, tendered him while at the gymnasium, had been somewhat hesitating. They thought that his long absence from a university had, perhaps, unfitted him

¹ "Das Bedürfniss, meinen Zuhörern einen Leitfaden zu meinen philosophischen Vorlesungen in die Hände zu geben, ist die nächste Veranlassung, dass ich diese Uebersicht des gesammten Umfanges der Philosophie früher ans Licht treten lasse, als mein Gedanke gewesen wäre."—*Preface to first edition of Encyclopedia.*

for lecturing to mature students. But these doubts seem now to have been quite set at rest by Hegel's success at Heidelberg; and on the 26th of December, 1817, Altenstein, the minister of instruction, wrote Hegel, again offering him the chair of philosophy at the University of Berlin. Hegel accepted.

CHAPTER VI

HEGEL IN BERLIN: PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AND RECTOR

HEGEL is now forty-seven years of age, but he has the energy and joyous confidence of a younger man. The letters that he writes at this time from Berlin are full of appreciation of his new surroundings and opportunities. He puts everything in the best light. Altenstein is firm in friendship and in support. Outer circumstances are comfortable. So he enters upon this new and broadest stadium of his career with the brightest hopes. But he is not in a flurry, nor does he make a noise. Solger, in November, 1818, wrote to Tieck: "I was curious to see what impression the good Hegel would make here. No one talks of him, for he is quiet and busy."

In October, 1818, Hegel opened his lectures in Berlin with an introduction similar to that of his Heidelberg course. There is the same enthusiasm, the same belief in the high function of philosophy in culture, the same exultant pointing to Germany as the chosen land of philosophic thought, the same faith that here and now, in this lecture-room, a further progress of the spirit is at hand.

Philosophy was not to be merely critical. Kant's word that antithesis, contradiction, was the outcome of rational thought, was not to be the final word of philosophy. The infinite and divine were to be something more than the positings of a merely practical theory; they were somehow to be grasped by thought as its most real possession. Hegel called to youth who were still "free from the negating

spirit, from the emptiness of a merely critical effort. A heart that is healthy still has the courage to ask for truth. It is the realm of truth which is the home of philosophy; which she builds, and to which she leads us through her study. Whatever in life is true, great and divine, is so through the Idea. The aim of philosophy is to comprehend this Idea in its truth and universality."

In 1820, Hegel was appointed on the government board of examiners for the Province of Brandenburg. In this capacity he had to examine in philosophy candidates for school positions. He had also to pass upon the German essays submitted by the gymnasial graduates, the *Abiturienten*, seeking entrance to the university. In his judgment of the pupils, says Rosenkranz, Hegel was lenient. He did not think that original work should be demanded of youth, but rather a clear, appreciative reproduction of what had been studied in the gymnasial course.

But Hegel, interested though he was in the whole course of education, wished to concentrate his energy upon the teaching and developing of a philosophical system. Upon his request he was relieved of his duties as examiner. This was in 1822. His attention, however, was called now and again to gymnasial matters. In 1823, he writes a letter to the ministry of instruction on the teaching of philosophy in the gymnasium.¹ In this Hegel says, in part: "From many sides the complaint is heard that students come to the universities without a fit preparation for the study of philosophy.² I have been asked to state my opinion as to how this state of things might be properly met in the gymnasium.

¹ Hegel's *Werke*, XVII., 357-367. Cf. this letter with that to Niethammer: Translations, Selection 48.

² Rosenkranz, in his introduction to Hegel's *Propædæutic*, says that the naive philosophical confession of many *Arbiturienten*—and we might add, of the world in general—might be expressed as follows: "Man is a being who has body and

"But it is to be said, first, that the courses of the gymnasium will affect only those who attend the gymnasium; whereas, as a matter of fact, the entrance requirements of universities are so slack that many untrained and unprepared students are in attendance. As professor in the university here in Berlin, I cannot but look with apprehension upon the presence of university students lacking all information and culture. For the object of the teaching at a university is not merely to give equipment for bread-winning, but to culture the mind and spirit."

Hegel then recommends that university officers should advise all students seeking to enter the university, but who are yet unprepared, to fill up the lack elsewhere. He then passes to the main subject of his letter, the preparation in the gymnasium for speculative thinking and for the study of philosophy. There are two sides, he says, of such preparation, a material and a formal. To the material side belongs the gymnasium study of the classics. The disposition and imagination of the youth are informed by the great historical and artistic views of individuals and nations, from whose deeds and destinies moral and religious principles may be derived. But the study of the classic literature can be fruitful for the mind and for its higher activities, only as in the upper classes of the gymnasium the formal language work is

soul. The soul is a simple thing, which, however, possesses various faculties. Among these are the desires and impulses—a desire after knowledge, for instance. Unusual ideas arise from fancy. If one or more faculties of the soul are out of order, soul-sickness, or diseased mind, is the result. Such a condition is very dangerous. When a man sleeps he can also dream. After death, the soul is immortal. Knowledge is the having ideas of objects which impress us. These ideas we call conceptions. We distinguish these by marks more or less distinct, and arrange them in kinds and classes as best we may. Thought has certain rules or laws with which it must accord, else it will go lame. The judgment is a combination of different conceptions. A syllogism has three members, and can prove anything true. An orderly arrangement of all knowledge is called a system."

looked upon more as a means, while the content is the chief end in view—philology being kept for the more special work of the university.

Besides the classics, there should be taught the dogmatic content of religion. This should be treated in its true, objective aspect. Deep reverence for it should be instilled. There should not be merely theistic generalities, moralizing, or appeals to subjective feeling. In this case, capricious opinion is apt to be fostered and put in opposition to speculative thinking; the arbitrary and befogged understanding is made supreme, which either is indifferent to philosophy or lends itself to sophistry.

These studies—the classics and the truths of objective, dogmatic religion—are to give the pupil the taste for the higher philosophical work of the university. The material they furnish is, in the university, to be given philosophical system and form.

But there is an intermediate step, which must be taken by the gymnasium. General ideas and the thought-forms must be dealt with. Acquaintance and familiarity with formal thought must be regarded as the essential preparative for the university study of philosophy.

The history of philosophy, says Hegel, is not to be regarded as a fit preparative. Without the speculative idea, as a norm and touch-stone, such a history is apt to be a tale of chance, insignificant opinions, and easily leads to a contemptuous prejudice against philosophy. On the other hand, Hegel names the following as elements of an adequate propædæutic:

1. The so-called empirical psychology. This deals with the sensations, the imagination, memory and other powers of the mind. The field here is so wide that mere summary treatment is apt to be but trivial and pedantic. But such a study properly dealt with may introduce things necessary and interesting, and form a direct introduction to logic.

2. The chief part of the propædæutic should be the principles of logic. Omitting the speculative signification and treatment, the instruction as heretofore may be directed to the concept, the judgments, the syllogism in the various figures, to division, definition, and the methods of scientific proof. As a most important subjective result of this study it is to be noted that the attention of the students has been turned to the fact that there is a realm of thought by itself, and that formal thought may itself be an object of investigation. "That this," says Hegel, "is not beyond the power of gymnasial pupils, I have learned by several year's experience as professor of philosophical propædæutics and as rector in a gymnasium. And then, too, in my own case, it was in my twelfth year that, on account of being destined for the theological school, I learned the Wolfian definitions of the so-called *Idea clara*; and in my fourteenth year all the rules and figures of the syllogism. And if it were not so counter to the predilection nowadays for original thinking and activity, I should be inclined the more to advise this kind of study, for this reason: in order to possess knowledge—be it what it may, even the highest—one must have it in his memory; and if it be in memory early, one has just so much the more freedom and opportunity to use it in independent thought."

3. Metaphysics, properly speaking, should be excluded from the gymnasium. But there may be one phase of it that may enter, namely, that part of natural theology which treats of the proofs of the existence of God.

4. Rights, law, ethics, should be included. Definite ethical ideas of the nature of the will, of freedom, of law, of duty, should be given in the gymnasium. "And in our times," says Hegel, "there would appear to be most need, too, of imparting right notions concerning the duties of men as citizens."

So much for this letter. A fuller treatment of gymnasial propædeutics is given in the letter to Niethammer, included among the translations.

Hegel's first great literary work of the Berlin period deals with the concepts of rights and of the state. This work, like Plato's *Republic*, treats incidentally of education. The state itself is the outgrowth of nature and of culture, whose true end is to give freest development to all its citizens—a development never to be attained outside the institutional social life constituting the state.

At this time in Germany there was beating a new national life. The aims and ideals of this life were vague. The panorama of Napoleonic change had passed; but it had left brilliant memories, it had suggested fanciful possibilities, it had given aspirations after "new things," as Cæsar would say. This vague, yet warm and glowing feeling after nationality was strongest among the patriotic bands of students. The *Burschenschaft* dreamed, and sang, and made political speeches. So far, harmless. Then it killed Kotzebue. Stern governmental repression was the result.

Hegel was a man of moderation. His enthusiasm was gently constructive; his patriotism reflective, civilizing. He was, however, neither cold nor pedantic. This may be shown by the fact that, while opposing the more sentimental, passionate, ill-advised movements of youth, he still had a loyal following among the young.

Many young men, says Rosenkranz, after the beginning of the repressive measures against the *Burschenschaft*, had come to Berlin. They became Hegel's hearers, and thankfully attributed to him a truly new life. They formed the kernel of a gradually growing constituency. "Very many names of brave men now in high regard might here be mentioned who stood in this relationship to Hegel, and for whom he was unweariedly active with fatherly affection and self-

sacrifice.”¹ Sometimes his good-will led him into adventure. One example may be given: One of his hearers was imprisoned for some political charge. The prison overlooked the Spree. His friends, wishing to show their sympathy, betook themselves to boat and rowed beneath his window to speak with him. One attempt was unsuccessful. The friends, also hearers of Hegel, induced him to accompany them on a second visit. A bullet from the watch might have put an end to the undertaking. It appears that on the water Hegel felt some misgivings. When the boat came beneath the window conversation was to begin, and in Latin for safety’s sake. Hegel confined himself to some innocent common-places; asking, for instance, of the prisoner: “*Num me vides?*” As the window was but an arm’s length away, this question gave rise to no little merriment. We may be glad to know that the fun did not have a bad sequel; for, upon trial, the student was acquitted.

Goethe, in a letter of 1820 to Hegel, writes appreciatively of the latter’s influence as educator of young men. He says, “I am glad to hear from many sources that your efforts to educate young men are bearing the best of fruits. It is well indeed that in these wondrous times there is a teaching spreading out from some center by which, both theoretically and practically, one’s life may be shaped.”²

¹ Rosenkranz, *Hegel’s Leben*, p. 338.

² Given in Hegel’s *Werke*, XVII, p. 502. Hegel and Goethe were friends. In one of Hegel’s letters to his wife there is a pleasant account of a visit to the poet. Hegel’s interest, too, in Goethe’s color experiments is but another facet of his many-sidedness. In the summer of 1821, Goethe sent Hegel a drinking-glass with this dedication:

“Dem Absoluten
empfiehlt sich
schönstens
zu freundlicher Aufnahme
das Urphänomen.

To the absolute, hoping that he will accept this with best wishes, from the primal phenomenon.”

By opponents Hegel was looked upon as a quietist in politics—as the government philosopher. His great *credo*¹—when properly understood a very bulwark of soul strength—that what *is* is reasonable, seemed, when taken on the surface, but a weakling's shrug at efforts for reform. But Hegel's "is" is more than momentary. It stretches to that far off, divine event, standing at the end of which one might look back and say: "All has been well, for it has led to this." That end is held as present in Hegel's "is." And such an "is" does not lead to quiescence, though it gives peace. The end, if that word may be used of timeless matters, is seen to be the result of contest, conflict, triumph; its essence is active. It is never-dying enmity—without rancor, because on the winning side—against the dark, ignorant, cruel evil; and so it is not mere momentary, empty being, but is permanent, and is filled with the joy of overcoming.²

But Hegel was human; and we find him sometimes charging as most unreasonable those men who differed with him as to the meaning of rationality. They were dreamers, they were shallow, their patriotism a "slopping over" of sentiment. Fries was a leader of blockheads—a "*Heerführer aller Seichtigkeit*." Quite an unpleasant picture might be drawn in this light. But it is aside from our purpose. A stroke of it has been brought in to save this sketch from being merely eulogism. And even this black stroke might be softened by the remark, that Hegel's polemic was not so much personal as doctrinal. Then, too, from the times of

¹ "Was wirklich ist, ist vernünftig; was vernünftig ist, ist wirklich."

² Noble things might be said of Hegel as reformer. He is an example of the high type outlined in Emerson's essay, Man as Reformer. "The mediator between the spiritual and actual world should have great prospective prudence," says Emerson; and such had Hegel.

What Grimm says of Goethe might be said of Hegel also: "Goethe hat aufgebaut. Goethe hat niemals für augenblickliche Zwecke eine 'Partei' bilden wollen. . . . Goethe wirkte sanft und unmerklich wie die Natur selber."

Paul and Silas to those of Milton and of the *Post*, castigatory epithets, mixed with a little high-souled venom, have not been uncommon. Nor, upon the whole, are they unkind; they generously give one's opponent opportunity for keenest counter-thrust, and, when the antagonists are noble, lead to reconciliation and honorable amends. Witness Hegel and Schleiermacher.

Hegel was responsive to his environment. Ever a lover of men and of cities, seeing in the state the supreme outcome of nature and of mind, and in the art works made possible by society the purest expression of the human spirit, Hegel was at home in Berlin—a treasure city of art and science, and the capital of a growing state. Eagerly and delightedly he attended concert, theater, picture-gallery and exhibition. “It is laughable,” says his biographer, “now and then to find Hegel described as a philosopher who hardened into a dreary, abstruse logician, without appreciation for works of the imagination. This is utterly untrue. In fact, of those philosophers who have founded systems, Hegel stands pre-eminent for having put the whole realm of art to philosophic scrutiny. Other nations, in their judgment on this point, have been more just than the Germans. Bénard, the French translator of Hegel's *Aesthetik*, says in his preface: ‘Nous le dirons sans craindre, qu'on nous accuse, de nous laisser entraîner à l'exagération par un faux enthousiasme: nul philosophe n'a développé avec autant de profondeur et d'étendue l'idée de l'art; nul n'a déterminé et caractérisé les principales époques de son histoire avec le même précision; nul enfin n'a présenté une classification et une théorie des arts, qui soit plus capable de satisfaire l'esprit philosophique de notre siècle. D'ailleurs, le système mis à part, on trouvera en abondance dans ce livre des vues originales, des aperçus nouveaux, des appréciations justes, des

jugements d'une haute portée.'"¹ And an American expositor says: "The Aesthetics of Hegel is a voluminous treatise, and more easy of comprehension than any other of his works. Its appearance began a new era in art criticism, and it has been the mine from which many subsequent writers have drawn their treasures. To read it intelligently will open new vistas and make possible new enjoyment for any cultured reader."²

But Hegel saw and described and philosophized about life and art, not alone for the public, but for the home circle as well. His letters indicate this. Those now to be mentioned are especially interesting in this connection.

In 1822, Hegel made a trip of a few weeks to Holland; in 1824 to Vienna, and in 1827 to Paris. We have a full record of these journeys, in the letters to his wife. These letters give many pleasant views of Hegel. He was the most conscientious of travelers, seeing everything he could; and yet he did not forget his home. These letters take up ninety printed pages.³ We translate but a few lines from several of them, for their life and color.

During the trip to Holland, 1822

Sept. 15, 1822.

Good morning, dear Mary, from the sunshine of *Mary's*-burg, for this is Magdeburg, the Magd [Maid] being the V. Mary, to whom the cathedral here was dedicated. . . . Yesterday I saw what was to be seen here—the celebrated cathedral, among other things. It may be famous because it is a cathedral; but, architecturally, it is not so well conceived as our gothic churches of Nürnberg. . . .

¹ Rosenkranz, *Hegel's Leben*, p. 348.

² Kedney, *Hegel's Aesthetics: A Critical Exposition*. Preface.

³ *Werke*, XVII, 544-624.

KASSEL, 18 Sept.

The night was beautiful, the stars shone gloriously, the morning star more lovely than all. When it was day we saw quite another face of nature. No longer the flat fields, but fine oak forests and hills, the soft slopes of which were covered with fruit, while at their feet spread the meadows—in short, Nature in her homelike aspect. I enjoyed my Englishman [a fellow traveler]. He is a young man of 25 or 26, a fine-looking man, good natured, and well informed. . . .

KOBLENZ, 24 Sept.

Here I am seated, Dear, by a window overlooking the Rhine—my favorite—to think of you all, and to write to thee. . . .

BRUSSELS, 3 Oct.

After I had attended service in the cathedral, and had taken leave of the good people who had been my kind entertainers, started out in the afternoon for Aachen. I had the good company of an oldish German who had become an Englishman, and of an advocate from Köhr, who always carries Goethe's *Faust* with him as a Bible. . . . [Hegel then writes of his visits to the picture galleries. "What loveliness! What beauty!" he exclaims. Then he continues the description:] A woman and child, attributed by some to Michael Angelo, is a wonderful painting. But the Night of Correggio!—as I call the Dresden picture, the Day of Correggio, so this, the true Night—what a picture! The light radiates from the child. Mary seems to me lovelier here than in the Dresden picture; she, as well as the very surroundings, is smiling. There is a joyous seriousness about it. The luminous darkness—as in Correggio's pictures at Sanssouci, his later mode—is magnificent. . . .

BREDA, 9 Oct.

My curiosity has gotten the better of me, and instead of going straight on, I have tarried to see a monument that was

finished by Michael Angelo. By Michael Angelo! Where in all Germany is there to be seen a work by this master? . .

From Aachen to Lüttich the road is full of beggars. Here we have not met one. The village people are all well-clothed—the children playing merrily, and none in rags, none without shoes and stockings. . . .

HAAG, 10 Oct.

One must see the churches of Ghent and of Antwerp if he wishes to see fine, rich, catholic churches—vast, gothic, sublime—with painted windows (the most splendid I have ever seen are in Brussels). Quite high on the columns are life-sized marble statues—scores of them, and below them paintings of Rubens, Van Dyck, and their pupils—great and splendid canvases, some thirty, more or less, in a church. . .

AMSTERDAM, 12 Oct.

The first thing: I am happier than words can say that today I found your and dear Karl's letter at the post—such glad and joyous news from you. Well, *Gottlob!* The relief is great. So now, with a light heart, to give an account of myself. . . .

To and from Vienna, 1824

PRAG, 14 Sept.

. . . . Then I went to the theater, but to describe the play to you would take more time, paper, and memory than are mine. . . .

WIEN, 21 Sept.

. . . . In the Italian opera—piece from Mercadante. What men's voices! Two tenors, Rubini and Donzelli—what voices, what manner, charm, richness, strength, resonance. But one would have to hear them. . . .

25 Sept.

I have again been seeing and hearing much. So to give faithful report as heretofore. Thursday morning I saw the

zoölogical collections, rich and very finely located. . . . In the afternoon, another two hours in the Belvedere, and then to the Figaro of Rossini. Lablache, what a Figaro! Mad. Fodore, what a Rosine! Her singing is perfect. Such beauty, charm, art, freedom, taste in expression! And Lablache, a glorious bass! and how joyous and merry, with nothing low or common anywhere. . . .

3 Oct.

On the way back through the promenade, I hoped to gain opportunity for describing the elegance of the ladies here; but I saw none of the aristocracy. . . .

PRAG.

. . . . It has often troubled me to think that I am enjoying so much that is beautiful and am living in Utopia—is it well with my Marie, too? Then I should be easy. But you have been without much pleasure that I have had alone, without you. If only I could bring to you all the lovely things that I have seen and heard. . . .

From Paris, 1827

PARIS, 3 Sept., 1827.

. . . . It goes without saying that Cousin¹ and I are in happy cordiality together. We did not linger long at table, for *il a à veiller aux intérêts de Mde. Hegel*; that is to say, to see that this letter is mailed to-day, and that before two o'clock. . . .

19 Sept.

. . . . Yesterday I saw the English company render Shakespeare's Othello. Kemble, a celebrated English actor, was Othello, and Miss Smithson, Desdemona. It was a very peculiar affair, quite different from ours. . . . Such passion and ranting declamation would not be dreamed of by a Ger-

¹ Victor Cousin.

man actor or his audience. . . . I understood most all of it, for I read in the libretto word for word while they spoke. . .

20 Sept.

It is beautiful about Paris—a rich and varied landscape. No wonder that much time is spent in the country.

This evening I am going to the opera to hear the Pisaroni; and soon to the gallery in the Louvre.

About the ladies' costumes worn here, I have not yet written you. I can tell of no striking differences from those of Berlin, though to be sure I have not seen as yet the *haute société*, though in the theater prominent people enough. The hats . . . etc.

21 Sept.

. . . . Last evening I saw Romeo and Juliet by the English troupe. . . . Kemble in the first four acts, quite mild and tame; in the last act, however, terrible, maddened. Now I have seen the English raging in all its glory. It is wonderful how they spoil Shakespeare. In the last act Juliet awakes and Romeo is still alive, but having drunk the poison. Here are scenes in which they get beside themselves, and rage horribly. . . .

30 Sept.

[After an account of the world of things to do and see in Paris, he says]: In short, one must be six months in Paris to see but once round all that is so deeply interesting. Cousin has often laughed as I visited and found noteworthy this, that and the other thing, which my conscience as a traveler and the *Manuel des Étrangers* bade me examine. . .

In the winter of 1822 Hegel began his lectures upon the philosophy of history. This course of lectures he repeated five times. Such a work would seem the logical necessity of the man. Early interested in history, as a vast panorama of far-off and magnificent happenings, then by following that

very interest led into a new study of the society about him, he turns again to view philosophically the course of events from the distant to the near. His mind now has new categories and deeper insight. He will now not merely *feel* the significance of history, he will interpret it.

In a letter of 1822, Hegel says: "My lectures on the philosophy of history give me a great deal to do. . . . It is very pleasant to make the peoples of the world pass in review." He is conscious, however, of the vastness of his task. In the midst of it, after treating of eastern nations, he says: "I do not well see how I shall struggle through with it, when I come to our modern times, in the western world."

It is tempting here to stray into philosophical fields, even though one's step be uncertain. But there is an educational—not that that is complete without the philosophical—aspect of these lectures. Indeed, the whole historic drama is but a great school in which the spirit teaches its world—its *alter ego*—the great lesson of conscious freedom. Professor Giddings thus summarizes the *Philosophy of History*: "In Hegel's philosophy of history human development is conceived as a process of self-realization. Step by step, man comes to knowledge of himself as a self-conscious and self-determining being, and as a constituent in the universe which is an organic whole. But this progress is not intellectual only. The sphere of man's freedom also is widened. His activity finds an ever larger realm. History, therefore, has been a progress in the consciousness of freedom. It began when spiritual consciousness and aspiration dawned upon man. At first freedom was thought as abstract and universal, and it was therefore conceived as existing only in one person. That one was God in heaven or the monarch upon earth. This stage of history was worked out in the oriental world. In the Grecian world an advance was made. Freedom was no longer ascribed solely to one. Some were free,

many could be free, but not all. The slave remained. Rome carried the work of Greece somewhat further, embodying the substance of freedom in the formal law of personal rights. 'Finally, with the Germanic world, and under the inspiration of Christianity, we come to the age of full maturity, whose mission is to comprehend and carry out the truth that freedom is the birthright of all men.'"¹

Hegel's fame as a teacher grew more and more. It became the fashion to attend his lectures. Men of all ranks listened to him. Students from all parts of Germany, from all European nations, came to sit at his feet. Notwithstanding the halting delivery, the depth of content filled his hearers with the purest enthusiasm.

Self-seeking, of course, led some to attend. Hegelianism was becoming "the thing." What might not open up to one fitted to teach it?

But men like Hotho found in the teaching something strong and satisfactory—something that gave value to even the discouragements and perplexities of life. A pure breath of the spirit moved in the hearts of many. An ethical force centered in his room. The cool blade of his logic was hilted with rubies. The very intellect grew emotional.

There is a music of thought joined with fancy and aspiration. Under its influence things common are often seen to have a meaning as lofty as Jacob's ladder down which came the angels of God. Sometimes Hegel touched notes of such meaning. Then he was

Not harsh, and crabbed, as dull fools suppose,
But musical as is Apollo's lute.

We shall let Heinrich Hotho, one of Hegel's most distinguished hearers, echo this side of his teacher. This is his

¹ Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 302.

account:¹ “. . . Inwardly lived out and died out, without faith and without hope, I at last threw myself into the arms of philosophy. The precise steps thereafter I can no longer re-tell. But the full days of learning and of effort, the dawning brightness of the first comprehension, the wide horizon that opened, the guiding hand reached out to me, the riches without stint that daily streamed in, until I had the unexpected joy of feeling that a key had been found which might open every secret of God's world—the memory of this joy yet endures, ever with the afterglow of a peace in the soul such as despairing ones may experience, when forgetting every earthly woe they feel themselves endlessly uplifted to the pure activity of heaven. Hardly a year passed before I found myself a new creature.” Thus, and for a page or so more, he tells of his inner pilgrimage, led by Hegel, to new faith and insight—to eternal truths that still might be grasped here and now. “But,” he continues, “this is not the place to say more of the wonderful and powerful teaching which wrought this change. You will get some further hint of it, however, from the following description of the man whom I thank for it: .

“It was at the beginning of my student years that one morning, with a mingled feeling of fear and confidence, I entered Hegel's room for the first time. He sat before a broad writing table, and was searching hurriedly among the mass of books and papers that lay upon it. The figure had changed early; it was not erect, but full of original vigor and strength. He wore a yellow-gray dressing gown, easy and long enough to reach to the ground. He was not of imposing stature, nor was there any especially attractive charm about him. What struck one was his air of old-world, honest frankness. I shall never forget my first impression of his face. The features were faded but reposeful, without a

¹ Hotho, *Vorstudien für Leben und Kunst*, p. 381 seq.

trace of passionate disturbance. They seemed to reflect an infinity of silent thought. The battle of doubt, the storm of an increasing ferment of thought during forty years of seeking and of finding, did not seem to have conquered, nor even to have left a scar. There was only the untiring effort to unfold the early-found germ of truth into ever richer and deeper, ever firmer and more inevitable forms—only this effort had put furrows in brow and cheeks and mouth. When the intellect was not aroused the features seemed aged and withered. But when it awoke there was seen the deep earnestness of a thought which had been the outgrowth of years of patient study. How full of dignity the head, how noble the nose, the high though somewhat retreating brow, the reposeful chin. Good faith and rectitude in matters great and small, the clear consciousness of having with his best powers sought to be satisfied with the truth alone, were nobly expressed in his face. I had expected some examination, or some inspiring word about philosophy, and was surprised enough at something very different. Having but just returned from a trip to the Netherlands,¹ he could talk of nothing but the cleanliness of the cities, the charm and hard-won fertility of the country, of the green, wide-stretching meadows, the flocks, the canals, the tower-like mills and easy roadways, of the art treasures, of the staid and proper citizens—so that at the end of a half hour I felt myself at home both in Holland and with himself.

“A few days afterwards, when I saw him in the lecture room, it was hard at first to get used either to his mode of delivery or to the sequence of his thought. Relaxed, grimly almost, he sat with head bent, turning over and over the pages of his manuscript, while he spoke. A constant hacking and coughing broke the flow of his speech; every sentence stood alone, thrust out, as it were, brokenly; every

¹ Hegel made this journey in 1822.

word, every syllable was let go unwillingly, as if each were the most important and deserved especial emphasis. But the whole effect was to deepen my respect, to impress me with his worth. By his very earnestness, despite his peculiarities and my little comprehension of what was said, I felt myself irresistibly drawn to him. Soon by zealous attendance I grew used to the externalities of his delivery. And then the meaning of what he said became vivid, and I saw it as a whole and so could judge its worth.

“A smooth flowing eloquence presupposes a free and easy acquaintance with the subject, and a certain formal readiness can send even platitudes from the tongue trippingly and pleasantly. But Hegel’s task was to bring out the mightiest thoughts from the foundations of things, and to give them living force; they must, therefore, even though they had been dealt with for years, be brought forth ever anew in the living present. A more striking picture of this difficult process than that given by Hegel lecturing, could not be conceived. Like the oldest prophets who struggle to make speech compressed, so as more tersely to tell the thought within, which struggles but half victoriously for utterance, so Hegel fought and conquered, though being hard pressed. Wholly giving himself to the subject, he seemed to develop it out of itself, and for its own sake, and hardly for the hearer. And yet it sprang from him alone; and an almost paternal care for clearness tempered the iron earnestness which otherwise might have repelled one from taking in ideas so recalcitrant. He began haltingly, struggled on, began once more, paused, spoke, reflected—the fitting word seemed ever lacking, but in a moment was given unerringly; it seemed too common, but was inimitably adequate. . . . Now one had seized the clear meaning of a proposition, and hoped for a further step—in vain. The thought, instead of proceeding, circled with similar wording about the same

point. But if the attention strayed for a moment and was then duteously turned back, it was punished by seeing that it had lost the connection. For imperceptibly almost, proceeding by apparently insignificant steps, the full thought had been shown to be limited, to be one-sided; its differences had been developed into contradictions, the victorious solution of which was seen only in the final re-union [reconciliation on nobler terms] of what before had been opposed. And so, ever carefully taking up the preceding, in order to unfold its implicate antitheses and then to blend them in richer harmony, the wonderful thought-stream pressed and fought its way along, now dividing, now uniting, hesitating sometimes, then leaping on, and always advancing. But he who could follow with complete understanding, without swerving right or left, felt himself thrilled with adventurous excitement. To what depths were his thoughts taken—ever at the point of losing all that had been won, the toil all in vain, the utmost might of the intellect forced to halt. But in just these depths that powerful spirit moved and worked with calm confidence. Then only did the voice raise itself, the eye sent a gleam over what had been gathered together, and glowed with the still fire of assurance, while with never lacking words he touched all the heights and depths of the soul. His speech in these moments was so clear and full, so simply truthful, that every one who could grasp it felt as if he himself had been discovering the thought it unfolded.

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“A few years afterwards I had the good fortune to be counted in the inner circle of his younger acquaintances and friends. As I look back, what stands out prominently was his thoroughly consistent character. His sentiments were one with his philosophy; his inner feeling was in closest harmony with his thinking, his personal will was one with his philosophic conviction. . . . With the greatest independence, he

was still most reverential. In religious matters he fought with the sharpest weapons for the enlightened freedom of thought, while he went beyond most in his acceptance of orthodox doctrines. In politics he inclined to the main features of the English constitutional government. The privileges of primogeniture and of rank he defended. . . . He was bitter against the demagogues who were ever seeking "new things" in statecraft. Against the caprice of personal opinion, subjective fancy, arbitrary passion, he set himself, seeking to do away with these from youth up, and to put in their place—to do away by putting in their place—a just appreciation of the real, the lawful, the substantial. The senses, sentiments, impulses, wishes and will were to be brought into free harmony with the necessary and rational, and their accord made habitual. . . .

"From early youth, Hegel had given himself devotedly to every sort of scientific study. For some years, like Schiller, he had lived in almost monastic seclusion, but had felt the longing for active life. When he came from out the silence, life put him in a hard school. He was in the midst of difficulties. Though he clearly saw the need of a thorough working over and reform of philosophic theory, he was far at that time from feeling in himself the might for such an undertaking. He was one of those strong natures that only in manhood reveal their depth; but then the more complete and broad is their unfolding. When I learned to know him, his chief works had been published, his fame was established, and outwardly, too, he was in happy circumstances. Thus at peace within and without, his whole demeanor—when unfretted by bodily pain—had the utmost kindness. How gladly I accompanied him on his daily walks. He seemed to move almost wearily, but really he was more energetic and strong than we younger men. He was ready for every pleasure party; indeed, recreation, as he grew

older, was the more sought. At such times, who would have thought him the deepest spirit of his age? He liked gossip talk, and though not refusing conversation on scientific matters, seemed rather to avoid than to invite it. Talk of the day and of the town was agreeable to him; political happenings, occurrences in the art world, were unfailing topics. As such were his play and pastime, he often defended what more seriously he had opposed, and bantered me with my judicial sobriety and matter-of-factness. How vivacious he became in these hours. If he were walking with one, he would stop every moment, speak, gesticulate, or let ring out a hearty laugh. And whatever he affirmed, even if to afterthought it seemed untenable, one felt constrained to accept, so clearly and forcibly expressed was every word, every opinion, every sentiment. He was glad to go to concerts and theaters; merry, quick to applaud, fond of a joke, content with the commonplaces of social intercourse. He had his favorites among singers, actresses and poets.

"In business matters his discriminating mind was so exact in weighing, before action, pros and cons, that men of quick decision were in despair with him. But his resolution when formed was final.

"When he was in the midst of friends, his genial comradeship distinguished him. Not a master, perhaps, of the lighter *bon mots* of society, he had that ceremonious but easy approachability, united with humor when it was the time for jest, with seriousness when such was required, and always with such a general benevolence that those about him instinctively met him on like ground. He was fond of the company of ladies, and, if on intimate terms, the fairest was sure of an attention which had the sportiveness of youth softened by the fatherly courtesy of approaching age. The more recluse had been his earlier laborious years, the more did he enjoy in these later years the social circle; and as if

his own depth needed the contrast of the superficiality of others, the meeting with people of the most ordinary minds was pleasant to him; indeed, he even seemed to have for these a sort of good-hearted preference. With what unostentatious dignity and unfeigned earnestness did he act when public occasion demanded. How many hours of advice, of examination, of encouragement, did he give those who sought him for these. And as Plato in his *Banquet* glories over the self-possession and endurance of Socrates in efforts that exhausted others, so was Hegel of all those whom I have ever seen the one who most has impressed me as a man capable and full of joyous energy."

In 1826 Hegel's friends celebrated his birthday. Young and old gathered about him. His family, however, were absent at Nürnberg. But Hegel wrote them about the kindness which had been shown him. ". . . In the morning, various congratulations given by dear, true souls and friends; and several letters and poems, too. . . ." And so the letter goes on describing, with never an eye to the public, the festivities of the day. "You can't think," it says, "what hearty, deep-felt assurances of confidence, of love, of regard, I got from dear friends, young and old. It was a day to repay one for the labors of life."

In 1830 Hegel was chosen rector of the university. We have the Latin speech he delivered upon taking office. It is the swan note before the end. "It is not ours," he says, "to contend against human malignity, nor to fight the diseases which threaten our bodies, nor other ills that weigh upon human frailty. Our dwelling place has not yet been disturbed; we are in a haven not yet visited by storm. . . . Our work is with youth; our care: letters, arts, science of things divine and human. Contemplation is ours, and the educating and preparing lives for the toils and trials of the future

—occupati sumus contemplando, docendo, præparandis animis ad pericula et labores futuros.”

But in the next year the storm beat upon that haven. Pestilence entered many homes. Hegel was taken. “He had begun his winter lectures,” says Caird, “with a fire and energy of expression which surprised his hearers. . . . But on Sunday [November 13] he was suddenly seized by cholera in its most virulent form, and the next day passed away in a quiet sleep without ever having felt an apprehension of danger. . . . ‘His death,’ wrote Varnhagen von Ense, ‘was as fortunate as death can ever be. With unweakened spirit, in vigorous activity, at the height of his fame and influence, surrounded by the proofs of his success, content with his position, taking a lively share in the social pleasures and showing a friendly sympathy in all the life of the capital, he passed away from all these interests without regret or pain, for the nature and name of his illness remained unknown to him, and he might fall asleep with dream of recovery. But for us, what an awful void! he was the corner-stone of our university.’”

We have thus followed the outward, temporary occurrences of Hegel's career. We have seen that though marked by little that is romantic or adventurous, they are nevertheless surcharged with life and meaning. Hegel may not be the Hero as philosopher. Hegel's spirit was not Promethean. Why should it be?—it was one with the divine decrees. Hegel was not pessimistic, like Schopenhauer, nor optimistic—almost too easily—like Emerson. He was not a defiant reformer like Rousseau or Voltaire. Hegel could indeed say, “Ich bin der Geist der stets verneint.” But his denial was directed against the partial, the skeptical, the material, the animal—it was denial of the pri-

macy of these in order to affirm the whole, the assertory, the free, the spiritual. If Hegel was not like the sea-surf dashing in high, white splendor against the cliffs, he had something adamantine, solid, steadfast about him, like the cliffs themselves, without which the surf would not be.

As teacher, we have felt his temporary influence through the accounts of d'Yxkull, Hinrichs and Hotho, Cousin and Goethe. But Hegel has permanent influence. Rosenkranz writes of him as "Nationalphilosoph;" Michelet as "unwiderlegter Weltphilosoph." Véra writes: "Nous n'hésitons pas à proclamer Hegel comme un des plus puissant penseurs, le plus puissant peut-être, qui ait jamais existé." Dr. Harris speaks of Hegel in terms Dante might have used, had the inspiring power of Vergil and of Beatrice been united in one person.

Hegel is indeed an educator of men beyond their school days. His words concerning the school itself have therefore an added value. It is to these that the reader is now invited.

PART II

HEGEL'S VIEW OF EDUCATION

INTRODUCTION

I

HEGEL did not live to write a *Science of pedagogics*. The seed thoughts of such a work, however, are contained in his writings. Rosenkranz, perhaps the man most after Hegel's mind, has developed these in his *Philosophy of education*. Still it is important to go back to the seed thoughts. Those of Hegel, like maple seed, are winged, and not all fell upon Rosenkranz. Some are still but seeds, and capable of fruiting upon any fit soil.

II

What of Hegel's relation to Herbart? In 1809, while Hegel was schoolmaster in Nürnberg, Herbart was called to Königsberg—to the chair of philosophy made famous by Kant. The holders of this chair had to give lectures on education. In connection with his course of lectures, Herbart established a model school and training class. This was the beginning of the influence which later was to be dominant. Herbart's work as an inspirer of educators was to be greater than his work as philosopher. His metaphysics seem now to have been left to one side; while the half-loaf of his educational theory would, by some, be distributed to feed every sort of soul hunger. It may be better

truly to regard it as partial, and to look elsewhere—perhaps to Hegel—for the wider philosophical views into which it may fit as a not inharmonious fragment.

To the question, Was Hegel influenced by Herbart? only a negative answer can be given. Rosenkranz says:¹ “Herbart’s philosophy was little attended to at that time. His local isolation in Königsberg, and the late publication of his greater systematic works, were two of the causes of this. Despite Hegel’s great interest in every occurrence of the literary and scientific worlds, it cannot be learned from any of his papers that he ever read a book of Herbart.”

Hegel and Herbart would agree in their conception of the worth of a many-sided interest.

But Herbart regards the interest rather as a flame set on fire from without, while with Hegel it is the spontaneous, self-determined act of the mind. Herbart regards the child’s mind more as the creature of a well-arranged plan of in-pourings, while Hegel would lead the mind to go out and conquer what it wishes—its wishes being made rational by education.

Herbart sees in the mind a power, indeed, but merely of infinite receptivity, and of reaction thereupon. Logically, perhaps, resignation is Herbart’s last word; though his own spirit and trend carry him to a freer conviction.

Hegel sees in the child-mind the potentiality of becoming one with the universal mind, which is free and self-determined, which embraces and shapes all change. His last word is freedom.

III

Hegel’s freedom is not license. When perfect, it knows and wills the universal. Becoming perfect, it is rationally active. It swims, not merely floats, in the tide of affairs. It

¹ *Hegel’s Leben*, p. 268.

has the good will, part of which ever strives to know the right will. It is not merely formal; it has content. It studies history, art, sociology, philosophy. It has an ideal of the state, and seeks to actualize it by adding force to whatever tends toward it. It is social. It says, not I, but We. Individually, this freedom is to be won. Universally, it is a state always existent. The individual may participate in it, if he will; if not, he is but one of the nature-things, to be used as other will determines.


IV

Hegel's freedom is not isolation. It is not a prize for Crusoe. Nor is it for mere static society—a society without ideals. It is for a growing state. It perhaps would imply a world-state; for no individual is quite free while sympathetically he feels the chains of another. This is not to say that it implies a world-government, though there is nothing but the slow years to hinder that.

But to the present. The child is to become a citizen. His individuality is to have many facets, reflecting many relationships. Individually he must limit himself; choose this vocation, do this task, read that book, speak thus. "*Omnis determinatio est limitatio.*" But the substance which he shapes thus and so may be just as rich and intense as the civilization out of which it is taken. Hegel would make it the individual's duty to see to it that he participated in the substance of his civilization.

V

But individuals and states pass away. What is the enduring? Religion gives the first answer. The second, not annulling, but comprehending the essential spirit of the first, is given by philosophy. The institutionalized man must become self-conscious spirit. His thought must ripen into that comprehension which becomes transformed into being.



Religiously: "We shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is." Philosophically: In so far as one knows the absolute, he is it.

VI

Education is the process of all this. The schools, as part of this process, are so lifted into a high scheme of things. Their work is real and significant. Hegel helps to make this clear. Herein lies his value for us. He may not tell of many methods of instruction for the class-room, but he gives some insight as to what instruction and discipline are for; and such insight is perhaps what is needed most of all.

TRANSLATIONS

I. GENERAL NOTION OF EDUCATION

1. *Definition of Education*

EDUCATION is the art of making men moral.¹ It regards man as natural, and points out how he may be born anew—how his first nature may be changed to a second, spiritual nature.²

Education may be defined as the visible, progressive transcending of the negative or subjective. For, the child, as the form of the potentiality of a moral individual, is a subjective or negative. His becoming a man is the outgrowing this form; and his education is the discipline or process by which this is done. To gain his positive and essential character, he must be nourished at the breast of the universally moral; he first must live as a stranger in the absolute intuition of that morality; he must make more and more of it his own, and finally pass over into the universal spirit. It is evident from this that the effort to be virtuous, to obtain absolute morality through education, is not at all a striving after an individual and separate morality. Indeed, such an effort after a positive morality peculiarly one's own, would be vain and in itself impossible. Regarding morality, the wisest men of old said truly: To be moral, is to live in accord

¹ [Cf: "The one and the whole work of education may be summed up in the concept—Morality."—*Herbart*.]

² Hegel's *Werke*, VIII, 218.

with one's country;¹—and in regard to education, the answer of a Pythagorean to the question, What is the best education for my son?—That which makes him a citizen amid a great and good people.²

The spirit must be brought to lay aside its separateness, it must be brought to know and to will the universal. It must learn to live and have its being in the world-culture. This reforming of the soul—this alone is education.³

2. *Education should lead to reflective self-consciousness*

The child, as man in general, is a reasonable being. But the reason of the child as such is at first only an inner, that is, is present only as potency, faculty, etc.; and this inner at the same time has for the child the form only of an outer, apparent in the will of his parents, in the knowledge of his teachers, and in the surrounding world. The education and culture of the child consists then in this: what he is at first *in himself*, and so, *for others* (the adults), he must become *for himself*.⁴

3. *Education should make free*

Man becomes what a man should be only through culture.⁵

¹ [This may often be difficult: one's country may at times contain such contending tendencies. Cf. Renan, in his Discourse of May 15, 1886:—"Je suis, par essence, un légitimiste; j'étais né pour servir fidèlement, et avec toute l'application dont je suis capable, une dynaste ou une Constitution tenues pour autorité incontestée. Les révolutions m'ont rendu la tâche difficile . . . Or, j'ai soixante-trois ans; vous voyez combien mon cas est étrange; les légitimistes à ma façon se préparent en notre siècle de cruels embarras, car il faudrait aussi que les gouvernements fussent fidèles à eux-mêmes, et ils ne le sont guère, il faut l'avouer."]

However, this may be the case only with the *vertu politique*; it may be otherwise with the *vertus morales et chrétiennes*, as Montesquieu distinguishes them.]

² I, 399.

³ VII b, 82.

⁴ VI, 278.

⁵ Thaulow, *Hegel's Ansichten*, p. 14.

Culture in its absolute signification is freedom, and the work of attaining the higher freedom. It is the absolute transition to the unlimited subjective substantiality of morality, raised to the form of the universal. It is no longer immediate, natural; but is spiritual. This freedom is won for the subject through the stern strife against the naïve subjectivity of life, against the immediateness of arbitrary desire and passion. This stern strife makes many turn back. But it is only through this battle that culture is attained. It is through this that the subjective will wins in itself its objectivity, by which alone it becomes worthy and fitted to be the realization of the Idea.

This form of universality, to which the individual has been transformed, has this significance, that the individual becomes a true being-for-himself. While recognizing the content and the unlimited self-determination of the universal, yet, in the moral realm, the individual knows himself to be a free subject, infinitely existent for himself. This is the standpoint from which culture is seen to be the absolute's essential mode of progress, and to be of infinite worth.¹

4. *Education should lead to unselfish interest in what is actual and true*

To theoretic culture belongs the sense for objects in themselves, independently of any subjective interest. This is born of a many-sided knowledge. It possesses a universality of standpoint from which things may be judged. Thereby man rises from a particular knowledge of insignificant things to a general knowledge. Sharing in general interests, he meets other men in a community of knowledge. In going beyond his immediate knowledge and experience, a man learns that there are better ways than his own. He transcends himself, and can discriminate the essential from the non-essential.

¹VIII, 252.

Distinct knowledge has to do with the essential characteristics of objects under all circumstances. To culture belongs the judgment of the objects and the relations of actuality. This requires that a man know the origin, the nature, and purpose of a thing, and its relations to other things. These are not immediately given in intuition, but are gained by exhaustive study and reflection. The uneducated man stops at immediate intuition. He has no open eye. He has only a subjective seeing and comprehension. He does not see the whole thing. He only knows some of its characteristics, and these not completely. It is only the knowledge of the general standpoint that enables one to see what is essential. This standpoint is the main point of the thing studied. It contains the most important categories; in which, so to speak, all that one has to do is to place the object or event, which is thus easily and correctly comprehended.

The opposite fault to that of not knowing how to judge, is that of too quick judgment without understanding. Such hasty judgment arises from a man's having, to be sure, a standpoint, but one looking one way only. So he does not gain the full notion of the thing. An educated man knows the limits of his ability to judge.

Thus the sense for the objective in its independence belongs to culture. I am not to seek my particular subjectivity in objects about me. I must regard them as they are in and for themselves—in their independency, and not because of use to me.

This is the unselfish interest in science for its own sake. A self-seeking interest in nature is destructive of the sciences. Unselfish study places things in their living independence, cleansing them of the spots and rubbish put upon them from without.¹

¹Cf. Comte, quoted by Fiske, *Cosmical Evolution*, I, 252: "The most important practical results continually flow from theories formed purely with scientific

The objective has the form of universality, without wilfulness, whim, or caprice, and freed from partiality and the like. The objective is the aim of him who with single eye seeks the truth in its wholeness.¹

5. *Education gives individuality and power, and consciousness of these*²

It is through culture that the individual is given his actuality and counts for something. His true original nature and substance is the spirit of estrangement from his natural being. This externalizing himself, so to speak, is his aim, and makes up his existence. It is the process of transition both of the ideal substance into actuality and, conversely, of the determined individuality into essentiality. This individuality attains what it truly is by culture. Only so has it actual existence. So much culture, so much actuality and power.

The things of nature are immediate and singular. But man, as spirit, duplicates himself; since at first he is but one of the things of nature; and then, just as truly, exists for himself, beholds himself, pictures himself, thinks, and is a spirit only through this active being-for-himself.

This consciousness of self is attained in two ways. First,

intent, and which have sometimes been pursued for ages without any practical result. A remarkable example is furnished by the beautiful researches of the Greek geometers upon conic sections, which, after a long series of generations, have renovated the science of astronomy, and thus brought the art of navigation to a pitch of perfection which it could never have reached but for the purely theoretic inquiries of Archimedes and Apollonios. As Condorcet well observes, the sailor, whom an exact calculation of longitude preserves from shipwreck, owes his life to a theory conceived, two thousand years ago, by men of genius who were thinking of nothing but lines and angles."

¹ XVIII, 61.

² II, 369. [The reader is advised to hasten through the obscurity of this passage.]

introspectively, in so far as he himself, looking within, must bring himself to consciousness—must be conscious of what moves in his breast, of his impulses and passions. Secondly, through practical activity a man becomes an object for himself, since he has the impulse himself to produce what is given him as present and immediate, and so to know himself, to measure himself by his achievement. He does this by altering outer things; he puts upon them the stamp of the inner, finding in them again his own character. The first impulses of the child have this tendency to alter outer things. The boy throws a stone in the stream and is pleased with the circles made in the water. Thereby he becomes aware of his own activity. This tendency expresses itself most variously. And it is not only with outer things that man acts in this way, but also with himself. He does not leave his own nature as he found it, but alters it to his purpose. Forms, manners, every kind of outer expression, may be changed by spiritual culture.¹

6. *The culture of the race must be absorbed by the individual*

The individual must traverse the stages of culture already traversed by the universal spirit.² Doing this, he must yet be aware that the spirit has outgrown these older forms. He must pass through them as over a well-traveled and even way. Thus we see knowledges which in early times taxed the maturest minds of men, now become the property, or means

¹ *Xa.*, 41.

² [Herbert Spencer says: "The education of the child must accord both in mode and arrangement with the education of mankind as considered historically; or in other words, the genesis of knowledge in the individual must follow the same course as the genesis of knowledge in the race. To M. Comte, we believe, society owes the enunciation of this doctrine. . . ."]

Yet Hegel was Comte's forerunner, and Rein, in his *Outlines of Pedagogics*, mentions some twenty-four great men who have enunciated the same principle. In Lange's *Apperception* (trans. edited by De Garmo, p. 110 et seq.), there is a criticism of the crude application of this principle in school practice.]

for exercise and even play, of school children. This past existence now belongs to the universal spirit, which, constituting as it does the substance of the individual and his non-organic nature, appears to him as something outer. In this aspect, the education of the individual consists in his acquiring this which is already at hand, in his absorbing his non-organic nature and winning it as a possession for himself. Regarded from the side of the universal spirit, it is nothing else than this spirit's growth to self-consciousness. It is its becoming, and its reflection thereupon.¹

7. Mankind a unity in their rationality; but this does not mean unattached cosmopolitanism for the individual

It belongs to culture, to thought as consciousness of the individual in the form of universality, that the ego should be conceived as the universal person, wherein all persons are identical. So a man counts wherever he is found, not because he is Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian—but is man. This consciousness is of infinite importance. It is at fault, however, if it becomes a certain cosmopolitanism—too broad visioned to enter into the concerns of one's own country.²

Man is essentially reasonable. Herein lies the possibility of equality of rights of all men.³

8. The individual will of the pupil to be brought into accord with the social good

The peculiarities of men must not be rated too highly. The assertion, that a teacher must carefully adjust himself to the individuality of his pupils so as to develop it—this assertion is empty. The teacher has no time for that. The individuality of the children is met in the family. But with the school begins a life in accord with a general order,

¹ II., *Vorrede*, 23.

² VIII, 270.

³ VII b, 65.

after general rules for all. In school the spirit must be brought to lay aside its particularities, it must know and will the universal.¹

9. *Belief. Religious education*

By belief, I understand neither the bare subjective conviction, which is limited to the form of certainty, without reference to the content; nor, on the other hand, only the creed, the confession of faith of the church, which is formulated by tongue or pen, and may be taken up by the lips and put in the memory without being identical with the inner, with the knowledge and consciousness of one's self. According to the old and the true sense of the word belief, I count it as containing the one idea as much as the other. Though distinguishable, they are bound together into one. A religious society (the church) is in a happy condition when the distinction is merely formal; when neither the spirit of the people opposes any content of its own to the church's teach-

¹ VII b, 82. [Happily what is of general utility is also best for the development of personal originality. Under general law energy of will is increased; and this energy will find later its own pathway in the world. Madame Necker says: "Quand les limites de la liberté et du devoir sont effacées, le vague de l'incertitude se répand sur tous les projets et jusque sur les actions; on a toujours regret à la résolution qu'on n'a pas prise; on est toujours tenté de revenir sur ses pas. Pour préserver l'enfant et ensuite l'homme d'un tel tourment, il faut qu'une juste autorité préside au commencement de la vie en faisant une part bien définie à la volonté. Aussi l'éducation publique où l'on gouverne par des lois immuables, sans surveiller constamment les individus, est-elle la plus favorable au développement de l'énergie.—*L'éducation progressive*, I, 56.]

Childish individuality may have streaks that are non-social, and even anti-social. It is these—is it not?—that Hegel would meet with negating, authoritative teaching. It is then perhaps saying too much, to say with Caird: Hegel "was a strict disciplinarian, and altogether opposed to the Pestalozzian ideas of education then in vogue, according to which the teaching must accommodate itself to the individuality of the pupil, and as little as possible exercise any pressure upon his natural tendencies." The significant, social personality of his pupil, Hegel, would further, precisely through effecting a willing self-surrender of his perverse, tangential peculiarities.]

ings, nor the church's doctrines have mere external content untouched by the divine spirit. The activity of the church within itself consists chiefly in educating men—in the work of making the truth an inner thing, so that a man is taken up and permeated by it, and his self-consciousness finds itself and its essential being only in this truth. That these two sides are neither immediately nor firmly and lastingly united in all their elements, but that there is a separation of the immediate self-consciousness from the true content, is apparent in any long educational effort.

Consciousness of one's self is at first made up of the natural feeling and the natural will, with their idle thoughts and whims. The true content, however, is first presented to the spirit from without by spoken word or writing. Religious education should have this two-fold result: that the feelings which we have immediately from nature lose their dictatorship, and that what was merely verbal becomes living, personal spirit. This transformation and absorption of what was at first external is met by an enemy. The natural mind is its opponent, and must of necessity be such, because what is to be brought forth is not a natural life, but the free spirit. The natural enemy, however, has been conquered from the beginning, and the free spirit unchained. The battle with the natural is accordingly only a phenomenon of the passing individual. But another enemy opposes the individual—an enemy whose basis of attack is not only the merely natural part of man, but rather the supra-sensible in man—his thought, the spring of the inner itself, the seal of the divine origin of men. When thought assumes such independence that it becomes a menace to belief, then takes place a sterner, more stubborn fight than the first battle, in which were engaged only the natural will and the untutored consciousness which had not yet its true object. This thought is what is called human thought, subjective understanding, finite reason. It

is rightly distinguished from that thought which, though in men, is still divine; from the understanding which seeks not its own, but the universal; from the reason which sees, in the infinite and eternal, the alone existent.¹

10. *Religious teaching*

Teachers, who do not know how they should begin to teach religion, hold instruction in it to be unnecessary. But religion has a content which must be brought before the mind in an objective way. There are certain religious ideas that may be taught through words. It is another thing to warm the heart, to stir emotion. But this is not teaching. It is a calling-forth of subjective feeling, occasioned by, perhaps, a preacher's oratory, but it is not teaching. It is true that when a man starts from feeling, positing this as the first source, and then says that religious ideas come from feeling—it is true that he is partly right, inasmuch as the original determination lies in the very nature of the spirit itself. Nevertheless, feeling is so indeterminate that anything may arise from it. But the knowledge of what is given in feeling does not belong to the feeling itself, but is given through culture and teaching, which deal with ideas.

These teachers would have children, and men also, to be content with the subjective emotion of love. But love, to be pure, must rid itself of self-seeking;² it must be free. And

¹XVII, 280. [And this infinite Object of the Reason is not unattractive to Love. Spinoza: "Sed amor erga rem æternam et infinitam sola lætitia pascit animum, ipsaque omnis tristitiæ est expers; quod valde est desiderandum, totisque viribus quærendum."—*De intellectus emendatione*.]

²[It was Spinoza's grasp of this principle that worked so powerfully upon Goethe. *Dichtung und Wahrheit*:—"Nachdem ich mich nämlich in aller Welt um ein Bildungsmittel meines wunderlichen Wesens umgesehen hatte, gerieth ich endlich an die Ethik dieses Mannes. . . . Was mich aber besondere an ihn fesselte, war die gränzenlose Uneigennützigkeit, die aus jedem Satze hervorleuchtete. Jenes wunderliche Wort: "Wer Gott recht liebt, muss nicht verlangen, dass Gott ihn wieder liebe," mit allen den Vordersätzen, worauf es ruht, mit allen den Folgen, die daraus entspringen, erfüllte mein ganzes Nachdenken.]

only that spirit is free which has come out from its subjectivity and looked upon the Substantial as something placed over against the subjective, and higher. Only so does the spirit truly return to itself again. It must have felt the antithesis between itself and the Absolute Might. That is, the fear of God precedes true love of God. What is true in and for itself must be seen by the mind to be independent. The mind then relinquishes its self-seeking, and in recognizing the true, as such, gains true freedom.¹ [The very recognition, with utter yielding thereto, lifts the soul to the height of the thing it sees.]

We have immediate knowledge of God, which is a revelation within us. This is a fundamental truth, to which we must hold fast.¹

If religion be a matter of feeling alone, it flickers down to something idealess. It becomes inoperative, and so loses all determined content.²

11. *Ethical ideas are understood by the child, and should be taught*

It is one of the notions of modern days, that moral maxims and religious teaching are not for children; since, it is alleged, they do not understand them and can gather from them only words for the memory. But looked at more closely the matter may easily suggest that moral ideas *are* well understood by the child, by the boy, by the youth, in proportion to their age; and that our whole life is nothing else than a growing comprehension of their range and significance. We see them exemplified in ever new cases, and our knowledge of their many-sided meaning develops. In fact, were we to put off the teaching of these moral ideas

¹ Thaulow, *Hegel's Ausichten*, p. 109.

² *Ibid.*, p. 110.

until a man is able to grasp their whole meaning, very few persons need be taught, and these not much before the end of life.¹

12. *Moral education the common work of parent and teacher*

It is only by the common and harmonious effort of parents and teachers that anything can be done to counteract grave faults.²

Let us, parents and teachers alike, support each other in the work of the moral culture of the young. By uniting we may hope to see crowned with success our efforts to educate them to skillful, capable, moral manhood.³

II. HUMAN NATURE, WITH REFERENCE TO EDUCATION

13. *The ages of man*⁴

The development of the normal human being is made up of a series of processes. These change in accordance with the changing relation of the individual to the race and to the external world. They form the basis of distinction between childhood, manhood, and old age. These different ages are the manifestations of the alterations in the self-active Notion.

Childhood is the age of natural harmony, of oneness with self and the world. It is the beginning, just as old age is the end, disturbed by no antithesis between self and not-self. The child lives in innocence, without lasting griefs, in love for his parents, and in the consciousness of their love for him.

This immediate, and so non-spiritual, merely natural, unity

¹ XVI, 169. *Gymnasialrede*, Sept. 2, 1811.

² XVI, 158. *Gymnasialrede*, Sept. 14, 1810.

³ XVI, 199. *Gymnasialrede*, Aug. 30, 1815.

⁴ Thaulow says: "Many prominent teachers have thanked me for showing them this passage of Hegel. It is an epitome of the whole of pedagogics."

of the individual with his environment must be broken. The individual must come to the front, and stand over against the universal, which is being-in-and-for-itself, which is perfect and abiding. He must feel his independent self-hood.

But soon this feeling of self becomes just as one-sided as the child's entire lack of it. The idea is realizing itself in the world. But the youth attributes to himself the substantiality which belongs to the nature of the idea; while, on the other hand, the world seems to him but chance and accident. This false antithesis, however, cannot be maintained. The youth must grow to the insight that, on the contrary, the world is to be regarded as the substantial, while the individual is but the accidental. He must see that the activity and satisfaction essential to a man are to be found only in that fixed outer world which exists independently of him. He sees he must gain skill; he must adapt himself to demands without.

Attaining this viewpoint he has become a man. Complete in himself, the man looks upon the moral order of the world as something not awaiting his sanction before becoming operative, but as already essentially perfect. Thus he acts with, not against, the current of events; he is interested in advancing, not in retarding it; and so he rises above the one-sided subjectivity of the youth to the standpoint of objective spirituality.

Old age, on the contrary, is the return to indifference concerning affairs. The old man has poured his life into affairs. And so, in the end, his interest in them subsides into a feeling of unity. The inner coalesces with the outer.

We shall now treat of these life-periods more in detail.

Childhood may be divided into three stages, or, if we count the unborn child, into four. The child before birth has no peculiar individuality, none related in a particular way to particular objects. Its life is like that of a plant. At birth

it passes from vegetative to animal existence. This is a leap. The child passes from the condition of a germinally synthesized life into one of antithesis, of separateness. Light and air are without. He is brought into contact with them, and into ever multiplying relations to particular circumstances. He is nourished by a special act. Breathing is the first activity with which the child begins his individual existence. At birth the child's body is almost completely organized. The main subsequent alteration consists in growing. As regards this alteration, it is scarcely necessary to say that growth of animal life, as opposed to that of vegetable life, is no mere addition or off-shooting of other parts. It is a developing of the organism, and brings about a quantitative, formal difference, increasing in both bulk and strength. The animal, unlike the plant, has a body with members all interacting. They form one organism. This connection of all the parts with the negative, simple unity of the life, is the basis of the feeling of self. The animal organism attains its most perfect form in man. The most perfect animal has not the finely organized, the infinitely adaptable body that we see even in the young child.

As regards the spiritual development of the child in this first stage of its life, we may say that this is the time in which the human being learns the most. Now the child is made a confidant of all the senses. The outer world becomes a reality to him. He advances from sensation to perception. At first the child has only a sensation of the light by which things are visible. This bare sensation leads the child to seize after the distant as well as near. But the sense of touch teaches him better. His eye measures. He projects his world about himself. He learns, too, the resistance offered by external things.

The transition stage from infancy to boyhood has the following characteristics. The child's activity is directed more

and more upon the outer world; and along with his sense of the reality of the outer world he begins to be a real person, and to feel himself as such. This feeling is joined with the practical tendency to make all sorts of experiments upon his surroundings. For this practical activity, the child is fitted by the coming of his teeth, and by his learning to stand, walk and speak. The thing first to be learned is to stand upright. This is peculiar to man, and can be done only by the exercise of will. A man stands so long as he wills to stand. We collapse when we cease willing to stand. Standing is, therefore, an habitual willing to stand. A still freer relation to the outer world is attained by man through his power of walking. By this he does away with the limitations of space, finding the place he wants. Speech enables man to conceive things as universals. It leads him to the consciousness of his own universality—to the utterance of the I. This grasping of his I-ship is a most important gain in the child's spiritual development. At this point he begins to reflect, and is not all submerged in the outer world. This dawning independence first expresses itself in play with material objects.

In the passage of the child from play to serious study, he becomes a boy. In this transitional stage, children begin to be full of curiosity. They especially delight in stories. They seek rare and strange ideas. Above all is the awakening feeling that they are not yet what they are to be; and the ardent wish to become like the grown people about them. Out of this springs the child's desire to imitate. While the feeling of immediate unity with the parents is the spiritual mother-milk upon which the children thrive, still their own wish to be "grown up" has its influence, too. This personal aspiration for full development, is the lever to be grasped by education. But as the boy is still at the standpoint of immediateness, the higher to which he would

attain appears, not in any general or abstract form, but in the shape of some individual, either person, thing, or authority. It is this or that man who is the ideal which the boy strives to understand and to imitate. It is only in this concrete way that the child at this stage becomes acquainted with himself. Accordingly, what the boy is to learn must be set before him by authority and example. He has a feeling that what is thus set him is higher than he. In education this feeling is carefully to be kept uppermost. All play education, therefore, is a mistake. This seeks to teach while degrading earnestness to play. The teacher descends to the childishness of the pupils instead of lifting them up to serious realities. This play education may have throughout the whole life of the pupil the baneful result of making him account everything cheap. An equally bad result may be brought about by the foolish teacher who constantly prods on his pupils to an over-use of their minds. They become wise before their time. Of course the child must be stimulated to original thought. Yet the worthiest things are not to be sacrificed to his unripe understanding. But we pass to what more nearly concerns one side of education, that is, to discipline. The boy is not to be allowed to follow his own whim and fancy. He must learn to obey in order to command. Obedience is the beginning of all wisdom. For by this the boy's will is brought under the reasonable will imposed from without. The boy's will is not yet fledged, not truly independent and free. It has not learned to see the true, the objective, which makes for righteousness. If children are permitted to follow their impulses, if their self-will is unwisely yielded to, a most ugly habit of stubborn wilfulness is formed—of opposition, of selfishness. This is the root of all evil. By nature the child is neither good nor bad, since it is born with no knowledge of either good or evil. It is shallow to think of this unknowing inno-

cence as an ideal, and to aspire after it. Such innocence is of little worth and of short duration. Soon there appears in the child an evil self-will. This must be broken by discipline [*i. e.*, transmuted into good will, by the instilling of more generous motives]. In regard to the other side of education, instruction, it may be noted that it begins reasonably with the most abstract elements that the childish mind can grasp. These are the letters of the alphabet. These presuppose an abstraction not yet attained by some nations, *e. g.*, the Chinese. In general, speech is that airy element, that material immateriality by means of which the widening knowledge of the child is lifted more and more above the material and particular to the universal, and, so, to thought. This enabling to think is the chief service of the first education. As yet, however, the boy has attained only representative thought; he can but re-present the world in his notions of it. He learns the qualities of things, becomes acquainted with the relations of the natural and spiritual worlds, interests himself in what is going on; but does not yet know the world in its deeper interconnections. Only as a man does he attain this knowledge. But we cannot keep the boy from gathering an imperfect understanding of the natural and of the spiritual. We must, therefore, hold the following assertions to be wrong:—A boy does not understand anything of religion or of right; and so he is not to be instructed regarding them; in general, ideas on these subjects are not to be pressed upon him—his own experiences must teach him; we must be content to let his natural surroundings influence him.—We disagree with this. Even the peoples of antiquity did not allow their children to tarry at the material. But the modern spirit is higher above the material—it has a deeper insight into its own inner nature than had the ancients. The supra-sensible world must, therefore, early be brought near to the conception of the

boy. This is done by the school in a far higher degree than by the family. In the latter, the child has his place as an immediate part; he is loved, be his behavior good or bad. But in the school, the child, immediately considered, is not accounted of. He is respected only in so far as he is worthy—in accordance with his deeds. Here he is not the object of affection merely, but on every side is criticised and directed, and trained by rigid rules. He is subjected to the general order, which forbids many things in themselves innocent, simply because it would be impossible for all to do them. So the school forms the intermediary between the family and society at large; to which latter the boy at first bears only a general relation, his interests being taken up in play and study.

The boy ripens into the youth when, at puberty, the life of the race begins to stir within him and to seek satisfaction. The youth turns to the substantial universal. His ideal no longer appears to him, as to the boy, in some person, but is held by him as a universal, independent of such individuality. But to the youth this ideal still has a more or less subjective form, be it an ideal of love and friendship, or one of general ambition. In this subjectivity of the substantial contents of such an ideal lies not only its antithesis to the actual world, but also the motive force which strives by the realization of the ideal to do away with that antithesis. The form of the ideal inspires the youth's energy. So he dreams that he is called and is fitted to make the world over, or, at least, to turn it back to its right course. The young man's aspiring eye does not see that the substantial universal contained in his ideal is already being evolved and realized in the world. What is realized of the universal seems to him far below the ideal. Accordingly he feels that the world misunderstands both his ideal and himself. Thus the peace in which the child lived with the world is broken by the youth. Because


of this turning to the ideal, the youth seems to have a nobler outlook and greater unselfishness than the man, who is interested in his personal, temporal affairs. But it must be remembered that the man is not bound up in his personal inclinations and subjective opinions, nor is he engaged solely in his personal advancement, but is one with the reasonable realities about him, and is active in the world's behalf.

The youth necessarily reaches this stage. His immediate aim is to cultivate himself so that he may be fitted to realize his ideal. In his efforts for this realization he becomes a man. At first it may seem to him that the passage from ideal life into real life is a sorry entrance into philistinism. But up to this, he has been busy with generalities and with work but for himself; whereas, in becoming a man and entering upon practical life he should deal with particulars and be active for others.

Although it lies deep in the nature of things that, if anything is to be accomplished, particulars must be dealt with, it still may be that the beginnings of such dealing are painful. The feeling of inability immediately to realize one's ideals may lead to hypochondria. This hypochondria, unseen though it be in many, is escaped scarcely by any one. The later it is experienced, the worse are its symptoms. Weak natures may suffer it their life long. In this sickly mood, a man will not give up his subjectivity—he cannot conquer his repugnance to the actual; and so finds himself relatively incapable, and may easily become so altogether. If, then, a man is not to go under, he must recognize the world as essentially independent and complete. He must submit to the conditions it imposes, and win from it, though it seem to say him nay, what he will. Commonly men think they thus adapt themselves out of necessity. But rather must this unity with the world be recognized, not as a relation of necessity, but of reason. The reasonable, the divine,

has absolute power to realize itself. It has run its perfect course from eternity. It is not so powerless that it must wait for some far-off beginning. The world stands as the realization of the divine reason; only upon the surface rules the play of unintelligent caprice. It, therefore, may be considered complete and independent; at least with as much, and, perhaps, with more, correctness than may the individual just growing into manhood. Thus the man acts with reason in giving up his plan of making the world anew, and in striving instead to work out his personal aims, desires and interests only as a member of the world. Even so there is room for honorable, far-reaching, creative activity. For, although the world must be regarded as complete, still it is no dead thing, nor inert. But, like the life-process in general, it ever renews itself while at the same time it is ever advancing. The man's work is a part of this renewal and advancement.

So, while it is true that a man can bring forth only what is already present, it is also true that progress is the result of his activity. But it takes an enormous lever to move the world. A vast number of individuals must labor at it. However, if a man after a half century of work looks back, he will see that there has been progress. Certainty of this, together with the insight into the rationality of the world, does away with grieving over ruined ideals. What was true in these ideals, has lived on in the man's practical activity; only the false and empty abstractions have fallen away. The range and manner of men's work may be very diverse; but the substantial in all human work is the same, namely, what is right, moral or religious. Accordingly in every sphere of activity men may find contentment and honor, if only, in whatever sphere they belong, either by accident, outer necessity, or free choice, they do what rightly is demanded of them. For this it is necessary, above all things, that the training of the young man be adequate; and



secondly, that he should determine to gain his subsistence in working for others. Training alone does not make him a complete man. He becomes this only through wisely caring for his own temporal interests. In the same way, only then do nations become full-grown when they have made it impossible for a so-called paternal government to shut them out from the oversight of their own wants, material and spiritual.

While passing over into practical life, a man may feel that the times are out of joint, and may lose hope of their improvement. Nevertheless he grows more and more at one with his objective relationships. He becomes accustomed to his work. The matters with which he has to deal are, it is true, single things and changing, and new in their particularity. But these particulars have a universal, a rule, something according to law, about them. The longer a man is engaged in his occupation, so much the more clearly does he see this universal. In time he becomes perfectly at home in his calling, and gives himself wholly to it. The essential in all the phases of his business becomes a matter of course. Only the individual, the non-essential, presents to him any novelty.

It is just because his activity is so perfectly met and satisfied by his occupation—his impulses finding no opposition in their objects—it is because of this full development of his activity that the vitality of it begins to ebb. For with the doing away of the antithesis between the subject and its object, the interest in the latter is lost. Thus a man enters old age not only by the running down of the vitality of his physical organism, but also by the crystallizing of the spiritual life into habits. The old man lives without definite interests, since he has given up his early cherished ideals, and the future seems to promise nothing new. He believes rather that he already knows the universal, the essential, of

whatever may come. So the mind of the aged is turned only to this universal, and to the past, which he thanks as having given him the knowledge of the universal. While he thus lives in the remembrance of what is gone, and upon the substantial, he loses his memory for present particulars, and for the arbitrary, as, for instance, for names. But, as we have said, he retains the lessons of experience, accounting himself duty bound to point out the way to the young. This wisdom, however—this lifeless, complete passing over of the subjective activity into its world—leads as surely to second childhood with its lack of antithesis, as does the processless habitual activity of his physical organism lead to the abstract negation of its individual vitality—to death.

So the course of human life is closed with this last change in the totality of changes, determined by the self-active Notion through the process of the generic with the particular.¹

14. *Body, soul, spirit*

At first the spirit is one with its natural determinants. Out of this immediate and natural unity the spirit rises by opposing and battling with it. This battle is followed by the victory of the spirit over the body. The body is set aside and deposed. It is made but a symbol for the spirit's expression.²

The human form is not as is the animal, the body only of the soul, but of the spirit. Spirit and soul are essentially distinct. For the soul is merely this ideal, simple being-for-itself of the body as body; but the spirit is the being-for-itself of the conscious and self-conscious life with all the impressions, ideas and purposes of this conscious existence. With this vast difference between the merely animal life and the spiritual consciousness, it may seem strange that the

¹ VII b, 90-103.

² VII b, 43.

human body nevertheless appears so like the animal. But our wonder at such similarity may be met by our remembering that the spirit, in accord with its self-active nature, determines to express itself in life, and so to be at once both soul and nature-existence. As living soul the spirit assumes, through the same self-active notion which belongs to the animal soul, a body. However high the spirit is above what is merely living, it nevertheless makes for itself a body which appears organized on one and the same principle as the animal. But since the spirit is not only an Idea in existence—an Idea fulfilled by natural and animal life, but is the Idea, which in its own free inner essence is an Idea for itself—since this is so, the spirit works out for itself, beyond the sense world, its own objectivity—the knowledge whose reality is coincident with thought itself.

Moreover, besides thought, and its systematic philosophical activity, the spirit carries on a full life of sensation, desire, conception, imagination, and the like, which stands in more or less close relation with its existence as soul and body, and accordingly has the human body as one of its realities. In this reality, which is peculiarly its own, the spirit takes up its life, illumines it, permeates it, and so becomes visible to others. At this point, then, the human body is no mere nature-existence, but has by its form and structure not only to reveal the sensible and natural being of the spirit, but also, as the expression of something higher within, to differentiate itself from mere animal corporality, however similar it seems thereto.¹

The mastering of the body is the condition of the soul's becoming free, of its attaining objective consciousness. Of course the individual soul in itself is limited by the body. As a living being I have an organized body, and this is not

¹ X b, 370.

foreign to me. It belongs to my Idea, it is the immediate, outward existence of my Notion, it forms my nature-existence. Accordingly, be it said in passing, we must declare empty the conception of those who hold that man properly should have no organized body, because thereby he is bound to care for his physical needs, and so is withdrawn from his purely spiritual life and becomes incapable of true freedom. The reasonably religious man has no such mistaken view. He thinks the satisfaction of his bodily needs a worthy end, and makes it the object of prayer to God, the Eternal Spirit. And the philosopher must see that the spirit exists for itself only by setting over against itself the material—partly as its own corporality, partly as the external world in general—an antithesis which, however, results in unity by its being recognized and so removed.

Between the spirit and its own body there naturally is felt a closer union than between the spirit and the remainder of the outer world. Because of the necessary connection between my soul and body, the immediate activity of the former in and through the latter is no finite, no negative activity. This immediate harmony of soul and body must be maintained. This does not mean that, like athletes and acrobats, I am to make my body an end in itself. But I must give it its due, must spare it, and keep it healthy and strong. I may not despise it and treat it as an enemy. It is just through the lack of care, or perhaps through the misuse of my body, that I am brought into the relation of dependence upon it, and upon outer necessity; for in this way, notwithstanding its identity with me, I make it a negative to me, and so an enemy. I force it to rise against me and to exact penalty from my spirit.¹ On the other hand, if I act accord-

¹ ["The body must be vigorous to obey the soul; a good servant ought to be robust. The weaker the body, the more it commands; the stronger, the more it obeys."—*Rousseau*.]

ing to the laws of my bodily organism, my soul, in its body, is free. The soul, however, is to rise above this stage of immediate unity with its body. The form of this immediateness contradicts the notion of the soul, by which it is determined to be ideality in reference to itself. To become what is implied in its notion, the soul must make its early identity with the body, an identity recognized and sanctioned by the spirit; that is, it must take possession of the body, must form it to an adaptable and easy tool for its activity. The soul must transform it so that it will not stand in the way of the soul's development. It must be made an accident to the substance of the soul, which is freedom.

The body is the means by which I come in contact with the outer world in general. Do I wish to realize my aims? Then I must make my body capable of transmuting these subjective aims into the outer objective. By nature my body is not skilled for this, it rather does what accords with its animal nature. The mere organic instincts are not yet impulses made perfect by the spirit. To serve the spirit my body must first be educated. With animals, the body obeying its instincts carries out perfectly all things necessarily implied in the Idea of the animal. With man, on the contrary, control of the body must be gained by purposeful effort. At first the body's obedience is awkward. It has no certainty of movement. But by attentive practice and culture it attains an increasing facility of immediately embodying the soul's inner desires. Thus is developed a marvelous relationship—an immediate control of the spirit over the body.¹

15. *Temperament and character*

The manifold varieties of talent and of genius may be classed in accord with the various subjects upon which they

¹ VII b, 236.

work. The various temperaments, on the other hand, have no such outer reference for convenient classification. It is difficult to say just what the word "temperament" means. It is not applied to the moral nature of actions nor to the talent which reveals itself in an action; nor, finally, to an emotion of a specific kind. It is best, therefore, to take temperament as meaning the general mode of the individual's activity, of the way in which he objectifies himself—in which he deals with actuality. In this sense, it is seen that the temperament has not the importance for the free spirit that was formerly assigned to it. In a time of advanced culture, the manifold and arbitrary modes of behavior and of action are lost, and with them the temperamental differences. The attempted classifications of the temperaments are so indefinite, that we hardly know how to apply them to the individual; since, in a given individual, we find several of the specified temperaments more or less mingled.

A fourfold division of the temperaments is usual—the choleric, the sanguine, the phlegmatic, and the melancholic. Kant treats of these in detail. The main difference in these temperaments is this: that, on the one hand, a man loses himself in the things which interest him; while, on the other, he is more self-centered—his own personality being of most concern. To the first, belong the sanguine and phlegmatic; to the latter, the choleric and melancholic. The sanguine man forgets himself in his affairs; and the more so because of his superficial activity, which is engaged with a multitude of things. The phlegmatic man, on the contrary, persistently pursues one thing. With the choleric and melancholic, as already said, the center of interest is their subjectivity. Men of these two temperaments differ, however, in that the choleric are shifting, while the melancholic are fixed; so that, in this respect, the choleric corresponds to the sanguine, and the melancholic to the phlegmatic.

We have said that the difference of temperaments loses its importance in a time when the behavior and activity of the individual are prescribed by the general culture. The character, on the contrary, remains the distinguishing mark of men. It is this that gives the individual his fixed determination. To character belongs, first of all, the energy with which a man steadily pursues his aims and interests, and guards in all his actions his self-consistency. Without character no man rises from his indeterminateness, or chooses one direction rather than another. The demand is to be made of every one, that he show character. The man of character has weight with others because they know where he stands. To character belongs also, beyond the mere energy, a will of rich content and aims. Only through the carrying out of great purposes does a man reveal a great character, which is as a beacon to others. And his purposes must have inner sanction, if his character is to express the absolute unity of the content and of the formal activity of the will, and so to have complete truth. If, on the other hand, the will sticks to mere particulars, without general outlook, it becomes self-will. This has only the form, not the content, of character. Through self-will—that parody of character—the individuality of men is cut off from community with others.

Stability of character is not given altogether at birth. It must be developed through the will. It cannot, however, be denied that character has a natural basis, some men being by nature stronger than others.¹

Not without many-sidedness can the character have living interest. At the same time this fullness must appear included in one subject. It must not be dissipation, fickleness, and mere excitability. While a man of character must come

¹ VII b, 84.

in close touch with the most varied departments of the human mind, yet he must not lose himself; but rather amid this totality of interests, purposes, peculiarities, must guard his own acquired subjectivity.¹

To act, there is essential need of character. A man of character is a man of understanding, who as such has definite aims in mind, and pursues them steadily. He who would do anything great, must, as Goethe says, know how to limit himself. He, on the contrary, who wills everything, wills truly nothing, and has nothing for a result.²

16. *The human spirit a unity. Heart and head, intelligence and will, not to be separated*

From an old-time notion we are still accustomed to separate head and heart, thinking and feeling—or however the two are named—and to look upon them as almost independent. Accordingly the influence of instruction upon the character appears remote or casual. But the human spirit is a unity; it is not a bundle of unrelated natures.³

The separation of the intelligence from the will is often made, because they are wrongly conceived as two fixed, independent existences, so that there may be will without intelligence, and intellectual activity without will. But to separate the activities of the spirit is to make it a mere ag-

¹ X a, 305.

² VI, 148.

³ XVI, 156. *Gymnasialrede*, 14 Sept., 1810. [Cf. "A high development of sympathy cannot be secured without a high development of representativeness, so closely inter-related are our intellectual and moral natures."—Fiske, *Cosmical Evolution*, Vol. II., 354.]

"Goethe expressed Herder's fundamental idea when he said: 'Everything that man undertakes to produce, whether by action, word, or in whatsoever way, ought to spring from the union of all his faculties.'"—H. W. Mabie, *Essays in Literary Interpretation*, p. 59.]

gregate, and to look upon its inter-dependencies as a mere casual collocation.¹

17. *Memory. Mnemonics*

It is not by chance that youth has a better memory than old age. Consciously or unconsciously, it is ever in use. Reflection has not yet weakened its energy. It is busy filling the soul with pure existences of outer space. These are not yet opposed by the subjectivity. Talent is generally accompanied by a good memory. But these mere empirical facts do not help us in knowing what memory is in itself. It is the most difficult point in any doctrine of mind, in the systematization of the intelligence, to state exactly the place and significance of memory, and its organic connection with thought.²

Great men have generally been famous for their good memories. For, what interests a man, that he retains; and a great man broadens the field of his interests to cover countless things. Thus the interest in gaining an adequate conception of actuality, together with the retention of what has been gained, is a characteristic of the greatest minds.³

¹ VII b, 302. [The heart and intellect should lay the path over which the will must push its way. Madame Necker writes: "Fortifier la volonté, l'élever, la maintenir, s'il se peut, à cette hauteur où elle règne en souveraine sur les penchants humains, trouvant dans leur force particulière, tantôt des obstacles et tantôt des secours, mais jamais une puissance qui la subjugue.

Ensuite, comme la volonté, indépendamment de sa force, doit avoir un caractère déterminé et suivre une marche constante; comme elle ne peut se prononcer en actes sans avoir affaire aux penchants du cœur; comme de plus il est certain que nous la sentons souvent décidée par les divers mobiles qu'elle pourrait gouverner, l'éducation doit en second lieu donner à l'élève les sentiments, les goûts, les habitudes même, que exerceront la plus salutaire influence sur la volonté, et qui, dans les moments où elle est le moins capable d'effort, imprimeront encore une heureuse direction à la conduite."—*Éducation progressive*, I., 48.]

² VII b, 352.

³ X a, 362.

The ancient mnemonics, which has recently been resuscitated, but which ought to be forgotten, consists in changing names into pictures, and thus degrades the memory to a power of mere imagery. The mnemonic impressions are not retained by heart, so to speak, as are those of repeated memorizing. When reproduced they are not brought from the inmost, deepest recesses of the self, but are merely read off from the surface of the imagination.

Mnemonics accords with the prejudice which places the imagination above the memory. But memory does not deal with mere pictures which are taken from the immediate, non-spiritual act of the intelligence in intuition, but with an existence which is the product of the intelligence itself. Its reproductions come from its permanent possessions.¹

18. *Habit*

Habit, like memory, is a difficult point in the organization of the spirit. Habit is the mechanism of the feeling of self, as memory is the mechanism of intelligence. The natural qualities and changes of age, of sleeping and waking, are immediately natural. Habit, on the other hand, is a determination which has been made natural, mechanical. Habit is rightly called a second nature—nature, because it is an immediate expression of the soul; a second, for it is an immediateness acquired by the soul, which modifies the body as the self directs, through the feelings, the intelligence and the will.²

The form of habit embraces all sorts and all stages of the activity of the spirit. The most external, the spatial deter-

¹ VII b, 347. [Hegel's "learning by heart" includes reflection upon what is stored away by repetition, and also its assimilation by the knowledge previously acquired. So we must not quote against him: *Sçavoir par cœur n'est pas sçavoir*. Hegel's heart is larger than the lips; it includes the intelligence also.]

² VII b, 230.

mination of the individual, namely, his ability to stand upright, is made a habit by the will. It is an immediate, unconsciously assumed position, that remains the result of a permanent will. So, too, seeing is the concrete habit, which unites immediately in one act many determinations of sensation, of consciousness, of intuition, of understanding, etc. Even freest thought, active with its own pure elements, stands in need of habit, of this form of the immediate, whereby it becomes an untrammelled and complete possession of my self. Only through this habit of thinking do I exist for myself as a thinker.

Habit is often spoken of disparagingly, as something lifeless, accidental, particular. It is true the form of habit, as any other form, may have any or all content. Still it is most essential to the existence of any mental life in the individual subject. Because of his habits the subject exists as concrete immediateness, as soul in ideality. His habits—religious, moral and other—constitute him as belonging to *this* self, to *this* soul, not merely as an addition, nor as passing sensation or idea, nor as an inner abstraction separated from action and actuality, but in very essence. In scientific studies of the mind and spirit, habit is usually ignored as if beneath consideration, or rather, perhaps, because its determination is so difficult.¹

¹ VII b, 233. [Habit is as important a factor in social groups as in the individual. Cf. the following, quoted by Gumplówicz: *Grundriss der Sociologie*, S. 130:—"Geheimnissvoll in ihrem stillen dämonischen Walten ist die Macht der Gewohnheit, wie sie im Handeln und Denken das kleine Leben der Einzelnen und die grosse Geschichte der Menschheit beherrscht. Dieser dunkle Trieb aller irdischen Dinge, im Wechsel zu beharren, der rastlos fluthenden Bewegung ein Moment der Stetigkeit und der Ruhe abzugewinnen, durch die Gleichmässigkeit des Pendelschlages den endlosen Oscillationen den Schein festgefügtter Ordnung entgegenzusetzen, er ist es wesentlich, der aller geistigen Thätigkeit unseres Geschlechts Schwerpunkt und Gleichgewicht verleiht. Erst die natürliche Neigung zur gleichartigen Wiederholungen derselben Bewegungsacte, dann das Sichbefestigen und Sichverkörpern derselben Wiederholungen zu gesetzmässiger Gewöh-

III. WHAT THE PUPIL MUST BRING TO HIS EDUCATION

19. *Precocity not the promise of eminence*

The mental development of many children outruns their bodily development. This is the case particularly with those of artistic talent, and most of all with musicians. But, in general, understanding comes only with years. Precocity of artistic talent is perhaps an advantage. But as a rule the early development of the child's intelligence is not the promise of an eminent mind in manhood.¹

20. *Energy and promptness*

There can be nothing worse than the evil of procrastination, of the putting-off or shirking of work, so that it is not pursued in all earnestness and in an unchangeable order. What is undertaken to be done at a set time should be accomplished as surely as the sun rises.²

21. *Attention*

Without attention the mind can seize hold of no object. It is through it alone that the mind stands in the presence of things, and obtains, if not complete knowledge of them—for complete cognition implies a still more highly developed act of mind—still the first steps in knowledge. Attention accordingly lies at the beginning of education. Regarded closely, attention must be seen to be a taking in of content, which is determined both objectively and subjectively; or, in other words, a content that exists not for me alone, but

nung, wie viel bewusstes Denken und Wollen gerinnt dadurch [to flow again, however, in new purpose and achievement] allmählich zur unbewussten Function eines geistlosen Mechanismus! [which offers, nevertheless, many a lever for the directing hand of self-conscious will] . . . Regel und Ordnung und Sitte und Gesetz, wie sie von Geschlecht zu Geschlecht forterbend die Culturgeschichte tragen, wie wären sie denkbar ohne das unablässige Wirken jener geheimnissvollen Kraft?"]

¹ VII b, 90.² XVI, 153.

independently also.¹ In attention there is found a successive separation and unification of the subjective and objective. It is an immediate application to the object, and at the same time a reflecting upon self in its relation to that object. Herein it is apparent that the attention is something dependent upon my will—that I am attentive only when I will to be so. But it must not be thought that to direct the attention is an easy matter. It demands effort when one wishes to grasp one object rather than another, to abstract himself from the thousand things moving through his mind, from his other interests, and even from his own person; and repressing the tendency to hasty judgment, to give himself up wholly to the object. Thus, attention implies both the suppression of that tendency to make self uppermost, and also self-surrender to the object—two factors essential to a good mind, though they are often deemed unnecessary by the so-called polite education which leaves one with no eager interest in anything.

Lack of power to fix attention leads back to wildness. The savage is hardly ever attentive. He lets everything pass by him, and fixates scarcely upon anything. Only through mental culture does the attention gain strength and fulness. The botanist, for instance, notices in a plant incomparably more than a man ignorant of botany. So it is with every kind of knowledge. A man of great and cultured mind sees completely what is before him. With him an impression has the full character of a cognition.²

22. *Early obedience the condition of obtaining independence*

Obedience is the beginning of all wisdom.³

One's own conviction is a different thing than subservience

¹ [The question: "What sayeth the law? How readeest thou?" would be a case in point.]

² VII b, 312.

³ VII b, 96.

to the authority of others. If my acts are to have moral worth, then they must flow from my convictions. The action must be altogether mine. If I act according to the authority of others, the deeds are not entirely my own. They are the result partly of a conviction from without.

But there are times when morality demands one to act out of obedience to the authority of others. Originally a man follows his natural propensities without second thought, unless it be biased or false reflection, which is itself under the sway of his animal nature. In these circumstances obedience must be learned, because the will is not yet rational. Through obedience the negative has its effect, in that the passions are reined in. Only so does a man attain independence.¹

23. *Silence and docility required of a learner*

The silence (*ἡσυχία*) that Pythagoras required of his pupils during their tutelage, the duty of restraining idle talk, may be considered essential in any scheme of education. One must begin by striving to comprehend the thoughts of others. Willingness to yield one's own ideas is the first necessity for a learner. We often say that the understanding is developed by questioning, objecting, responding, etc. But, in truth, the mind is not developed by these; it is only made superficial. The inner nature of a man is broadened by culture, and given him as a possession through self-restraint. Thought is enriched, and the mind vitalized, by silence.²

Thought, at the beginning, like the will, should be obedient.³

The tendency of youth to independent reflection and reasoning is one-sided. It should be indulged in as little as

¹ XVIII, 29.

² XIII, 230.

³ XVI, 154.

possible. The pupils of Pythagoras kept silence during their first four years; that is, they were not to have personal ideas and thoughts, or to express them. For the chief end of education is to do away with these personal ideas, thoughts, reflections of youth, and their utterance. If the tendency toward self-reasoning be unchecked, there is no discipline or order in thought, no coherent and consequent knowledge.

But if learning were to be limited to a mere taking in, its results would be little better than writing upon the water, for it is not mere receiving, but the self-activity of grasping, and the power to put in use, that alone make knowledge our possession.¹

24. *Self-forgetful interest in affairs*

The Pythagoreans had a rigid program for the order of the day, in which every hour had its work. In the morning, upon rising, they recalled the events of the previous day, since the duty of to-day springs from that of yesterday. And at evening they had to examine themselves and prove what had been done during the day, whether good or bad.

But true culture is not furthered by idle self-examination, a turning of the attention too much upon self as an individual. There is need rather of self-forgetfulness which devotes itself to affairs and to the universal. This interest in affairs is the essential thing; while that useless anxiety over self is slavish.²

¹XVI, 153. [Schiller: "Seine Kultur wird also darin bestehen; erstlich dem empfangenden Vermögen die vielfältigsten Berührungen mit der Welt zu verschaffen und auf Seiten des Gefühls die Passivität aufs höchste zu treiben, zweitens dem bestimmenden Vermögen die höchste Unabhängigkeit von dem empfangenden zu erwerben und auf Seiten der Vernunft die Aktivität aufs höchste zu treiben." *Ueber die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen*. 13ter Brief.]

²XIII, 233. [Cf. Schleiermacher, *Monologen*, 73: "Wie kommt dem Menschen die besonnene Weisheit und die reife Erfahrung? . . Ich fühle, wie ich sie jetzt erwerbe; es ist eben der Jugend treibende Kraft und das frische Leben des Geistes, was sie hervorbringt. Umschauen nach allen Seiten; aufnehmen alles

25. *Intuition the beginning—but only the beginning—of complete knowledge*

In all branches of knowledge emphasis must be laid upon the necessity for the intuition of their respective subject matters.¹ To give attention means that one deals with the matter in hand with mind, heart and soul—in short, in his entirety. He must put himself at its center, and examine it. It is only when the substance of the object lies open to the intuition and forms the basis of thought that a man can, without error, advance to the study of the particulars rooted in that substance. But if there is no intuition of the object in its wholeness, or if such intuition ceases, then the reflective thought loses itself in its observation of the manifold disconnected parts and relations of the object. Then the analytic reason, through its one-sided, finite categories of cause and effect, of outer end and means, etc., tears the object in pieces, even though this be a living thing, like plant or animal. And it fails in this way, in spite of its much skill, to understand the concrete nature of the object—to recognize the vital bond that connects all the particulars.²

in den innersten Sinn, besiegen einzelner Gefühle Gewalt, dass nicht die Thräne, sei's der Freude oder des Kammers, das Auge der Seele trübe und verdunkle seine Bilder; rasch sich von einem zum andern bewegen und, unersättlich im Handeln, auch fremdes Thun noch innerlich nachahmend abbilden: das ist das muntere Leben der Jugend, und eben das ist das Werden der Weisheit und der Erfahrung.”]

¹ [“Nothing requires more to be insisted on than that vivid and complete impressions are all-essential. No sound fabric of wisdom can be woven out of raw material.”—Spencer, *Education*.]

² [Goethe also has his hit at this “science.”

“Wer will was Lebendig's erkennen und beschreiben,
Sucht erst den Geist hinauszutreiben;
Dann hat er die Theile in seiner Hand,
Fehlt leider nur das geistige Band.”

This is true not alone in matters of botany, zoölogy, and the like, but also in regard to history and biography. Lowell's sense of what was fit was much disturbed by Masson's voluminously analytic life of Milton. Part of his stricture

But the intuition is not the final stage of knowledge. It must be transcended. It is not yet cognitive knowledge, because it has not yet unfolded the implications of the substance of the object, but rather is limited to the apprehension of the substance—gazing, as it were, upon the surface, and not discriminating the accessory and accidental. Accordingly, intuition is only the beginning of cognition. This latter demands intelligence. It is, then, an error to think that a man truly knows a thing when he has of it merely an immediate intuition. Complete knowledge belongs only to the pure thought of the comprehending reason; and only he who has risen to this thought has a perfectly clear and true intuition. To him the intuition furnishes merely the adequate form, in which his completely developed knowledge gathers itself together. In the immediate intuition, I have, it is true, the whole thing before me. But it is only in the fully developed and assimilated knowledge which resumes the form of simple intuition, that the object in its full and systematic totality is grasped.

In general it is only the educated man who has an intuition which is both freed from the non-essential, and complete in its rational content.¹

26. *Even a child's studies call for reflection*

Reflection is required even of the child. In his exercise, for instance, of combining adjectives and substantives, he must be attentive and must discriminate. He must remem-

will illustrate Hegel's thought in the above. "Human motives," he writes, "cannot be thus chemically cross-examined, nor do we arrive at any true knowledge of character by such minute subdivision of its ingredients. Nothing is so essential to a biographer as an eye that can distinguish at a glance between real events that are levers of thought and action, and what Donne calls 'unconcerning things, matters of fact,'—between substantial personages, whose contact or even neighborhood is influential, and the supernumeraries that serve first to fill up a stage and afterwards the interstices of a biographical dictionary."]

¹ VII b, 319.

ber the rule, and must frame his particular case in accord with it. The rule is the general, and the child must keep this in mind in forming the particular.¹

27. The self-activity implied in learning

To learn is not to acquire something foreign. It is the progress of the mind upon itself, by which it becomes conscious of its own essence or being.²

It is most important to lead the boy from the state of mere receptivity to that of personal effort. For learning, which is merely taking in and remembering, is a very small part of education.³

We must not think Plato's idealism to be subjective idealism—that crass idealism which is put forth in our modern times—as if a man could have no general knowledge, could not have outer determinations, but as if all ideas were evolved from the subject. It is often affirmed that idealism is of this sort, that an individual evolves all his ideas from himself, that he posits everything from within. But this is an unhistoric and entirely false notion. If this inexact statement be taken for the definition of idealism, then, as a matter of fact, there have been no idealists among the philosophers. The Platonic idealism is quite other than this.

As regards learning, in particular, Plato states that what is truly universal, the Idea, the Good, the Beautiful, is already present in the mind, and is brought forth out of it alone. [We become conscious of these, however, only in the presence of outer things in our daily experience; not that the more essential part of our knowledge comes from these outer things, but that they are the occasion of our knowing.] The notion that knowledge comes entirely from

¹ VI, 40.

² XIV, 203.

³ XVI, 153.

without, is held nowadays only by a crude and abstract empiricism.¹

IV. THE EDUCATION OF THE SCHOOL, IN RELATION TO THE FAMILY AND TO SOCIETY.

28. *The importance of a good education and the right of children thereto*

The importance of a good education has never been so great as now. The inner treasures which parents bestow upon their children by a good education and by the advantages of the schools are imperishable. They are the best and surest inheritance that they can give their children.²

The rights of a father in his children are equaled by duties toward them; as the duty of obedience on the part of children implies their right to be educated into freedom.³

The rights of parents to the services of their children are limited by the demands of discipline and education. Nothing could be more wicked than the holding of children as slaves.⁴

The duty of parents to children is to care for their maintenance and education; that of children, to obey until they are of age, and to honor their parents their life long; that of brothers and sisters, to act toward one another with considerate love.⁵

29. *The mother's influence in education*

The mother should be the chief influence in early education, for morality must be instilled in the child with his earliest perceptions.⁶

¹ XIV, 215.

² *Rede*, 2 Sept., 1813; XVI, 189.

³ VII b, 378.

⁴ VIII, 236.

⁵ XVIII, 67.

⁶ VIII, 238.



It is the mother's love alone which flows with the whole current of the being. Brothers and sisters and the father, though loving his children, have other relationships in which they live. Fathers and brothers have to turn to the world, to the state, property, war. With the mother, on the other hand, love toward her child is no partial thing, no single movement, but is her highest earthly vocation, in which her natural character and her holiest calling are united.¹

30. *The right of compulsory education*

It is difficult to draw the line between the rights of parents and those of the state. As regards education, parents commonly think they have full liberty, and may follow their own wishes as best they may. All compulsory education is apt to be met by the parents' opposition. They it is who decry the teachers and schools because counter to their notions. Nevertheless the state has the right, in accord with its approved experience, to compel parents to send their children to school.²

31. *Education a serious work*

A man attains what he should, not by instinct. He must win his true place. On this is based the child's right to be educated. The need or craving for education exists in the child as a feeling of dissatisfaction with himself as he is—as an impulse to belong to the world of grown people, which seems so great a thing—the wish to be “big.” The play education looks upon what is childish as already something of value in itself alone. It meets the children at a low level. It puts both itself and what is serious into a puerile form, for which the children themselves feel contempt. This education, attempting to make the incompleteness of childhood seem as something complete, and to make the children satisfied with it, casts down and tramples upon their own true

¹ X c, 44.

² VIII, 299.

better wants. It effects, in part, indifference and stupidity regarding the substantial relationships of the spiritual world, and in part little respect for the men who thus childishly teach.¹

32. *School life a preparation for after life*

School life is dispassionate. It lacks the higher interest and earnestness of real life. It is a secluded, inner preparation. It educates the individual to participate in the world life. The sciences are not enlarged by the school. What has already been found out, is the subject of instruction; and this in only an elementary way. Its knowledge is old property of the race.² The work of the school has not its perfect end in itself. It lays but the foundation for the possibility of other work, that of real performance. Although the subjects that are studied in school have been developed long ago, the individuals who are being educated by this study are not as yet developed. This preparation, this culture, can never be "finished." Only a certain stage of it may be attained.³

33. *Educational building should be solid*

Sureness and permanence in the foundations of one's knowledge is of the chief importance, in order that he be

¹ VIII, 236. [Cf. Guyau, *Éducation et Hérité*, p. 19: "Kant a eu raison de dire: C'est une chose funeste d'habituer l'enfant à tout regarder comme un jeu . . . Il est d'une haute importance d'apprendre aux enfants à travailler; l'homme est le seul animal qui soit dans la nécessité de le faire."

Froebel's Kindergarten is saved from the charge of offering a mere play-education by its "occupations"—which are very real work—and by the character of its plays, which point to the social and industrial realities of the older people's world.

² [There is danger, perhaps, in regarding school subjects as petrefactions. Progress in the sciences should be watched, and the results embodied in the curriculum.]

³ XVI, 175—*Gymnasialrede*, 2 Sept., 1811.

fitted for the more advanced. One must not hurry into the higher classes.¹

34. *The pupil not to be educated in solitude (Rousseau's Emil), nor, on the other hand, amid all the distractions of society*

The experiments of separating a boy from society and of educating him apart in the country (Rousseau's Emil) have failed, because he who is a stranger to the laws of the world, cannot succeed in it. There are no rights for the individual outside of his citizenship in a good state.²

In modern education much harm has resulted from the maxim that children are early to be brought out into society

¹XVI, 178—*Gymnasialrede*, 2 Sept., 1811. [Such hurry is not uncommon. Mr. Martin writes of the district schools in Massachusetts of some forty or fifty years ago: "In some schools a few of the more intelligent boys and girls made a real advance in mathematics and science; in many more schools ambitious boys and girls with ambitious teachers—usually college undergraduates—pushed themselves into algebra and geometry and natural philosophy before they could read intelligently, or perform creditably the simpler operations in arithmetic."—*Evolution of Mass. Public School System*, p. 199.

And in higher matters, too, haste should be slow. Abstract philosophy should not come before there is a rich content of life. "The Socratic 'pang of philosophy,'" writes Professor Jowett, "that is to say, the fascination of abstract ideas, may easily interfere with the growth of the mind in youth or in early manhood. Poetry, language, physical science, mathematics, the works of great writers—Greek, Latin, or English—are a much better basis [but only basis, be it understood] of education than metaphysical philosophy. They are the 'land of health' in which Plato would have the youth of his city reared: where beauty, 'the effluence of fair works, will visit the eye and ear, and insensibly, like a fresh breeze from a purer region, will draw the soul, even in childhood, into harmony with the beauty of reason.'"—Preface, p. vii, to Purves' *Selections from Plato*.]

²VIII., 219. [The question of private versus public instruction has been long discussed. Quintilian treated of it wisely. We cite one passage: "Non fugiendae sint omnino scholae. . . . Ante omnia, futurus orator [nonne dicemus futurus vir?], cui in maxima celebritate, et in media republicae luce vivendum est, assuescat jam a tenero non reformidare homines, neque illa solitaria et velut umbratile vita pallescere."—*Inst. Orat.*, I. c. 1.]

—that they are to have their fill of the pleasures and excitements of grown people. Experience refutes this. It shows that men who have laid a prudent inner foundation, and who have been brought up in moral habits, learn quickly enough how to act properly in society. Men of world-wide fame have come from the narrow gate of a monastery; while, on the contrary, men who have grown up amid all the externalities of life, unfold little fruit of inner worth. But short reflection will show the necessity of this. In order to be capable and to have true worth, the inner basis of character must be built strong and well. The youth who sees only the glamor of outer life and learns how it is valued by men whom he admires and reveres, holds it to be all important, because he has not learned to know the earnestness with which these very men pursue their work outside of recreation hours. So the youth gets warped notions of the worth of things. He delights in amusements that demand no intense application. He holds cheap what the school respects as duty; and would shirk the work it lays upon him.¹

35. *School government and discipline*

With advancing culture there has been a great change in the conception of what belongs to school discipline and government. The right view of education is more and more being held. It must not suppress, but thoroughly encourage growing self-hood and independence. In the family as in the school the notion is disappearing that children must always be impressed with the feeling of submission and dependence; that even in what is indifferent they are always to be made to obey their superiors; that they must be forced to study so as to learn obedience; that severity on the part of the teacher must be the motive power rather than the pupil's love and his sense of the worth and dignity of his work; all this is passing away.

¹ XVI, 197.

A school that benefits its scholars must require quietness and attention in hours of study, moral behavior toward teachers and fellow pupils, the performance of set tasks, and obedience. But their actions in things indifferent, which do not affect the order, must be free. An air of serfdom is wholly out of place in the school room. A company of students are not to be thought slaves, nor are they to act as such. Education that leads to independence demands that the pupil be early accustomed to consult his own feeling of propriety and his own understanding. There should be a large sphere of freedom amid his fellow students and his elders, in which he may determine his own behavior.¹

36. *One phase of the poetry of youth*

Particularly in youth do we feel ourselves related and in sympathy with all nature. We, and things about us, seem alive with one soul. We have a feeling of the world-soul, of the oneness of spirit and nature, and of the spirituality of nature.²

¹ XVI, 172. *Gymnasialrede*, 2 Sept., 1811.

² VII b, 49. [This feeling, almost pantheistic, though it comes again and again, stays but a moment. Immediately there is the wish for its social communication. Wordsworth, Thoreau, Burroughs, write of their oneness with nature, that *men* may read. Compare what Hegel says in another place: "But the study of nature has but little charm for youth. The interest in nature appears—and not unrightly—rather as theoretical indolence, in comparison with interest in human and spiritual deeds and forms." Compare, also, Socrates in the *Phaidros*, when his young companion laughed at him for being like a stranger in the country. Σω:—"Συγγίγνωσκέ μοι, ὦ ἄριστε. φιλομαθῆς γάρ εἰμι, τὰ μὲν οὖν χωρία καὶ τὰ δένδρα οὐδέν μ' ἐθέλει διδάσκειν, οἱ δ' ἐν τῷ ἄστει ἄνθρωποι." "You must have patience with me, for I love knowledge; and the trees and fields do not teach me, but the men in the city." And Browning expresses another shade of the same feeling:

"What matter though my trust were gone
From natural things? Henceforth my part
Be less with nature than with art!
For art supplants, gives mainly worth
To nature; 'tis man stamps the earth."

—*Christmas Eve and Easter Day.*]

37. *Friendship*

Friendship like that of Achilles and Patroclus, or like that still closer friendship of Orestes and Pylades, is chiefly the privilege of youth. In youth, individuals live in no fixed relation with externality. They cleave each to another, and have mind, will and activity in common. Every undertaking is a joint affair. In friendship between men this cannot be the case. A man's work must pursue its own path, and cannot be carried out in closest fellowship with another. Men meet and part; their interests now join and then diverge. The friendship—the inner unity of thought, of conviction, of general purpose—remains. But it is no longer the youthful friendship, in which one determines and enters upon nothing that is not the immediate object of the other also. It is essential to our deeper life that, upon the whole, each must care for himself, must be capable amid his own particular environment.¹

38. *The Sturm und Drang period of youth*

Young men think they must break through the world's course which is being actualized; and consider it a misfortune that there are such things as families, society, state, laws, trades, etc., because these substantial life-relationships cruelly limit their ideals and oppose their heart's infinite rights. They would cry halt to this order of things, would change the world, better it, or, at least, in spite of it, hew out a heaven on earth.

This time of tempest lasts, in our modern world, not beyond the student years. These educate the individual for real life. During them the youth should shed his horns, and adjust himself, with his wishes and plans, to the actual and rational relationships about him. He enters partnership

¹ X b, 186.

with the world, and wins for himself therein adequate standing-room.¹

39. *The necessity and value of a vocation*

Oftentimes a man's particular vocation appears to him allotted by fate. Yet this form of an outer necessity is to be transcended. One's calling must be taken hold of freely, and freely carried on. Man, as regards the outer circumstances of fate, and all that he is immediately, must so act as to make all this his own—he must transcend the form of outer necessity. It makes little difference what are the conditions of a man's lot, if only what he is, he is rightly; that is, if only he fulfils his vocation. One's vocation is a many-sided thing. It is stuff or material that must be worked up in all directions, so that it has nothing foreign, unyielding, contradictory. In so far as I have made it mine, I am free in it. If a man is dissatisfied with his calling, the chief reason is that he does not meet all its demands. He is in a position that is not truly his own. Still he is in this position, and cannot give it up. Thus he is out of harmony with himself.

Faithfulness and obedience in one's calling, as well as resignation and self-forgetfulness, have as a basis the giving up of trifling, of self-will, and self-seeking, in the presence of what is in and for itself necessary. A vocation is something universal and necessary, and is a part of a complete human life. It is a part, too, of the total work of humanity. When a man has a vocation he is a participator in and fellow-worker with the universal. Thereby he becomes objective.

¹ X b, 216. [But ever and again an Omar Khayyâm, past the period of youth, will sigh:

“ Ah Love! could you and I with Him conspire
To grasp this sorry Scheme of Things entire,
Would not we shatter it to bits—and then
Remould it nearer to the Heart's Desire!”

Yet the very putting of such a plaint in song is a sort of victory.]

The calling, it is true, is a particular and limited sphere. Still it is a necessary part of the whole, and is also in itself a whole. If a man is to be anything, he must know how to limit himself; that is, to make his vocation entirely his own. Then it is no prison for him. He is then at one with himself, with his environment, with his sphere. He is a universal, a whole.¹

V. CULTURE VALUES OF VARIOUS SUBJECTS

40. *Military drill*

Instruction in military drill is very important. To perform the exercise quickly, to be alert, to carry out exactly what is commanded, without debate with one's self, is the most direct way of counteracting a lazy absent-mindedness, which takes its time in comprehending what is heard, and still more time in half performing what it half perceives.

From another side, too, such exercise appears most beneficial. We are too much in the habit of regarding every art and science as a specialty. Those in which we are engaged appear as our natural possession, while others apart from our training and calling appear foreign, and as something in which we could never be at home. But, just as the *nihil humani a mi alienum puto* is, in its moral meaning, a beautiful sentiment, so, too, it has significance in reference to men's trades or arts. A really cultured man is not limited by nature to a particular thing, but rather is fitted to enter anything. The necessity for taking up a new art or science does not find him compelled to stand discouraged at the thought of the difficulties and of his unfitness, but ready to take hold of the work and carry it out. Drill in arms is apt to appear far removed from the business of studying. But it is near to the youthful spirit; and such drill best serves in leveling the partition wall that we build about our callings.

¹ XVIII, 64.

A higher consideration is that this exercise, while it does not take away the pupils from their first duty, acts as a reminder that every man—whatever his position—should be ready to defend his fatherland and his prince—a duty that lies in the nature of the case, and which formerly was recognized by all citizens as theirs, but which now, by whole classes of the people, is not given a thought.¹

41. *Arithmetic*

Numbers are immaterial objects. And their study and use in their various combinations gives mental exercise apart from the senses. Thereby the mind is held to reflection within itself, and to abstract activity—a thing of great, but one-sided importance. For, since numbers have as their basis only an exterior, idealess difference, they demand, in their use, only an idealess and mechanical activity. The effort of the mind mainly consists in grasping something almost empty, and dealing with it in various combinations. The content is the bare unit. But the fitting content of the moral and intellectual life, into which the young are to be educated, is very different from this bare unit. The effect of making mathematical exercises the chief subject of education is to make the mind empty and dull. Since reckoning is such an outer, mechanical exercise, machines have

¹XVI, 152. *Gymnasialrede*, 14 Sept., 1810. [Hegel spoke these words in 1810. Austerlitz, Jena, and Auerstadt could not have been far from his thoughts. Perhaps there is a note of reconstruction sounded in the above. Education on new and broader lines was to do its part. Hon. W. T. Harris, in referring to his recent visit to Europe, says: "The principal advance has been in public education. The Franco-Prussian war was a boon in this respect, that it opened the eyes of Europe to the fact that a cultured, well-trained people must necessarily conquer. Since then compulsory education has been the rule in Europe." There is another side, however. Renan writes, in 1879, to a German friend: "On a fait de vous une nation organisée pour la guerre; comme ces chevaliers du xvi^e siècle, bardés de fer, vous êtes écrasés par votre armement." Part of this is true. Another part is peculiarly French, in its bitter remembrance of the weight of German arms a decade before.]

been invented which perform arithmetical operations perfectly. If, concerning arithmetic, we keep in mind only such a fact as that, we shall be slow in giving it the first place in education. To do that is to put the mind upon a rack in order to evolve a perfect machine.¹

42. *The study of grammar*

The value of grammatical study can scarcely be overestimated, for it forms the beginning of logical culture, a fact, however, that appears to be almost overlooked. Grammar has for its subject-matter the categories, the peculiar products and determinations of the reason. With its study, therefore, the study of reason itself is begun. These essentials of intelligence, which grammar deals with, are easily grasped by a child. The abstractions are simple. They are, as it were, the single letters and vocables of the mind with which we learn to spell it out, so to speak, and then to read and interpret it. The pupil is made to distinguish shades of meaning. And it is most important that these differences be made a subject of study. For since the determinations of reason, we being reasoning beings, are in us, and since we understand them immediately, the first work of education is to put them wholly in our possession, that is, to make them objects of consciousness designated by appropriate names.²

The grammatical study of an ancient language has the advantage of calling out the attentive and sustained effort of

¹ III, 251. [Cf. President Eliot: "From one-sixth to one-fourth, or even one-third, of the whole school time of American children is given to the subject of arithmetic—a subject which does not train a single one of the four faculties that it should be the fundamental object of education to develop. It has nothing to do with observing correctly, or with recording accurately the results of observation, or with collating facts and drawing just inferences therefrom, or with expressing clearly and forcibly logical thought."]

² XVI, 143. *Gymnasialrede*, 29 Sept., 1809.

the understanding. In such study, unlike that of the mother tongue, it is not mere unreflecting habit that can supply the right form of words, but it is necessary to have in mind the proper value of the parts of speech, and to recall the right rule for their use. In this there is a constant subsuming of the particular under the general, and application of the general to the particular. This is the form of all reasoning. Thus careful grammatical study is one of the most noble and universal means of culture.¹

43. *The Voice. Declamation. Reading*

The voice is the chief revealer of a man's innermost. What he is, is known by his voice. If harsh, we feel the speaker to be rude; if melodious, we recognize a beautiful soul.²

Public declamation is an interesting exercise. And if only instruction in it were more thorough, it would promise much greater results.

To read justly and sympathetically demands a fine and intelligent sense and much study. Practice in reading, joined with reflection, is to be valued so highly that perhaps the greatest part of other teaching and explanation in the schools might be spared, and the time thus saved be given up to this form of instruction. We hope to see this study, when worked out properly, become a prime factor in education.³

44. *Culture essential to sound and noble speech*

One can use a language correctly enough by rule. But without culture it is impossible to speak well. Culture gives

¹ XVI, 144. *Gymnasialrede*, 29 Sept., 1809.

² VII b, 131.

³ XVI, 180. *Gymnasialrede*, 2d Sept., 1811.

the mind manifold viewpoints. It gives a wealth of categories for an all-sided treatment of a subject.¹

45. *The value of the classics*

The foundation of the higher study of literature is and must remain, first, the literature of Greece, and then that of Rome. The glory and perfection of their masterpieces must be the spiritual bath, the profane baptism, which gives the soul its earliest and most lasting taste for things of beauty and of knowledge. For this it is not enough to have a mere general and surface acquaintance with the ancients. We must live with them, imbibing their atmosphere, their ideas and ways, and even, if one will, their errors and prejudices. We must be at home in their world—the most beautiful that has ever been. As the first paradise was the paradise of the natural man, so the second, the higher, is the paradise of the spiritual man, who in his beautiful spontaneity, freedom, depth and joyousness stepped forth as a bridegroom from his chamber. The first wild magnificence of his rise in the east is circumscribed by the glory of form, and toned down to beauty. His depth is no longer that of solemn turgidity and confusion, but is open and clear. His joyousness is no mere childish spirits. It has transcended the sadness that sighs over the gloom of fate, and has won poise and freedom.²

¹ XIV, 12. [Quintilian, in urging that an orator should study the various sciences, geometry, music, etc., says: "Et muta animalia mellis inimitabilem humanæ rationi saporem, vario florum ac succorum genere perficiunt. Nos mirabimus, si oratio, qua nihil præstantius homini dedit providentia, pluribus artibus eget; quæ, etiam quum se non ostendunt in dicendo, nec proferunt, vim tamen occultam suggerent, et tacitæ quoque sentiuntur." And Cicero in his oration, *Pro Archia Poeta*: "Atque hoc eo mihi concedendum est magis, quod ex his studiis hæc quoque crescit oratio et facultas, quæ, quantacumque in me est, nunquam amicorum periculis defuit."]

² [Cf. Schiller. *Ueber die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen* 6^{te} Brief: "Die Griechen beschämen uns nicht bloss durch eine Simplicität, die unserm Zeitalter fremd ist, sie sind zugleich unsre Nebenbuhler, ja oft unsre Muster in den

I think it is not saying too much when I say that he who has not known the works of the ancients has not known beauty.¹

The reading of the ancients is one of the best of preparations for the study of philosophy. By it one gathers a store of abstract ideas, and is practised in thinking. He has the seeds which later ripen in many fields of philosophy. The many contradictions of the old thinkers, especially concerning the practical part of world wisdom, have at least lightened the labor of finding the middle way, in which lies the truth.²

46. *Logic.*

Logic like grammar has two aspects and values. It is one thing for him who is but entering upon its study and upon the study of the other sciences, and quite another thing for him, who after such study, takes up his logic again. In grammar the beginner finds in its laws and forms only dry abstractions, arbitrary rules, and a mass of distinctions, without further value or significance. But it is only to him, on the other hand, who is a master of his own language, and knows also other languages, that it is given to feel the spirit and culture of a people in the grammar of their language. For him its rules have content and living worth. Through the grammar he recognizes the general mode of the mind's expression—its logic.

So the beginner in scientific study at first finds in logic an isolated system of abstractions, limited to itself and without reference to other sciences. Compared with the evidently rich content of the other sciences, this science, in its abstract

nämlichen Vorzügen, mit denen wir uns über die Naturwidrigkeit unsere Sitten zu trösten pflegen. Zugleich voll Form und voll Fülle, zugleich philosophierend und bildend, zugleich zart und energisch, sehen wir sie die Jugend der Phantasie mit der Männlichkeit der Vernunft in einer herrlichen Menschheit vereinigen.”]

¹ XVI, 139. *Gymnasialrede*, 29 Sept., 1809.

² *Id.* Rosenkranz, *Hegel's Leben*, p. 27.

form, seems empty and colorless. Its pure and simple distinctions seem very far from making good its claim to be the absolute science, the science which reveals the essential nature of the mind and of the world. First acquaintance with logic thinks its significance limited to itself. Its contents seem to embrace only an isolated investigation of thought distinctions. It is only after a deeper study of the other sciences that logic is seen to be not a mere abstract universal, but a universal containing the whole realm of the particular. The same proverb in the mouth of a boy has not the significance and reach that it has for a man of wide experience. So logic is given its due value only when it is seen to be the outcome of the experience of the other sciences. It is the general truth, not as a special knowledge alongside of other matters and realities, but as the essence of these others. Whether or not logic, in the beginning of its study, has this value for the mind, nevertheless the mind receives through it the power which leads it into all truth. The system of logic is a realm of shadows, freed from all materiality. The study of this science, the tarrying and labor in the shadow realm, is the essential culture and discipline of consciousness. It is an exercise far removed from the aims and intuitions of the senses, from feeling, from the world of mere opinion. Regarded negatively, this exercise consists in the avoidance of capricious and arbitrary judgments. But its chief service is to give independency of thought. Thought becomes at home in the abstract, and in the progress of pure concepts. It gains unexpected power to deal with the manifold knowledges and sciences. It strips off the external. It grasps the essential. Thus the empty forms of logic become filled with content. Logic becomes a universal, no longer standing as a particular beside other particulars, but underlying them. It is their essence, their absolute truth.¹

¹III, 45.

47. *The requisites for philosophic study*

Deep earnestness of mind is the true ground of philosophy. Philosophy is the opponent of merely temporal interests and idle opinions.¹

The courage of truth, faith in the might of spirit, is the first requisite for philosophic study.²

48. *On the teaching of introductory philosophy in the gymnasium—A letter of Oct., 1812, to Niethammer*³

You have asked me to write what I thought about the teaching of philosophy in the gymnasium. Some time ago I made a first draft of my thoughts; but have not since found the time to work them over properly. So, not to delay too long the sending of something according to your wish, I send the draft about as it stood. As the paper has no other than a private purpose, it may fulfil this as it is. The abruptness of thought, and still more the scattered bits of polemic—these be good enough to attribute to the unfinished form. The polemics, too, you must take as without any particular aim, the unsuppressed flaring up of zeal in the presence of counter views.

I am not yet settled in my own mind regarding the whole matter. It may be that no special philosophical instruction is needed in the gymnasium; that the study of the ancients may be better adapted for the gymnasial youth, and the content of such study the best introduction to philosophy. But how shall I, a professor of preparatory philosophy, take up arms against my place and the thing I teach, casting away my own bread and butter? As a teacher of philosophy and as rector, I had better argue in favor of philosophy being taught, else the professors of that subject in the gymnasia might be declared superfluous and sent elsewhere. Still, I rather incline the other way. . . .

¹ VI, xxxvii.

² VI, xl.

³ XVII, 333-348.

But to the task in hand. According to the official program, the teaching of introductory philosophy in the gymnasium presents two sides:

I. The subjects taught. II. The method.

I. SUBJECTS TAUGHT

As regards the subjects and their assignment to the three classes, the program requires:

1. For the lower class: the elements of religion, law, and ethics. Also a beginning in speculative thought may be made with logic.

2. For the intermediate class: (a) cosmology and natural theology, in connection with the Kantian *Critiques*; (b) psychology.

3. For the upper class: the philosophical encyclopedia.

Since in the lower class it was not easy to connect the instruction in religion, law and ethics with logic, I have thus far had but the first three in the lower class, reserving the logic for the intermediate class. Here it was given with psychology. Then, in the upper class, came the prescribed encyclopedia.

Were I to give my general judgment upon the program as a whole, as regards the thing itself and my own experience therewith, I could say that I have found it to answer its purpose very well.

To treat the matter in detail. 1. The program prescribes, as the first subjects, religion, law and ethics; and the presupposition is that the beginning is to be made with religion. Since, however, there is no compendium of instruction, it rests with the teacher to treat the order and connection of these subjects in accord with his own views. For my part, I know no other way than to begin with law, or rights, as the simplest abstract consequence of freedom, to go thence to morals, and, finally, to religion as the highest step.

If it is asked: Are these subjects fitted to be the first introduction to philosophy? I can only say, Yes. The concepts met with in these subjects are simple, and have at the same time a definiteness suited to the age of this class. The subject matter, too, has support [is apperceptionally welcome, we might say, nowadays] in the natural feeling of the pupils—it has a reality for their inner lives, for it constitutes the side of inner reality itself. I therefore, for the lower class, much prefer these subjects to logic, because the logic has but abstract content, far removed from that immediate reality of the inner life—its content is theoretical. Freedom, law, property, and the like, are practical matters with which we are in daily contact, and, besides this immediate relationship to us, they have, so to speak, a sanctioned existence and real significance. But the logical determinations of general and particular, etc., are for the mind which is not yet at home in the thought world, only shadows of the real; to which real it must ever recur before it is enabled to deal with and grasp independently the logical concepts. The common demand made upon introductory philosophy is that a beginning should be made with the actual, and from that point the consciousness should be led on to what is higher—to thought. But in the concept of freedom, the actual and immediate are already contained, in a form, however, which is, at the same time, thought. So that in these subjects a beginning is truly made with what is desired—the true, the spiritual, the real. I have always found in this class a greater interest in these practical questions than in the more theoretical discussions I ventured upon. And I was met with even a greater lack of interest when I began at first—according to the direction of the program—with logic. After that I did not repeat the experiment.

2. The next stage for the learner is the theoretic-spiritual—the logical, metaphysical, psychological. Comparing logic

and psychology with each other, we may say on the whole, that logic is the easier because it has simpler abstract determination for its content. Psychology, on the other hand, deals with a complex concrete—consciousness itself being its object. (But psychology may be too easy and trivial if it be taken up as merely empirical psychology, after the manner of Kampe's Psychology for children. The style of Carus unfits his writings for school use. So far as I know them, they are tedious, unedifying, lifeless, spiritless.)

I divide the teaching of psychology into two parts: (a) of phenomenal mind or spirit; (b) of spirit, as it is in and for itself. In the first, I treat of consciousness as set forth in my *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, under the three phases of (1) consciousness, (2) self-consciousness, (3) reason. In the second, are dealt with feeling, intuition, conception, imagination, etc. . . . Since logic is prescribed as the second science for the middle class, it would seem that with this the subject of metaphysics was covered. This, we may say here, is a subject with which people nowadays are apt to be puzzled. Under it, in the program of study, there are prescribed the Kantian exposition of the antinomial cosmology and the dialectic-natural theology. As a matter of fact, this is to prescribe not so much metaphysics itself, as its dialectic; and this part comes within the province of logic.

As I look at it, logic includes metaphysics. Here I may cite Kant as my forerunner and authority. His critique reduces metaphysics to a study of the understanding and of the reason. Logic, in the Kantian sense, can be so taken, that besides the usual content of the so-called general logic, there may be connected with it and presupposed the logic called by him transcendental—that logic, namely, which treats of the categories, of the concepts of reflection, and of the reason—analytic and dialectic. These objective forms of thought constitute an independent content, the part of the

Aristotelian *Organon de categoriis*, or what used to make up Ontology. They are, moreover, independent of a metaphysical system. They are as much present in transcendental idealism as in dogmatism: the latter calls them determinations of entities; the former, determinations of the understanding. My objective *Logic* will, as I hope, serve to disentangle the science, and to present it in its true form. In the meantime the Kantian discriminations will do, as giving the essential.

As regards the Kantian antinomies, their dialectic side will be mentioned later. Their remaining content is partly logical, partly the world in space and time—matter. It is with this latter part that logic includes cosmology. But, in fact, that wider content, namely, the world, matter, and the like, is useless luggage—a worthless haze of conception. When the Kantian critique touches natural theology the critique may be used, as I have used it, in the teaching of religion. The material it offers is not out of place in the three or four years course of study. It has interest, partly in that it gives a knowledge of the famous proof for the existence of God, partly in that it gives the equally famous criticism of Kant on that proof, and partly as an occasion for criticising this criticism.

3. The encyclopedia is to embrace the general content of philosophy, namely the fundamental concepts and principles of its particular sciences. Of these I make three main divisions: (a) logic; (b) the philosophy of nature; (c) the philosophy of mind or spirit. All the other sciences, though not styled philosophical, are, as regards their principles, to be included in this encyclopedia. Though at first sight it might seem well to give in the gymnasium such a sketch of the elements of the sciences, a deeper view would perhaps regard such a sketch as unnecessary, because two, at least, of the three divisions cursorily treated in the encyclopedia, have

before had fuller treatment. Logic, the first science of the encyclopedia, is taken up in the middle class. That we have spoken of. So also the third division, the philosophy of mind, has been dealt with, (1) in the psychology, (2) in the study of law, duty and religion. (Even psychology as such—which falls into the two parts of (1) the theoretical, and of (2) the practical spirit, or of the intelligence, and of the will—may largely forego the treatment of the second part, since the truth of that part has already been brought out in the teaching of law, ethics and religion. For the bare psychological side of this practical teaching, namely the side treating of feeling, desire, instinct, affection, etc., is only formal. What concerns their true content—*e. g.*, the desire for property or for knowledge, the affection of parents for children, and the like—is treated of in the teaching of right or of duty as necessary relationships—as duty to acquire competence, limited by principles of equity; as duty to culture one's self; as duties of parents and children, and the like.)

To the third division of the encyclopedia belongs also the teaching of religion. But this has been specially prescribed for an earlier course. Accordingly all that remains is the second division of the encyclopedia, namely the philosophy of nature. But (1) the study of nature (*Naturbetrachtung*) has yet but little charm for youth. Interest in nature is felt to be—and not wrongly—as a sort of theoretic idleness, as compared with interest in human and spiritual deeds and forms. (2) The study of nature is more difficult; for the mind in grasping nature has to transform what is opposed to the concept, into the concept—*das Gegenteil des Begriffes in den Begriff zu verwandeln*—a task of which only trained thought is capable. (3) The philosophy of nature, as speculative physics, presupposes acquaintance with natural phenomena, with empirical physics—an acquaintance which here is lacking.

In the fourth year of the life of the gymnasium, I had pupils who had studied the three courses of philosophy in the lower and middle classes. These, I saw, were already acquainted with the circle of philosophical sciences. I accordingly dispensed with the greater part of the encyclopedia, spending most of the time on the nature philosophy. On the other hand, I felt that it would be well, could one side of the philosophy of mind, namely, that relating to the beautiful, be given more attention. *Æsthetics* should be included in the circle of the sciences. It would seem particularly fitted to be a gymnasial study. Instruction in this might be given in the upper class by the professor of classical literature. But he already has enough to do with the classical literature; nor should the hours devoted to that subject be lessened. It would be most beneficial were the gymnasiasts to gain, besides a better notion of meter, also clearer conceptions of the nature of the epic, the tragedy, the comedy, etc. Teaching in *æsthetics* should give the latest and best views regarding the nature and purpose of art. This should not be an empty talk about art; but should, as was said, introduce the various forms of poetry, ancient and modern modes, characteristics of the greatest poets of different times and nations—all to be illustrated by examples from the works dealt with. This would be both a pleasant and an instructive course of study. It contains matter most suited to the gymnasium. It is a real lack that this science is not made a subject for teaching by any gymnasial program.

In this way, all the subjects of the encyclopedia, save nature philosophy, would have special courses in the gymnasium. There would be wanting perhaps a philosophical view of history. But this may be partly dispensed with, and in part may be treated in connection with the teaching of religion, with that part especially which discusses Provi-

dence. There is oft occasion, too, in the special courses, for mentioning the general divisions of the whole field of philosophy—pure thought, nature, and spirit.

II. METHOD

A. It is common to distinguish a philosophical system with its content of the special sciences from philosophizing itself. According to the modern wish, especially that of pedagogy, a pupil is to be educated not so much in the content of philosophy, as in the power to philosophize without content. That is about as much as to say, one must travel and keep traveling without learning to know cities, rivers, countries, peoples, etc.

But, first, when one learns to know a city, and then comes to a river and to other cities, he is learning at the same time how to travel—not only is *learning* it, but is actually traveling. And it may be that the only end of traveling is just this learning to know these towns, streams, etc.—the content.

Secondly, philosophy contains the highest thoughts of reason concerning things most essential; it contains what is general and true about them. It is of great importance to be acquainted with this content, and to get these thoughts in the head. The dreary, merely formal activity, the perennial empty feeling and beating the air, unsystematic reasoning or speculating—these result in empty and thoughtless minds that effect nothing. Law, ethics, religion, embrace most important content. Logic, too, is a science rich in content. Objective logic (Kant: transcendental) contains the basic conceptions of being, existence, force, substance, cause, etc.; the other, formal logic, concepts, judgments, syllogisms, etc., conceptions as fundamental as those of the former. Psychology deals with feeling, intuition, etc. The philosophical encyclopedia, finally, embraces the entire circle. The Wolfian sciences, logic, ontology, cosmology, etc., natural rights,

morals, etc., have more or less disappeared. But philosophy is none the less a systematic complex of sciences full of content. Moreover, the knowledge of the absolute Absolute is possible only through a knowledge of the totality of these sciences. This knowledge is of a system of which the various sciences form stages or departments, each science having as its aim the knowledge of its subject matter in its absolute truth. Shyness of system would demand a statue of a god, but would stipulate that it have no form. Unsystematic philosophizing is but hap-hazard and fragmentary thinking.

Thirdly. The act of becoming acquainted with a philosophy rich in content, is nothing else but learning that philosophy. Philosophy must be taught and learned just as any other science. The unfortunate haste to educate to independent thought and original productivity has hid this truth in shadows. As if when I were thinking about substance, cause, or the like, I myself were not thinking; as if these determinations were not being produced by myself in thought, but were as stones thrown in; as if, once more, while seeking their truth, the proofs of their synthetic relations or of their dialectic process, I myself had not this insight, were not myself convinced of these truths. When I know the Pythagorean proposition and its proof, is it not myself who know the proposition and its proof? In so far as in and by itself philosophic study is self-active, so far is it study—the learning of an already formulated, developed science. This is a treasure of acquired, enriched and transformed content. This inheritance that has come to us must be won by the individual; that is, it must be learned. The teacher possesses it. He thinks it before the pupil. The pupil thinks it over after him. The philosophical sciences contain the universally true thought of their respective subject matters. They are the result of the work of the thinking genius of all time. These true thoughts are incomparably beyond what an un-

informed youth can bring out of his thinking. The *original* thoughts of youth concerning the most important matters are in part quite poor and empty, and the much larger portion of the remainder are mere opinions or illusions which are partial, biased, and vague. Through study, truth comes to take the place of these scant opinions. Not until the mind is filled with thought has it the power to make knowledge advance, and itself gain a true possession therein. The school is not concerned with the advancement as such. Its study of philosophy is essentially to be directed to this end: that thereby something be learned, that vagueness and uncertainty be banished, that empty minds be filled with thought and with content, and that the natural, unrationalized peculiarity of thought—namely, whimsicality, caprice, self-will, opinionativeness—give place to wisdom.

B. The content of philosophy has in its method and soul three aspects. It is (1) abstract, (2) dialectic, (3) speculative. It is abstract in so far as it is chiefly concerned with the elements of thought. When purely abstract, as opposed to the dialectic and speculative, it is the so-called rational (*Verständige*) form which treats of the various determinations as fixed. The dialectic is the shifting and transformation of these fixed determinations—the work of the negating reason. The speculative form is the work of the positive, affirmatory reason. It is the spiritual, the truly philosophical.

As regards the teaching of philosophy in the gymnasium, the abstract form claims first attention. The pupil must learn to do without his eyes and ears. He must be withdrawn from concrete ideas and be led into the inner night of the soul. He must take his stand here and learn to distinguish and grasp abstract determinations.

Further, one learns to think abstractly through abstract thinking. A teacher may begin from the sensible and concrete and lead from these by analysis to the abstract, and so

—as it appears—take the natural way, from the easier to the more difficult. Or, he may begin with the abstract. He may take the abstract in and by itself, may teach it and make it plain. Comparing both ways, we may say, first, the former is indeed more natural, but it is not the scientific way. Although, for instance, in cutting a disk from a piece of wood, it may be more natural to cut away the corners, until gradually the piece appears rounded, the geometer does not so; he makes at once with a compass or with free hand an exact abstract circle. It is a just method, then,—inasmuch as the pure, the higher, the true, is *natura prius*—to begin with that in science. Secondly, it is wrong to consider as the easier the way which starts from the concrete sensible to attain to thought. On the contrary, it is the more difficult; as it is easier to pronounce and read the elements of speech, the single letters, than whole words. Since the abstract is the simpler, it is the easier to grasp. The concrete, palpable addendum is in the end to be cut away. It is unnecessary then to start with it, since it must be cast off; and it distracts the attention. The abstract as such is comprehensible enough. True understanding beyond this can only come through philosophy. The aim is to get thought of the universe into the head. But thought in general is abstract. Formal, contentless ratiocination is, it is true, also abstract enough. But it has been assumed that we have content, and the right content. Empty formalism, contentless abstraction, is best displaced by what has been argued for above, namely by the teaching of a definite content.

Holding, now, by a merely abstract form of philosophical content, we have what may be called a rational philosophy. And since the gymnasium has to provide an introduction to, and material for, philosophic thought, it would seem that this rational content, this system of abstract, contentful conceptions—giving as it does both introduction and material—

should constitute the main part of philosophical instruction in the gymnasium. This would make up the first stage.

The second stage as regards form is the dialectic. This is both more difficult than the abstract, and to the youth eager for something more tangible, less interesting. The program prescribes the Kantian antinomies, with a reference to cosmology. The antinomies contain what is deeply fundamental in the nature of the reason; but these foundations lie too hidden, their truth is covered up, they are, so to speak, too unthinkable. And, besides, they are a very bad dialectic; they are nothing but bald antitheses. I have, I think, shown the truth of this criticism in my *Logic*. Infinitely better is the dialectic of the old Eleatics even in the examples of it that have been preserved. In a systematic whole each new concept properly arises through the dialectic of the preceding. The teacher familiar with this mode of philosophizing should have the liberty to attempt the dialectic at every step he can, and where he cannot, to proceed to the next concept without it.

The third stage is the truly speculative, that is, the knowledge of unity in things opposed; or, the insight that things antithetical imply a higher unity—which is their truth. This speculative thought belongs essentially to philosophy. Naturally it is the most difficult; it is the truth. This appears in two stages: (1) In the common conceptions, apprehensions, imaginations of mind and heart; for instance, when one speaks of the universal, self-moving, and endlessly varied life of nature—of pantheism and the like—when one speaks of the eternal love of God, who creates in order to love, in order to behold himself in his eternal Son. . . . Right, self-consciousness, the practical, moral, in general, already contain in and by themselves the principles or beginnings thereof. And, indeed, no word other than speculative can be spoken of the spirit or of the spiritual. For

the spiritual is the unity of another with itself; it is the unity of reciprocal relationships. Otherwise one speaks, in using the words soul, spirit, God, only of stocks and stones. . . . But even here the thought is more or less pictorial or representative.

There is the second stage, of the notion, or Idea. And this is the speculative thought resulting from the dialectic. This alone is philosophy in the form of universal and necessary idea. This can rarely be touched upon in gymnasial instruction; it is grasped by but few, and it is hard to tell whether even they have it or not. To learn to think speculatively, which is stated by the program as the object of the teaching of introductory philosophy, accordingly is to be looked upon as the necessary goal. The introduction thereto is abstract thinking, then dialectic, and further the acquisition of conceptions of speculative content. Such, then, should be the preparatory work in philosophy for the gymnasium.

49. *Philosophical Propædæutic*

[The *Philosophical Propædæutic* of Hegel forms the 18th volume (205 pages) of his works. It is the outline of his philosophical courses given in the gymnasium in Nürnberg. It was first published by Rosenkranz in 1840. Dr. Harris has translated almost all of the *Propædæutic*.¹ Below are the writer's translations of passages bearing most directly upon education, and a statement of the general scope of the work.]

FIRST COURSE

LOWER CLASS

LAW, DUTY, RELIGION

Introduction

§ 1.² The subject of this instruction is the human will, from

¹ *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, vols. III. and IV.

² These paragraph numbers correspond to the original.

the standpoint of the relation of the particular will to the general will. . . .

§ 2. Consciousness in general is the reference of an object to the ego. . . . Our knowledge deals with objects which are known by sense perception, and also with objects which have their ground in the spirit itself. The former constitute the sensible world; the latter, the intelligible. The concepts of law, of ethics, and of religion belong to the latter.

§ 5. The inner determinations of the practical consciousness are either those of instinct or impulse, or those of will, properly speaking. The instinct, or impulse, is a natural self-determination, having its origin in limited feelings and having a limited object or aim beyond which it does not go. It is the unfree, immediately determined, lower power of desire, impelled by which man acts as a nature-creature. By reflection he transcends impulse and its limits. He thinks not alone of the impulse and its immediate realization, but compares it with other impulses and the ends of his being; and then after reflection decides whether to follow his impulse, or to restrain it and give it up.

§ 7. The abstract freedom of the will consists in that non-determinateness or identity of the ego with itself, in which there is determination only in so far as the will makes the determination, and is one with it; and at the same time is so self-possessed that it can withdraw from that determination. There can indeed be brought to bear upon the will from without all sorts of enticements, motives, rules; but when a man follows these, he does so only as his will makes the motives its own and resolves to act upon them.

§ 8. Responsibility.

§ 9. The act or deed.

§ 10. The free will as free is not limited by the determinations and particularities by which one individual is distinguished from another; but it is a general, a universal will;

and the individual becomes through this pure will a universal being.

Explanation and illustration of the introduction.

§ 1. This defines: Abstract, Concrete; Sense-perception, Experience; the Probable, the Credible.

§ 2. . . . Feeling, generally, is shifting and changeable. It has one aspect now, another a moment hence. Feeling in general is something subjective. The content of feeling is mine as a particular individual. When I say: I feel something to be so; I thereby state what exists for me. I do not affirm what is for others. The objective, on the other hand, is the universally true. It is rational.

§ 3-13. Imagination and thought. Abstraction. The forms of thought. These the spirit projects from itself; they nevertheless are also determinations of the existent. . . . Action, a uniting of the inner and the outer. Instinctive actions—Actions after reflection.

§ 14. Freedom of the will is the general type of freedom, and all other kinds of freedom are merely participants of this. When one says: freedom of the will, it is not meant that outside of the will there is still some power, property, force, that likewise is free. Just as, when one speaks of the omnipotence of God, it is not meant that there are other beings who are omnipotent.

§ 15. We often say: Our will is determined by these motives, circumstances, inducements. This would seem to imply that in such determination we are passive. But in reality we are then not merely passive; we are essentially active, in that our will accepts these circumstances as motives. The causal relationship is not illustrated here. The circumstances are not causes working upon my will and making it mere resulting effect. In such a relationship what lies in the cause would have necessary outcome. But by

reflection I can transcend this determination imposed by the circumstance. To the extent that a man fancies himself under the lead of circumstances, allurements, etc., he will forego action, degrading himself to an unfree or mere nature-existence; although even here his action will always be his own, not that of another, nor of anything without. The circumstances or inducements have only so much power over a man as he himself allows them.

. . .

§ 18. . . . Freedom consists in the determination of the will by itself. The will is not determined as the order of nature is determined. The will in itself is a universal will. The particularity or individuality of men is no obstruction to the universality of the will, but is subordinate to it. An action that is right or moral or admirable, is indeed done by an individual; but all applaud it. Therein they recognize themselves, or their own will. It is the same with works of art. People who are unable to do the art work, nevertheless see their own nature expressed by it. ✓

§ 20. The absolutely free will is distinguished from the relatively free, from the arbitrary, in that the absolute has but itself for object, while the relative is fixed on something limited. The relative will, *e. g.*, desire, cares for nothing but its object. The absolute will is distinguished, too, from self-will. This latter has something in common with the absolute will, since it wants not so much the object, as to have its own way, as will—to have its will respected. There is a difference, however. The self-willed man sticks to his will merely because it is his will, without any rational ground; that is, without his will having a universal reference.

. . .

§ 21. . . . The aim of education is to make man an independent being; that is, a being whose will is free. To this end many checks are put upon the desires of children. They must

learn obedience, so that their self-will and their dependence upon the impulses and desires of sense be done away with, and thus their will made free.

§ 22-25. Definition and illustrations of Law, Morality, Duty.

PART I

CH. I. RIGHTS. LAW

§ 2. Rights originate in a community wherein individuals mutually respect and treat one another as free beings. . . .

§ 4. In so far as the freedom of the individual is realized is he a person.

§ 5-21. Property. Slavery. Vengeance, Punishment, etc.

CH. II. THE STATE

§ 22. Rights, law—apart from individual caprice—have actualization only in the state.

§ 23. The family.

. . .

§ 24. The merely natural stage of human society is the stage of savagery, force, injustice. Men must be led from this to statehood, because only in the state can right be realized.

§ 26. Law is the abstract expression of the general will in and for itself.

§ 27. Government is the individuality of the general will in and for itself. It is the power which asserts, maintains, executes the law.

§ 28. The legislative, administrative, financial, judicial functions of government. The police. The army.

§ 29. To the state the citizens as individuals are subordinate. But the content and purpose of the state is the realizing of the natural, that is, the absolute rights of the citizens, who as members of the state do not relinquish these rights,

but rather through citizenship alone have hope of enjoying and developing them.

PART II

DUTY. ETHICS

§ 33. Law does not extend to the sentiments. Morality, on the other hand, is essentially connected with the sentiment and disposition. It demands that one act with respect to duty. This is the subjective side.

.

§ 40. Four classes of duty: (1) toward self; (2) to the family; (3) to the state; (4) toward others in general.

I

§ 41. Duty to one's self: (1) physical maintenance; (2) to develop one's individual existence into his universal nature, to educate himself.

§ 42. To theoretic culture belongs—besides a many sided and definite knowledge and general points of view from which to judge of things—the sense for objects in their independency, without a subjective bias.¹

§ 43. Practical culture makes a man reasonable and temperate in the satisfaction of his natural needs and instincts. He must (1) transcend the natural: he must be free. (2) He must give himself to his vocation—the essential thing. (3) In the satisfaction of his natural necessities he not only must not go beyond the necessary, but must be willing to give this up upon call of higher duty.

§§ 44, 45. One's vocation. [For translation of these paragraphs see Selection 39.]

II

§ 51. Marriage is not a merely natural, animal union, nor a

¹ For fuller translation of this paragraph, see Selection 4.

mere civil contract; but a moral union of sentiment in mutual love and confidence.

§ 52. The duty of parents to children is: to care for their maintenance and education. That of children: to obey their parents, until independence is attained, and to honor them their life long. That of brothers and sisters: to act toward one another with consideration and love.

III .

§ 55. In the spirit of a people each citizen has his spiritual substance. It is not alone the maintenance of the individuals which is dependent upon this living whole; but this latter constitutes the general nature or essence of each as an individual. The maintenance of the whole, therefore, is more important than the life of individuals as such; and all citizens should have this conviction.

. . .

§ 57. A sentiment of obedience toward the commands of the government, loyalty to the person of the prince and to the constitution, and the feeling of national honor, are the virtues of the citizen of every well-ordered state.

IV

§§ 59-70. A feeling of the rights of others. Justice. Truthfulness in word and deed. Helpfulness. Friendliness. Prudence. Politeness. True courtesy.

PART III

RELIGION

§ 71. The moral law within is the law of eternal reason. We recognize it as something higher than we, as existing independently, absolutely.

§ 72. This absolute is present in our pure consciousness, and reveals itself to us therein.

§ 73. Knowledge of the absolute is itself an absolute and

non-mediated knowledge, and can have nothing finite as its positive ground, or be proved by anything other than itself.

§ 74. This knowledge must grow definite, and not remain merely inner feeling, or faith in an indeterminate Being in general; but must become cognitive. The cognition of God is not beyond the reason, for this is nothing but the reflection of God, and is essentially the knowledge of the absolute. This cognition is beyond the power not of the reason but of the understanding, which knows but the finite and relative.

§ 75. Religion itself consists in the turning of the feeling and of the thought upon the absolute Being, and in the dwelling with the idea of Him as present. While thus lifted up one forgets his separateness from the Absolute, and all his acts are done with reference to His will.

SECOND COURSE

MIDDLE CLASS

PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, AND LOGIC

PART I

PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, OR THE SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Introduction

§§ 1-9. Object and subject. Realism, idealism. Three stages of consciousness: (1) Consciousness in general; (2) self-consciousness; (3) reason.

I. CONSCIOUSNESS IN GENERAL. §§ 10-21.

Three phases: (a) sensational; (b) perceptual; (c) rational.

(a) In simple sensation the consciousness is immediately aware of an outer object.

(b) Perception has no longer the sensible, in so far as that is merely immediate, for its object, but in so far as at

the same time it is a general. . . . The object of perception, accordingly, is the thing *with its properties*. These are defined partly by reference to other things—they have a general content.

(c) The rational consciousness (*der Verstand*—the understanding) deals with the essential and permanent in phenomena, with their inner truth, with forces of which they are the expression. The understanding formulates law. Here the rational consciousness is one with its object. The inner being of things is the thought or notion of those things.

II. SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS. §§ 22–39.

Self-consciousness has the ego for its object. Its pure formula is, $I = I$, or I am I.

This formula of self-consciousness defines no content. The impulse, trend, of self-consciousness consists in the effort to realize its notion, and in everything presented to it to attain to the consciousness of itself. Accordingly it is active: it tries (1) to do away with the strangeness, the “otherness” of objects, and to comprehend them as part of self; (2) to express itself and so attain objectivity, and existence-for-others—an existence which other people may reckon with. Both these trends are phases of one activity.

In the culture or advance of self-consciousness there are three stages: (1) desire, which feels itself as lacking and as wishing for things without; (2) a relation of superiority or of inferiority, of rule or of servitude, to other things or persons; (3) a general, social self-consciousness which recognizes one's self as being in the self-consciousness of others as their equal or associate. [Cf. the “consciousness of kind” which Professor Giddings makes the essential characteristic of social phenomena.]

III. THE REASON. §§ 40-42.

§ 40. The reason is the highest unity of the consciousness and of the self-consciousness, or of the knowlence of an object and of the knowledge of self. It is assured that its own determinations are as much objective, that they are determinations of existent things, as that they are our own thoughts. It is also the certainty of itself. It fuses the subjective and objective in one and the same thought.

§ 41. Or, what we see through the reason, is a content (1) that is filled not with our mere imagination, but with existences in and for themselves—with objective realities; and (2) that is no strange thing to the I—nothing that is merely given, but that is permeated by the reason, made its own, and even produced by it.

§ 42. The knowledge possessed by reason, accordingly, is not a subjective conviction; but it is truth, since truth consists in the harmony, or rather in the unity, of inner certainty and of being [of existent objectivity].

PART II

LOGIC

§§ 1-6. The sphere of logic. Thought in general. Three classes of thought: (1) the categories; (2) the determinations of reflection; (3) notions, concepts (*die Begriffe*).

I

Being, §§ 7-32

(a) Quality, (b) quantity, (c) mass, measure.

2

Existence or essence, §§ 33-55

1. The determinations of essence in itself. 2. The phenomenon: (a) the thing; (b) the appearance (phenomenon); (c) the relation.

3

Reality, §§ 56-68

(a) Substance; (b) cause; (c) inter-relation, reciprocity of cause and effect.

Then follows a discussion of the Kantian antinomies, §§ 69-87.

PART III

THE NOTION (*Der Begriff*)

1. The notion. 2. The end, or teleological notion. 3. The Idea.

THIRD COURSE

UPPER CLASS.

I DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION, AS SUBJECTIVE LOGIC. II PHILOSOPHICAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA

I

A. *Doctrine of the Notion (Comprehension)*

1. The notion. 2. Judgment (qualitative, quantitative, modal, etc.). 3. Syllogism (Conclusion).

B. *The realization of the notion*

1. Subjective purpose. 2. The passing over into objectivity. 3. The realized purpose.

C. *Doctrine of Ideas*

1. Idea of life. 2. Idea of knowledge, and of good.

II

PHILOSOPHICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA.

1. Logic. 2. Science of nature. 3. Science of spirit.

1. *Logic.*

This is a short restatement of course in preceding class.

2. *Science of Nature*

- (a) Mathematics.
- (b) Physics, organic and inorganic.

3. *Science of Spirit*

- (a) Psychology: feeling, perception, memory, imagination, thinking, understanding, judgment, reason.
- (b) The practical spirit: rights, morality, the state.
- (c) The spirit in its pure expression: art, religion, science. Science is the comprehensive knowledge of the absolute spirit. Since it is grasped notionally, there is in knowledge nothing foreign to reason. This knowledge has content identical with the knowledge itself. It is the notion which has itself for content and is self-comprehensive.

50. *Ethics and philosophy*

Morality, in principle, is the freeing of the soul from the alien and material, its rising to the plane on which it is determined by pure reason. A like purification of the soul is the prerequisite for philosophy. The moral and intellectual aspects of all things are in so far one and the same. Ethics and philosophy alike depend upon the pure, and so universal, reason. The truly moral outlook upon nature is, accordingly, the truly intellectual, and vice versa. The moral regard which excludes the intellectual, is no longer moral. Both are one in principle, neither is before the other, although it may seem so, empirically. Regarded from our becoming in time, the moral [practical, action that is willed] is the first. It is through the moral that we enter into the intellectual world, and recognize ourselves therein.¹ Innate knowledge is only a crystallization of the infinite and universal in the particularity of our nature. The moral imperative comes not from particularity; it proceeds from the pure

¹[According to the principle: Do, and ye shall know.]

universal, the essential, the infinite. But this difference between the moral and the intellectual exists only in temporal knowing and doing. True knowledge turns away from the mere finite reflection of the infinite, to the being in itself, to first knowledge. And in this aspect its particulars are under the sway of the universal; that is, there is present moral purity of soul.

On the other hand, true, not merely negative, morality implies that the soul is at home in the world of ideas, and is master of it. Morality apart from the intellect must needs be empty, for it is from the intellect that it gains fit material for its activity.

Accordingly he who has not this first knowledge cannot attain to moral perfection. The pure, the universal, is for him something external. He is on the plane of the non-pure, and a prisoner of the particular and empirical. "Cleansing the soul," says Plato, "consists in separating it as completely as possible from the body, and in accustoming it to withdraw within itself, from every point of contact with the body, and so to dwell as much as may be with itself. . . . Death is such a separation of the soul from the body. The true philosopher more than any other strives for this liberation." Ethics and philosophy unite in this effort for purification. But the way to it is not by the mere negative concept of the finite, namely that it is a limitation of the soul. There is need of a positive concept, and of an adequate intuition of being in itself. For he who knows that it is only in appearance that the natural is separated from the divine—that it is only in imperfect cognition that the body is distinct from the soul, while in reality it is one with her—will most of all practice himself in dying that death, praised by Socrates, which is the entrance to eternal freedom and true life.

The true triumph and final freeing of the soul lies alone in absolute idealism, in the absolute death of the real as such.

Those who deny the ethical principle of philosophy know neither the aims nor the progress of the soul, by which it is purified. The beginning of the progress is a yearning; for the immortal soul in entering the body feels it to be, as it were, the grave of its perfection. Aware of having lost the chief good, it hastens, like Ceres, to kindle its torch at the flaming mount, to explore depths and heights—in vain, until wearied out it comes to Eleusis.¹ This is the second stage. But here the all-seeing sun reveals Hades to be only the threshold to all good. The soul that accepts this revelation gains the deepest knowledge. It then seeks rest in naught but the eternal Father.²

¹ ["Vérité ou chimère, le rêve de l'infini nous attirera toujours, et, comme ce héros d'un conte celtique qui, ayant vu en songe une beauté ravissante, court le monde toute sa vie pour la trouver, l'homme qui, un moment s'est assis pour réfléchir sur sa destinée porte au cœur une flèche qu'il ne s'arrache plus."—Renan, *Discours et Conférences*, p. 40.

Novalis: "Philosophy is, properly speaking, homesickness, a desire to be everywhere at home."]

² I, 317. [This passage is from one of Hegel's earliest writings. Its mysticism may be noted. But mysticism is the indefinite, emotional recognition of great facts. In this passage the mystical expression is artistic, in that it may suggest to each reader the highest truth of which he himself is able to conceive. Hegel opens windows for soul-flight. And if, issuing thence, we find but an olive leaf in a new world, happy we; and grateful should we be to Hegel.]



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